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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is about (a) money supply being determined by banking behaviour, 
or by the behaviour of central banks and (b) the influence of money supply on bank 
stock returns. That money is endogenously determined is a proposition of post-
Keynesian (PK) economists suggesting that money supply is determined by the 
behaviour of commercial banks as banks adjust money creation in response to credit 
demands by the public. This theory challenges the monetarist view of exogenous 
money supply, where the central bank is said to control money supply. This thesis 
examines how, under the credit-creation behaviour of banks, the money supply 
affects bank stock returns in a multi-equation model. 
 
The theory of endogenous money is founded on the idea that loans made by 
banks cause deposits, and that deposits in banks, as a component of money supply, 
thus create more money supply. In the process, due to the changes in loans and 
deposits experienced by banks, the stock returns of banks may also be affected, since 
banks’ profit margins are affected by the changes in credits. Whether endogeneity is 
in fact the way the money supply behaves has not yet been widely tested and there is 
also not yet any published study on the behaviour of aggregate bank stock prices in 
relation to money supply changes. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to provide new 
findings on this unexplored relationship between endogenous money supply and 
bank stock returns by testing this proposition across several key economies over a 
long period, taking into account the actual monetary policy regimes in place in these 
economies. 
 
The empirical evidence in this thesis is obtained by using quarterly data from 
1973 to 2007 for the G-7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). As the data series covering the 
sample is over a long period, important monetary-policy regime changes – especially 
in Canada, the UK and the US – are considered and used in the empirical tests of the 
underlying hypotheses. The empirical tests conducted begin with unit root and 
Johansen cointegration tests to test for stationarity of the variables and whether the 
variables are cointegrated, followed by vector error-correction models (VECM) and 
   x 
Granger causality tests to test whether there is one-way or bidirectional causality in 
the long run and in the short run. These tests are used to determine (1) whether 
money is endogenous or exogenous, (2) if money is endogenous, which of the three 
views of PK theory is supported in this study, and (3) whether there exists a 
relationship between money supply and bank stock returns. Trivariate VAR tests 
developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) are used to test whether deposits are an 
important variable in the causality between bank loans and money supply. 
 
Later, a simultaneous equation model is developed to explore the possible 
simultaneous relationship between aggregate bank stock returns and money supply, 
and money supply and bank loans. This model is tested using Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) panel data estimation as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Prior to the model estimation, panel unit root tests are applied following procedures 
provided in Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) to test for stationarity in the 
variables; Pedroni (1997) panel cointegration is performed to establish whether the 
variables are cointegrated. VECM and Granger causality tests are also employed to 
determine whether there is causality between the variables in the equations. 
 
The results of this thesis provide several important new and useful leads.  
Firstly, bank loans are found to cause money supply; bidirectional causality exists 
between bank loans and money supply, suggesting that money is endogenous (except 
for two cases). Secondly, for the countries where money is found to be endogenous, 
there is mixed evidence as to which of the three views are supported by the test 
results – accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference. Mainly the 
structuralist and liquidity preference views were supported for Canada (1976:3 to 
1990:4), France, Germany, Japan, the UK (1992:4 to 2006:2), and the US.  Thirdly, 
the results indicate that there is a difference between long-term and short-term 
causality – for example, where there is support for structuralist or liquidity 
preference in the long run, evidence is in support of the accommodationist view in 
the short run, as in the cases of Japan, Canada (1976:3 to 1990:4) and the US (1987:1 
to 2007:1). 
  
Fourthly, as indicated by the robust results of the trivariate VAR tests, bank 
deposits are found to be a significant variable in all samples except those of Canada 
   xi 
(1991:1 to 2007:1) and Italy. Fifthly, it is found that with the exception of US (over 
1975:3 to 1986:4), there is a relationship between money supply and bank stock 
returns. The US has the most competitive banking system. Finally, the findings using 
the panel data estimation show that there is a positive relationship from money 
supply growth to growth of bank stock returns, but negative from the growth of bank 
stock returns to money supply growth. This may be explained through the central 
bank changing interest rates with the aim of negating inflation. This action leads to a 
rise in interest rates and subsequently to reduced money supply.  It was also found, in 
this context, that there is a bidirectional positive relationship between bank loan 
growth and money supply growth, which supports the PK theory of endogenous 
money. Thus, the money-to-bank-stock-returns relation is founded on money being 
endogenous, meaning that bank credit creation is the source of the effect of the 
money supply on bank stock returns. The money supply to bank stock returns were 
tested for robustness using three different tests. All tests provided confirmation of the 
relationship (except for the US). 
 
Apart from the very important empirical evidence that the thesis brings to bear 
on this new PK theory for a group of seven key developed economies, the findings of 
the thesis have important implications as to the key functioning of a banking system. 
Banks are not only transmitters of monetary policy but are also important in the 
development of the growth of money through loan creation to the money supply and 
bank stock price formation. 
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Chapter 1: Money Supply and Bank Stock Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and motivation  
The relationship between money supply and bank stock returns is a little-researched 
topic. Post-Keynesian (PK) theorists assert that money is endogenous and that 
causality runs from bank lending to bank deposits, which suggests a potential money 
supply influence on bank stock returns. The alternative, traditional (classical) view is 
that deposits create loans, and that this forms the basis for money being exogenous. 
The debate on whether money is endogenous or exogenous is still not settled 
(Davidson, 2006). Further, whether money is endogenous or exogenous is ultimately 
an empirical issue. Proponents of the PK theory insist that money supply will 
respond endogenously to any changes in the demand for funds/capital by producing-
units (mostly firms) through the intermediation of banks, given the interest rate, 
which is under the control of the central bank. This debate on the notion of 
endogenous money is still unresolved among mainstream economists, since the few 
studies to date have provided evidence in support of both schools of thought. The 
first issue relevant to this thesis is an investigation of money endogeneity and 
exogeneity, using a lengthy time-series of the latest data available across developed 
economies.   
 
Banks are important in a financial system, indeed in an economy, as, under 
both schools of thought, they are the transmitters of monetary policy changes. For 
example, using bank reserves as the principal channel, banks intermediate with the 
economy the effects of the central bank’s monetary policy changes. Banks possess an 
optimising behaviour in determining money supply, as they respond to changes in the 
portfolio decisions and loan demand of the public – households and firms – given the 
money market conditions set by the central bank (Holtemöller, 2003). This behaviour 
of the public and the resultant commercial bank behaviour make money endogenous, 
according to the originator of this idea (Moore, 1998). Given the central role played 
by the banks as a conduit for the effect of monetary policy on the economy, the 
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second issue of concern to this thesis is the relationship between money supply and 
bank stock returns. This issue has not yet been investigated. 
 
With official short-term interest rates playing the leading role as the 
instrument of monetary policy, the attention paid to money has declined (King, 2002). 
However, some central banks1 use money supply growth rates as an information 
variable by monitoring money supply movements as a robustness check to avoid 
serious monetary policy mistakes. Money growth rates in excess of those needed to 
sustain economic growth at a non-inflationary pace may provide early information on 
any developing financial instability. Thus, there is a motivation for this study to 
investigate the nexus of this behaviour by studying whether the money supply effect 
is endogenous or exogenous and leads to a flow-through effect to bank stock returns, 
if indeed the profitability of a given banking system is dependent on the money 
supply flow-through effect. 
 
Evidence that supports money endogeneity is found in the following studies: 
Arestis (1987), Moore (1989), Foster (1992, 1994), Palley (1994), Howells and 
Hussein (1998), Holtemöller (2003), Vymyatnina (2006) and Cifter and Ozun (2007). 
Studies that have investigated the relationship between macroeconomic variables 
including money supply and stock index returns include Mukherjee and Naka (1995) 
for Japan, and for the US market, Dhakal, Kandil and Sharma (1993), Lee (1994), 
Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), and Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007). These 
studies conclude that there is a long-term relationship between stock returns and 
macroeconomic variables including money supply. The index used in these studies is 
that of the whole stock market and not the banking index. Most banking studies, 
however, appear to be interested in investigating (i) the relationship between risk and 
returns of individual bank stocks (Stiroh, 2006; Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2007; 
and Uzun and Webb, 2007), (ii) the efficiency of banks and its relationship to their 
returns (Beccalli, Casu and Girardone, 2006; Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006; and 
Fiordelisi, 2007) or (iii) the determinants of individual bank stock returns (Goddard, 
Molyneux and Wilson, 2004; Carbó and Rodríguez, 2007; and Barros, Ferreira and 
Williams, 2007). Thus, an investigation of money endogeneity/exogeneity and the 
                                                 
1
 For example, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. 
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money supply effect on bank stock index returns is imperative. This thesis sets out to 
investigate this relationship. 
 
The evolution of the PK theory of endogenous money allows for the 
relationship between money supply and bank stock returns to be investigated from an 
intertemporal perspective. As proposed by the PK theory of money endogeneity, an 
exogenous change in interest rates by the central bank’s action will have an effect on 
the amount of loans made by the banking system or by individual banks and, in turn, 
on deposits. This will ultimately affect the money supply. At the same time, the 
changes to interest rates by the central bank will have an impact on the banks’ loan 
and deposit rates, thus creating a flow-through effect on their stock returns.  
 
This thesis is therefore motivated by two potential financial economics topics 
to add new findings to the literature. Seven of the G-8 countries were chosen for this 
study. It would be interesting to use data from all G-8 countries for the purpose of 
this analysis; however, data on economic time-series prior to 1992 in Russia and 
financial statistics on banks in Russia are not available.  Hence, this study will focus 
on the remaining seven countries, namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The G-7 data set spans a long 
period, 1973-2007. Part of the tests is done with quarterly data, consistent with the 
prior practices of PK theorists. 
 
1.2 Objectives and contribution of the thesis 
The main aim of this thesis is to present evidence on the relationship between money 
supply and bank stock returns using aggregate and panel data2 respectively, while 
taking into account the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money in the model. 
Two main issues – endogenous money and the link between endogenous money and 
bank stock returns, arising from the discussion in the previous section – are the 
themes of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
2
 Aggregate data include data that involves the banking industry in each country, whereas panel data 
include combined time-series data from 1973 to 2007 and stacked cross-section data from the seven 
countries. 
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There is a continuing debate on the monetary phenomenon, between the monetarists 
and PK theorists respectively, as to whether money supply is exogenous or 
endogenous. The controversies are mainly related to whether money supply causes 
loans, as monetarist theory assumes, or whether loans cause money supply (through 
deposits and reserves), as per the PK theory of endogenous money. Howells and 
Hussein (1998) and Caporale and Howells (2001),3 using quarterly data from 1957 to 
1993, 4  found support for endogenous money in the G-7 countries. As this is a 
debatable issue, this thesis will examine whether money supply is exogenous (that is, 
money supply causes loans) or endogenous (loans cause money supply) in each of 
the seven countries by using vector error-correction modelling methodology. Any 
findings on this issue are likely to add to the body of literature by expanding the 
sample period used in the previous studies. Additionally, Howells and Hussein 
(1998) do not account for the fact that there was a change in monetary policy regime 
in Canada, the UK and the US in their sample period. In contrast to the approach 
taken by Howells and Hussein (1998), this thesis will include sample splits for 
Canada, the UK and the US to determine whether there was a major change in the 
nature of money supply between different monetary policy regimes. 
 
 Presenting empirical evidence on emerging economies, Shanmugam, Nair 
and Li (2003), Vymyatnina (2006) and Cifter and Ozun (2007) not only investigate 
the nature of money supply in Malaysia, Russia and Turkey respectively, but also 
take a step further in investigating which of the three views of the money supply – 
accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference – is supported. In the 
developed economies, only Palley (1994) has determined this, for the US. Besides 
adding to the current body of literature on endogenous money, determining which of 
the three views is supported if money is endogenous could provide an understanding 
in the conduct of monetary policy in terms of the central banks being fully or partly 
accommodating to banks’ demand for reserves and the reaction in the banking 
system of the developed nation.  
 
                                                 
3
 Caporale and Howells (2001) used the same sample as Howells and Hussein (1998) but a different 
methodology was employed. 
4
 The actual dates vary between countries. 
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Empirical tests on money endogeneity are commonly used to determine the 
causality between bank loans and money supply. The reason is that deposits are not 
only held in the transactional form, but also in other forms of the broad money 
supply. Post-Keynesian theorists discuss money endogeneity as loans creating 
deposits, with this in turn, creating money supply. Thus, it is possible that deposits 
may be an important variable in the transmission from bank loans to money supply, 
as bank loans acquired are immediately transferred into demand deposits and not 
only into other types of deposits. Determining this trivariate causality beside the 
bivariate one allows a more robust procedure and a better understanding of the 
transmission from one variable to another. 
  
Before a further investigation of the simultaneous effect of money supply and 
bank stock returns can be pursued, an empirical investigation on the long-run 
equilibrium and causality relationship between money supply and bank stock returns 
in each country has to be established. This is imperative as there would be no merit 
in further investigation if the long-run relationship of the two variables is not in 
equilibrium. Previous studies, for example, Mukherjee and Naka (1995) for Japan, 
and Dhakal, Kandil and Sharma (1993), Lee (1994), Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(2002) and Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007) for the US market, have investigated 
the relationship between money supply (among other macroeconomic variables) and 
stock index returns. These studies have found that there is a relationship between 
stock index returns and the money supply. However, these studies were not extended 
to bank index stock returns. In this thesis, unit root tests will also be performed to 
determine the stationarity of the variables with controls for trend and constant.  Later, 
Johansen’s cointegration test will be employed to determine whether there is a long-
run relationship between money supply (whether exogenous or endogenous) and 
bank stock returns. Furthermore, long-run causality tests using vector error-
correction modelling will determine whether the two variables cause one another. 
This will add to the body of literature on macroeconomic variables and stock returns. 
 
As the PK theory of endogenous money has not been addressed in relation to 
bank stock returns, a simultaneous equation model is developed to test the effects of 
money supply on bank stock returns. The money supply effect revolves around three 
items in the balance sheet of a bank: deposits, loans and the flow-through effect on 
   6 
the market value of the equity in the balance sheet. Other changes that may be taking 
place in other balance-sheet items are of no relevance to this relationship. Further, we 
assume that changes in all other aspects of a bank are controlled by focusing only on 
the money supply effects and the flow-through effect to the market value of bank 
stocks. Bank earnings spread associated with the flow-through effect will be included 
in the model: this is predicated by the dividend valuation theory. The model will also 
include other macroeconomic variables that are seen as factors that affect the 
endogenous variables. The development of the model, incorporating possible new 
findings from applying the model using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
panel data methodology proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), will add to the 
banking literature. The assessment of the effects of endogenous money supply on 
banking industry stock returns, taking into account the post-Keynesian theory of 
endogenous money, in this thesis, is a first attempt at exploring this relationship.  
 
Prior to testing the GMM panel data model, a number of econometric tests 
are required to assess whether the variables used are stationary and cointegrated. 
Panel data unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) will 
be employed to test the stationarity of the variables, while the Pedroni (1999, 2004) 
panel cointegration test will be utilised to determine if cointegration exists between 
the variables. Vector error-correction modelling will also be used to test for the 
existence of causality between the variables. These procedures will contribute a new 
methodology for investigating this issue and thus add to the existing literature.  
 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate the following research questions: 
1. Is the money supply endogenous or exogenous in each of the G-7 countries? 
2. If the money supply is endogenous, which of the three views 
(accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) does it support? 
2a. Is the support for the views in (2) above different in the short-term than in the 
long-term? 
3. Following the PK theory where loans cause deposits and this in turn causes 
the money supply, is the PK theory valid for the sample of G-7 countries 
under study in this thesis?  
4. Is there causality between the money supply and aggregate bank stock 
returns? 
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5. Does a simultaneous relationship exist between bank loans, the money supply 
and aggregate bank stock returns such that loans create deposits (in the form 
of money supply) whilst at the same time loans and deposits affect the value 
of bank stocks? 
 
1.3 Organisation of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an 
introduction to the research issues in the context of the theories, while also 
presenting a very brief review of the literature on (a) the money supply debate and 
(b) bank stock returns and money supply. The evidence on the relationship between 
money supply and stock returns is also elaborated within Chapter 2. Following this, 
an overview of the history of the financial system and monetary policy regimes in 
each country is provided in Chapter 3. Based on the findings in the literature review, 
the aim of Chapter 4 is to describe an appropriate research design and test 
methodology, keeping in view the need for robust test processes required to link 
bank stock returns to the money supply. A description of the data used in this thesis 
is also provided in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the discussion of the results of the empirical tests. It 
presents summary results obtained from cointegration and vector error-correction 
models to determine whether money supply is exogenous or endogenous. Prior to 
doing those two tests, the stationarity property of the variables is examined and the 
results presented. Further results by controlling for regime changes are also discussed 
in this chapter. This chapter also includes results of the three views of money 
endogeneity; results from the trivariate causality test between bank loans, deposits 
and money supply; and results attained from the cointegration and vector error-
correction models, to ascertain whether there is a relationship between money supply 
and bank stock returns. Chapter 5 also contains the detailed results on the model 
developed in Chapter 4, which tests the effects of the money supply on the banking 
stock index returns. Panel unit root tests are performed and the results analysed to 
examine whether the variables are stationary. A description of the panel 
cointegration tests and the results is also included in this chapter. Vector error-
correction models determine if the variables in the simultaneous equation model 
   8 
developed in Chapter 4 cause the endogenous variables. Results of the robustness 
tests are also included in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings and by 
linking the findings. The chapter also identifies the limitations of this research and 
the scope and avenues for future research.  
   9 
Chapter 2: Theory and Evidence on Money Supply and 
Bank Stock Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the theory and empirical evidence on the Post-
Keynesian (PK) debate concerning endogenous money and its predecessor, 
exogenous money. The chapter also includes a discussion of the theory relating to 
stock return behaviour of the banking sector by way of equity valuation theory.  
Section 2.2 explains the theory of exogenous and endogenous money supply. In 
Section 2.3 the reader will find a description of bank behaviour that includes the 
theory on equity valuation. Empirical evidence on the theories is presented in Section 
2.4. Finally, a discussion as to any gaps in the literature is provided in Section 2.5.  
 
2.2 Possible link between money supply and bank stock returns 
There is a debate among mainstream economists on the PK theory of endogenous 
money. Arising from that, almost all textbooks have failed to discuss the PK theory, 
therefore leaving an important impression that money is entirely determined 
exogenously. But post-Keynesians have maintained for a while now that the money 
supply is endogenous, in that loans made by a bank lead to further deposits (which 
create reserves), which in turn create the supply of money, which therefore must 
have an impact on bank stock returns.  This section will discuss both approaches in 
detail, and also provide a review of the theory of exogenous money.  
 
Figure 2.1 is a representation of the central theme of this thesis as discussed 
in Chapter 1. It shows the link between the money supply theories and theories on 
bank stock returns.  
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Figure 2.1 The unexplored link between money supply and bank stock returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is possible to visualise that the economic theories on money supply (see the 
shaded gray area in Figure 2.1) must have an effect on aggregate bank stock returns 
(see the unshaded portion of Figure 2.1). The debate among economists is that the 
effect of money, if exogenous as traditionally maintained, on the stock return 
behaviour ought to be different from that of money being endogenous. Besides this 
known behaviour, finance theories such as the equity valuation theory would suggest 
a flow-through effect of money supply acting through the interest rate changes 
flowing to the bank as income changes and then affecting the bank stock returns. 
These ideas will be further elaborated in the sections that follow. 
 
2.3 Money supply: Exogenous and Endogenous 
The question as to whether money supply is exogenous or endogenous has long been 
debated amongst monetary economists, as emphasised in Chapter 1. Two schools of 
thought, originating from Keynesian and monetarist sources, have merged over time, 
resulting in a consensus that money is exogenous. On the other hand, post-
Keynesians have come to support the idea that money is endogenous. However, the 
existence of evidence of money exogeneity means that the old school is still not out 
of consideration. 
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 The idea of money supply being exogenous stems from Keynes’ liquidity 
preference theory. There are two views – the money view and the credit view 
(possibly relevant for bank stock returns) – which according to the advocates of this 
old idea explain the monetary transmission mechanism. This will be discussed in the 
following section. Although monetarists agree that money is exogenous, they still 
argue against Keynesian theory on the demand for money and the flow-through 
effect of the monetary transmission mechanism. This will be briefly discussed next. 
The PK theorists, though agreed on money endogeneity, also have differences of 
opinion on how money is considered endogenous. Three views are central to the PK 
theory of endogenous money: the accommodationist, structuralist and liquidity 
preference approaches, which will be elaborated on later. 
 
2.3.1 Exogenous money: Mainstream Keynesian and monetarists’ view  
Within the exogenous strand, there are two different views on the 
mechanisms through which monetary policy translates as money supply, which is 
expected to affect economic activity, and thus bank stock returns. These views are 
found in the literature as the money view and credit view.5 The money view and 
credit view correspond to the old Keynesian stream. 
 
The money view can be found in the standard ISLM framework – Investment-
Saving-Liquidity preference-Money equilibrium theory – using Keynes’ liquidity 
preference theory. Keynes (1936) assumed that individuals hold two assets: money 
and bonds, where money has a zero rate of return but bonds have a positive nominal 
return. Keynes’ liquidity preference theory suggests that individuals have three 
motives to money demand: transactions, precautionary and speculative. He believed 
that the demand for money is determined primarily by the level of the individual’s 
transactions (the transactions motive), and that individuals will hold money for the 
level of future transactions that they expect to make (the precautionary motive). 
Keynes also assumed that individuals hold money and bonds as a store of wealth and 
that speculation on interest-rate expectations on bonds will determine whether an 
                                                 
5
 This term, money view, is not to be confused to mean the “monetarist” view of the transmission 
mechanism. Another term used for the credit view is “lending view”; see Kashyap and Stein (1993) 
and Cecchetti (1995). 
   12 
individual would want to hold more money or more bonds (the speculative motive). 
This led Keynes to conclude that money demand is positively related to national 
income and negatively related to interest rates. These basic ideas were extended in 
later years, as will be made clear below. 
  
Keynes’ theory formed the basis of the ISLM analysis developed by Hicks 
(1937) and Hansen (1949, 1953), and extended by others. The theory is fully 
developed in the papers cited. Like Keynes, the ISLM model assumes that there are 
two assets held by individuals: money and bonds. It also assumes that price levels are 
fixed and that real interest rates play an important role in individual portfolio 
decisions to hold money or to invest in bonds.  
 
The LM curve is derived from the equilibrium condition where money 
demand (liquidity preference, L) equals money supply M, which is dependent on 
income y, and interest rates i: 
),(
−+
= iyLM           (2.1) 
The IS curve satisfies the equilibrium condition where savings, S, dependent on the 
level of output, y, equal investment: 
)( ySI =           (2.2) 
and  I is determined by capital, k, invested at a given interest rate, i: 
)(ikI =          (2.3) 
 
Hence, the money view shows that, assuming the central bank directly 
influences the quantity of money by adjusting money supply, a decrease in money 
supply will increase real interest rates (without regard to what actually happens 
inside the banking sector), which raises a firm’s cost of capital. With a higher cost of 
capital, there are fewer profitable projects. Thus the end result is a decrease in 
investment, causing aggregate output to decline. If the contrary happens, economic 
activity increases. 
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This line of reasoning assumes banks are passive, and that loans and bonds 
are perfect substitutes for borrowers. The early theorists ignored the fact that once a 
loan is made, then the loan leads to deposits, often in the same bank, which in turn 
could affect reserves and create new deposits when the borrowers issue cheques to 
draw down the loan. Hence the money supply is endogenously determined in the 
process within the banking sector through the actions of individual banks. 
 
As the money view assumed that banks were passive, a different view of the 
monetary transmission mechanism was proposed. Based on the fact that there is 
asymmetric information in the financial markets, the proponents of the credit view of 
the monetary transmission mechanism insist that both money supply and bank loans 
are important in affecting aggregate output. Two different channels exist here: the 
bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel. For the purposes of this thesis, 
only the bank lending channel is described here in detail. The balance sheet channel 
is discussed in Mishkin (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).  
 
The bank lending channel takes into account that close substitutes for bank 
credit are unavailable for households and small firms; hence they rely mainly on 
bank credit for external financing. By assuming that both bonds and loans are 
imperfect substitutes, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) modified the ISLM model of the 
money view by including bank loans that bear an interest rate, so that the financial 
side becomes: 
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where ( ).D
 
and ( ).L
 
are the demand for deposits and loans respectively, 
( ).Dm and ( ).Lm denote the money multiplier and loan multiplier, Bi is the interest on 
bonds and Li is the loan interest rate. R is the monetary base and rr is the required 
reserve ratio. Accordingly, the IS curve is replaced with the CC (commodities and 
credit) market: 
),(
−−
= LB iiYy          (2.6)  
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where y is output and is a function of the interest on bonds (iB) and interest rates on 
loans, such that: 
),,( Ryii BL φ= .        (2.7) 
 
Here, a contractionary monetary policy decreases bank reserves or excess 
reserves (money supply) and hence, bank deposits. The converse is true under 
expansionary policy. This will decrease the banks’ ability to extend credit. The lower 
credit availability will reduce gross investment in the economy, which will lead to a 
decline in output. The effect of this is greater on small firms than on large firms, as 
the latter can access the credit markets directly through the stock and bond markets. 
In contrast to the money view, the credit view indicates that loans and equities are 
imperfect substitutes both for banks and borrowers. Palley (2002) asserts that this 
model is similar to the structuralist approach of the PK theory of endogenous money, 
which will be discussed in Section 2.3.2.2. 
 
The above views (money and credit views) show the transmission mechanism 
of changes in money supply to the economy through banks, which in turn has an 
influence on bank stock returns. However, these views take into account that money-
supply changes are controlled by the central bank (exogenous) through the 
adjustment of high-powered money (monetary base).  
 
2.3.1.1 Monetarists 
Monetarists are mainly aligned with Milton Friedman’s ideas. They oppose 
the Keynesian view of money with regard to money demand.6 However, like the 
original Keynesians, they consider money supply as an exogenous variable, which 
means that the money supply is perfectly inelastic (vertical), with the interest rate 
driven by money demand. Friedman (1956) argued that there is more than one 
interest rate that is important to the operation of the economy. He developed a 
different theory of money demand by stating that individuals hold wealth in three 
forms: bonds, equity and goods. Thus, expectations as to whether there will be an 
increase in returns on either bonds, equity or goods relative to money, will have an 
                                                 
6
 Meltzer (1998) gives a full account of the debate between mainstream Keynesians and Monetarists. 
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effect on an individual’s demand for money. The mathematical derivation of the 
theory is not reproduced here as it is in the cited paper, and is well entrenched in 
theory literature.  
 
The monetarists’ view “… has not been accepted broadly within the 
profession or at central banks” (Meltzer, 1998, p. 13). Three reasons are given by 
Meltzer (1998) for why this is the case: (1) economists either did not accept the idea 
of neutrality or believed that the proposition held only in the long-term, (2) 
monetarists argue that the velocity of money is stable, which is disputed, and (3) they 
believe that inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon and therefore is the result 
of excessive money growth.  
 
Kaldor (1980) was probably the first to develop a response to the monetarists’ 
theory in that the causal relation between money and income goes in the opposite 
direction to that of the monetarists. With respect to the central bank controlling 
money supply by adjusting the monetary base, Kaldor and Trevithick (1981) argue 
that central banks tend to accommodate monetary base demand from banks, as 
frequent changes of the monetary base by the central banks can give rise to highly 
variable interest rates and unstable capital markets. Their accommodating behaviour 
is also attributable to their role as a lender of last resort.7 This accommodation of 
reserve behaviour by the central bank is one of the central ideas of post-Keynesians. 
 
2.3.2 Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money 
Influenced greatly by Kaldor, Basil Moore in 1988 developed the post-
Keynesian view on money, which is today the cornerstone of the PK theory of 
endogenous money (Rochon, 2006). Pollin (1991, p. 367) claims that [PK theorists] 
accept the assessment by the former New York Federal Reserve Bank senior vice 
president Holmes (1969) that, in the real world, banks extend credit, creating 
deposits in the process, resulting in money supply. The PK theory of endogenous 
money asserts that money supply8  is endogenously determined by the asset and 
liability management decisions of the commercial banks, the portfolio decisions of 
                                                 
7
 More discussion on Kaldor’s work can be found in Bertocco (2001). 
8
 In some literature, this is known as credit-money or money derived from credit supply.  
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the non-bank public and the demand for bank loans (Palley, 1994). The core of this 
theory is that causality runs from bank lending to bank deposits, instead of the 
traditional notion that deposits create loans. Thus, all other things being equal, the 
central idea revolves around three items on a bank’s balance sheet – namely loans, 
deposits and the share price (or market value) of the bank. These are financial 
variables in entering the economics of money. 
 
Lavoie and Godley (2006) describe the balance-sheet structure of a banking 
sector in the PK world.9 As the banking sector has become more complicated with 
the introduction of capital adequacy standards,10 there is a need for two balance 
sheets: one explaining the overall macroeconomic balance sheet – seen on the right-
hand side of Table 2.1 (see page 17) – and the other corresponding to private 
accounting. This research is based on the well-known Lavoie and Godley (2006) 
model in the following discussion. 
 
In the standard accounting balance sheet, it is assumed that the financial value 
of shares is equal to the net worth of the banks or their capital – or, in this case, the 
own funds (shares) of the banks, OFb.11 The own funds, when added to the liabilities, 
ensure that assets equal liabilities. A healthy bank must have more assets than 
liabilities so that its own fund is positive. If the bank is dissolved, then its own funds 
would accrue to the shareholders. Thus, if it is negative, the owners would get 
nothing, and the bank would be unable to pay back all of its liabilities. For banks, 
this situation could arise if borrowers were to default on their loans to the amount 
equal to the bank’s own funds. For example, if the borrowers of $100 million were in 
default, then $100 million would need to be subtracted from both sides of the balance 
sheet, that is, L and OFb. The bank would then need to find means to increase its own 
funds back to the required level relative to its loans in order to achieve an adequate 
                                                 
9
 They start with a balance sheet of a closed economy with a simple asset-based banking system and 
expand this to a more realistic banking sector. Only the realistic banking sector is summarised here. 
10
 Capital adequacy is acknowledged as an important aspect of banking but is not the main focus of 
this thesis. 
11These terms follow Lavoie and Godley (2006). While net worth is the term commonly used by 
accountants, the Bank of International Settlement refers to it as “capital”, while the authors call it 
“own funds of banks”, OF.  
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capital ratio. The own funds of the bank are therefore not the ultimate residual, as 
this is determined by the sum of the own funds of the banks in the last period OFb-1, 
their retained earnings FUb and the proceeds of the new issues of shares, eb.peb, 
minus the amount of non-performing loans, NPL: 
NPLpebFUOFOF ebbbb −∆++= − .1     (2.8)12 
 
The balance-sheet constraint of the banking system is thus:   
bbb HLOFMMB −−++= 21      (2.9) 
where banks are assumed to provide loans, L, and deposits (current and time deposits 
denoted as M1 and M2 respectively) on demand. They also need to acquire reserves, 
Hb, from the central bank. The amount of Treasury bills, Bb, held by the banks will 
normally fluctuate depending on whether the system needs them.  
 
Table 2.1: Two possible balance sheets of banks  
Standard accounting   Macroeconomic accounting 
Assets Liabilities  Assets Liabilities 
Bb M1  Bb M1 
L M2  L M2 
Hb Ab  Hb Ab 
 OFb   eb.peb 
  Total Assets = Total Liabilities  Assets – Liabilities = Vb 
Source: adapted from Lavoie and Godley, 2006, p. 263 exactly as in that source.  
Note: L are loans, M1 and M2 are current and time deposits respectively, Bb is Treasury bills, Hb is 
reserves, eb.peb is the outstanding number of shares issued by banks multiplied by the price of each 
share, Ab are advances, OFb  is the bank’s own funds, and  Vb is the net worth of the banking system 
from a system-wide view. 
 
There is also a possibility of an overdraft in the financial system, as in Europe. 
It is also possible that banks borrow from each other, as in the case of large city 
banks in the US. In this type of financial system, banks hold no Treasury bills but get 
                                                 
12
 Table 2.1 is taken from page 15 of Lavoie and Godley (2004), which was incorporated in 
Setterfield’s (2006) book. The equations are also found in the book. Lavoie and Godley’s works on 
post-Keynesian economics is widely acknowledged. 
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advances, Ab at cost ra (the borrowing rate) from the central bank; that is, the banks 
borrow from the central bank, so that the balance-sheet13 constraint now becomes:  
bbb OFMMHLA −−−+= 21      (2.10) 
 
Thus, if the system is to function well at all, the advances must be provided 
whenever they are needed. This may arise if households are holding a large 
proportion of their money holdings as cash or if the reserve ratios on money deposits 
are high. There is also the possibility that banks hold bills and receive advances from 
the central bank as part of their liabilities. Whatever is the case, the supply of 
reserves, H, must equal the demand for reserves. This means that the central bank is 
always responding fully to the banking system’s demand for reserves. This is in line 
with the accommodationist view (discussed in Section 2.3.2.1). 
 
Similarly, in the macroeconomic balance sheet, the net worth of the banking 
system (from a system-wide view), Vb may be positive : it becomes negative when 
the whole banking system undergoes a severe crisis with loss of regulatory capital 
and the value of the affected banks may be negative. Here eb is the outstanding 
number of shares issued by banks and peb is the price of each share, which equates to 
the banks’ market value. When the banks’ market value, eb.peb, is high, the net worth 
of the whole banking system could be negative. In essence, the banks’ market value 
may increase due to any share price increase occurring as a result of an increase in 
profits (earnings) and potential increase in dividends. This flow-through effect is 
consistent with the dividend valuation theory discussed in Section 2.4.2.  
 
2.3.2.1  The Accommodationist approach 
Although proponents of the PK theory accept the fundamentals of the 
endogeneity idea in that loans cause deposits and this in turn creates money supply, 
there is still a debate among advocates of the PK theory. That debate is between the 
accommodationists (horizontalists) and the structuralists. The disagreement mainly 
                                                 
13
 Table 2.1 is taken exactly from a well-used source that only discusses what happens when credit is 
created. Thus the terms in the table defined on page 17 only refer to consequential items in part of the 
balance sheet. It includes the shareholder value as OFb which can be equal to the market value of 
shares, eb.peb as shown in the table.   
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revolves around the central bank’s role in accommodating the demand for reserves, 
which ultimately determines the slope of the money supply curve. According to the 
accommodationists, the central bank determines the level of interest rates and the 
banking sector fully accommodate any demand for credit at any level of interest rate, 
while the structuralists insist that full accommodation is not necessary and that 
interest rates may increase endogenously (Palley, 1997). Both views will be 
elaborated further in the following sections. 
 
Exponents of the accommodationist view such as Moore (1988, 1989), 
Lavoie (1992) and Rochon (1999) reject the classical loanable funds theory and 
insist that money is generated by bank credit, and is used for the production and 
exchange of commodities. Thus, money supply will respond endogenously through 
bank intermediation to any changes in the demand for working capital by firms. The 
exogenous variable for this process of money creation is the price of credit (the 
interest rate), which is under the control of the central bank.  
 
The process of money creation involves a sequence of events starting from 
the firms and running to the banks, and to the central bank, as established by Moore 
(1988). It starts with firms that require credit to finance the expansion of their 
business, be it a production process or to start a new business. There are of course 
other ways besides bank financing for a business to obtain credit; however, for 
reasons of simplicity it is assumed here that banks are the only means by which firms 
or households can increase funds. 
 
As banks are in the business of selling credit, they will fully accommodate 
the firm’s demand for additional funds with the loan interest rate determined by the 
bank ( Li ) as a mark-up ( m ) on the short-term interest rate set by the central bank 
( CBi ), bearing in mind the possibility of alternative sources of finance provided by 
liability management practices.  Commercial banks consider the discount rate pegged 
by the central bank as exogenous, so that: 
( ) CBL imi += 1 . (2.11) 
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By the mark-up approach, banks apply a margin to any refinancing cost and 
automatically grant all the funding demanded by the productive economy (Piegay, 
1999) in a competitive market. The banks’ lending rates are based on the funding 
costs and the interest rate spread – the mark-up (margin) between the cost to banks 
and the loan rate that the bank charges, which is needed to achieve the bank’s profit 
goal (Rousseas, 1998). Hence, banks are price-makers and quantity takers. 
 
As banks are unable to increase or decrease the volume of loans in their loan 
portfolios directly on their own, but only indirectly through varying loan prices or 
controlling selling expenses, loan volume is not controllable from an individual 
bank’s perspective. Thus, at any point in time, banks usually give firms a line of 
credit, which largely exceeds their needs. Any decision on the part of the firm to 
draw on its credit line would automatically be accepted, at the agreed interest rate. 
Such loans are automatically created with a mandatory decision from the bank. The 
cost of borrowing is set in advance according to the risk grade assigned to the firms, 
based mainly on the absolute size of each firm’s earning assets (Lavoie, 1992). The 
supply of credit is thus horizontal within the limits set by the norms of the financial 
system, whether firms have access to credit at the decided rate or not. These norms 
include ensuring that loan requests meet the bank’s income and asset collateral 
requirements, and the loan officers having to satisfy themselves as to the credit-
worthiness of the project and the character of the borrower (Moore, 1988).   
 
As banks are concerned with the liquidity of their assets, they rely on the 
central bank as the last supplier of liquidity in order to meet any unexpected demand 
for cash withdrawals or international transfers. Hence, the liquidity of banks as a 
whole relies exclusively on the supply of reserves by the central bank. Moore (1998) 
argues that the central bank must always accommodate bank demand for reserves 
and currency in order to fulfil its responsibility of preserving the liquidity of the 
financial system, that is, the central bank acts as a lender of last resort. However, if 
reserves are fully supplied at the initiative of banks, the central bank is able to set the 
price of those reserves. Thus, although the central bank is unable to control the 
money supply in general, it can still choose the short-term interest rate at which 
reserves are made available. Hence, under the accommodationist view, money supply 
is perfectly interest-elastic (horizontal), as the supply of loans is determined by the 
   21 
level of loan demand (see quadrant X of Figure 2.2) and the short-term cost of funds 
is pegged by the central bank (see quadrant W of Figure 2.2). Due to this, the 
accommodationist approach is also known as the horizontalists’ approach. 
 
Figure 2.2: Accommodationist model (adapted from Palley, 1994, p. 74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the equilibrium of a model from the accommodationist 
viewpoint14 built by Palley (1994) where quadrant W shows the supply of reserves 
( sH ) being perfectly elastic at the exogenously set central bank rate ( CBi ). Quadrant 
X shows the market for bank loans where the loans supply schedule ( sL ) is perfectly 
elastic at a rate determined by the mark-up over the central bank rate, as in equation 
(2.10). Quadrant Y shows the banking sector balance-sheet constraint where demand 
deposits ( D) are determined from any given level of bank lending ( *L ). Quadrant Z 
determines the demand for reserves ( dH ) associated with the level of demand 
                                                 
14
 Palley (1994) used Fi to denote the central bank’s interest rate, which in his case was the Federal 
funds rate. In order to be consistent, the central bank rate in this thesis is denoted by CBi . 
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deposits ( *D ), which is linked to quadrant W to determine the actual supply of 
reserves ( *H ). The equations in quadrants Y and Z for the demand for reserves and 
demand deposits are derived as follows: 
( ) CBL imi += 1  (2.12) 
( )Λ,Ld iLL =  (2.13) 
ddds TDERL +=++  (2.14) 
tDT d =  (2.15) 
dd TkDkR 21 +=  (2.16) 
eDE d =   (2.17) 
cDC d =   (2.18) 
dddd ERCH ++=   (2.19) 
ds LL =   (2.20) 
DCM d += , (2.21) 
where: 
dL  = bank loan demand, 
Li  = bank loan interest rate, 
m = bank mark-up, 
CBi = central bank interest rate, 
sL = bank loan supply, 
dR = required reserves, 
dE = demand for excess reserves, 
D  = demand for checkable deposits, 
dT = demand for time deposits, 
1k  = required reserve ratio for demand deposits, 
2k  = required reserve ratio for time deposits, 
t, c, e = ratios of time deposits, currency and excess reserves to checkable deposits, 
dH = demand for monetary base (reserves), 
dC = demand for currency, and 
M = money supply (narrow); 
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with equation (2.12) being the loan pricing equation where the loan rate is a fixed 
mark-up over the short-term interest rate set by the central bank. Equations (2.13) 
and (2.14) are the loan demand and loan supply schedules respectively. Equations 
(2.15) to (2.18) describe the demands for time deposits, reserves, excess reserves and 
currency respectively as fixed proportions of the demand for checkable deposits, 
while equation (2.19) explains the total demand for reserves. Equation (2.20) is the 
loan market clearing condition (equilibrium), and equation (2.21) is the definition of 
the money supply. 
 
           Substituting equations (2.12) to (2.17) into (2.20) gives: 
( )
( )etkkt
imLD CB
−−−+
+
=
211
,)1( Λ
 . (2.22) 
 
Putting equations (2.17) and (2.21) into (2.18) yields: 
( ) ( )( )etkkt
imL
etkkcH CBd
−−−+
+
+++=
21
21 1
,)1( Λ
, (2.23) 
 
and substituting (2.17) and (2.21) into (2.20) gives: 
( )
( )etkkt
imL
cM CB
−−−+
+
+=
211
,)1()1( Λ . (2.24) 
 
Hence, any changes in the short-term interest rate by the central bank will 
change the level of bank lending and the money supply. Accordingly, the supply of 
reserves will automatically adjust to fully accommodate the increase in deposits. 
Expansionary shifts of loan demand increase the level of bank lending and raise the 
level of checkable deposits, and hence both the narrow and the broad money supply, 
which in turn is expected to influence bank stock returns: the converse is true under 
contractionary demand situation. This assumes that the central bank fully 
accommodates the demand for loans and hence reserves. However, if the central 
bank were unwilling to accommodate fully any increases in loan demand and so 
imposed a feedback rule whereby the central bank interest rate would rise in response 
to market pressures, then the supply of reserves schedule would be positively sloped 
as in Figure 2.3, in line with the structuralists’ view. 
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2.3.2.2 The Structuralist approach 
Proponents of the structuralist view, such as Wray (1990), Howells (1995) 
and Rousseas (1998), maintain that banks do not fully accommodate the demand for 
credit as the accommodationists propose, because the banks always use a 
combination of price and quantity rationing in their loan-making. For this reason, the 
structuralists argue that money supply is upward-sloping (quadrant X, Figure 2.3), as 
they believe that central banks only partially accommodate the demand for reserves, 
which will increase interest rates due to market pressures. This makes the supply of 
reserves a positive function of the central bank rate. The central bank has no control 
over total reserves ( sH ), as this is determined by the quantity demanded by banks to 
support their lending and deposit-taking activities; however, the central bank is still 
able to alter the mix of borrowed ( BR ) and non-borrowed reserves ( NBR ) to 
achieve its target, thus: 
BRNBRH s += . (2.25) 
 
Figure 2.3 The structuralist model (adapted from Palley, 1994, p. 76) 
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Additionally, Pollin (1991) argues that it is the changing structure of the 
liability side of the balance sheet of banks, rather than the asset side, that is 
responsible for the upward-sloping curve. Nevertheless, this behaviour would lead to 
the same endogeneity of money supply. 
 
Bank behaviour can be seen as that of a profit-maximising firm. As money 
creators, banks require guarantees against default risks, which make interest rates 
fixed in a partly endogenous manner. With the structuralist view, the commercial 
banks no longer apply a uniform mark-up ( m ) of the short-term interest rate pegged 
by the central bank; they instead take their liquidity preference into account, which is 
their risk assessment (Piegay, 1999). (The liquidity preference of different economic 
agents such as households and firms will be discussed further in Section 2.3.2.3.) 
Banks’ liquidity preference, which is expressed in terms of risk premium ( ε ), 
influences their responsiveness to the demand for credit. Thus, the interest rate on 
loans is (as per Deriet and Seccareccia, 1996):  
( )[ ] CBL imi ε+= 1 .15 (2.26) 
 
Hewitson (1995) asserts that as the banks increase their amount of credit 
extension, they will face greater risks and demand larger guarantees. This leads to 
higher interest rates as the volume of credit increases (Piegay, 1999). By changing 
the mix of their assets and liabilities, banks are able to obtain cheaper funding rather 
than relying solely on reserves, especially when the central bank raises interest rates 
in response to a strong demand for reserves. Palley (1987, 1994) explains that in 
asset management, banks hold secondary reserves, which exist in the form of holding 
bonds, to buffer any changes in loan demand and also demands for checkable and 
time deposits. Thus, if there are any unexpected withdrawals of deposits into 
currency, banks will sell their secondary reserves to fund the outflow; and 
alternatively if there is an increase in loan demand, individual banks will sell 
secondary reserves to fund the additional lending. In essence, Palley (1994) asserts 
                                                 
15
 This equation is originally derived by Rousseas (1985) (similar to equation (2.10) used by Palley 
(1994)) and modified by Deriet and Seccareccia (1996) to account for perceived risk in the financial 
system. 
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that the banks perform their own internal open market operations between their 
portfolios and those of the non-bank public. Although the total stock of reserves 
remains unchanged from these transactions, they allow the banking system to fund 
more loans.  
 
Liability management on the other hand is, as Lavoie (1992, p. 212), states, 
“the ability of banks to increase their lending activity by borrowing funds which 
appear on the liability side of the balance sheet, without having to dispose of their 
marketable assets, mainly Treasury bills”. Through liability management, banks are 
able to fulfil the demands of their borrowers by supplying credit at the banks’ 
lending rates, as long as the banks’ norms are satisfied. Structuralists, however, have 
long criticised this argument, questioning the reason for banks to engage in liability 
management if the central bank can accommodate required reserves, as claimed by 
the accommodationists (Pollin, 1991). Rochon (1999) agrees that perhaps banks 
would engage in liability management to meet their reserve needs, but he adds that 
banks may also practise liability management because reserves represent an implicit 
tax on banks and a loss of potential earnings. Regardless of whether central banks 
accommodate reserves or not, banks still actively engage in asset and liability 
management, as in the case of Canada, where reserve requirements have been 
abandoned (Rochon, 1999). 
 
Palley (2002) proposes that the structuralist model is similar to the Bernanke-
Blinder model discussed in Section 2.3.1, where the money multiplier, ( ).Dm  and 
loan multiplier ( ).Lm perform the role of bank liability and asset management 
respectively. In the asset management case, an increase in the demand for loans 
pushes loan market interest rates up, making banks move out of bonds and into loans. 
Alternatively, in managing liability, banks raise rates paid on deposits to attract more 
funds. The profit-maximising behaviour of banks drives them to equalise marginal 
costs and returns across different financial markets. This behaviour allows the 
financial sector to accommodate increases in credit demand. It also explains the 
movements of the loans and deposit multipliers and answers the question of why 
endogenous money supply responds positively to loan demand shocks. 
 
   27 
2.3.2.3 The Liquidity Preference approach 
In setting the mark-up over the short-term interest rate, banks may display 
different degrees of liquidity preference in distinct situations (Minsky, 1975). Dow 
and Dow (1989) suggest that liquidity preference is a preference for a liquid asset 
over any illiquid assets.  Banks distinguish among potential borrowers by risk 
category and are likely to have higher liquidity preference. Thus, for riskier 
borrowers, banks tend to adopt a very cautious lending behaviour. Liquidity 
preference16 affects the behavioural functions of households, firms, banks and the 
central bank and in turn the money supply process (Wray, 1995). 
 
The liquidity preference for households affects the money supply process in 
two ways: either through the composition of the households’ portfolios, or through or 
their size. In the case of the former, when households are more willing to exchange 
cash and current deposits for short- and long-term assets, firms’ profitability will 
increase, and this in turn will reduce their demand for financing any future working 
capital expenses. On the other hand, when households are willing to incur mortgages 
and consumer loans to finance the purchase of commodities, therefore changing the 
size of their loan portfolios, they influence the money supply process directly. 
 
As for firms, they may change the composition of their portfolios by 
exchanging liquid for less liquid assets. For example, they may exchange cash and 
deposits either for direct purchase of capital goods or for an indirect purchase by 
acquiring securities in the financial markets (Fontana, 2003). Firms may also change 
the size of their portfolios by incurring business loans to finance the production of 
new goods and services. On the other hand, firms may adopt a more conservative 
borrowing behaviour or more liquid portfolios. 
 
Structuralists insist that banks have their own liquidity preference. They 
argue that an expansion in the economy alone makes the interest rate rise. This is 
                                                 
16
 Some authors, for example, Shanmugam, Nair and Li (2003) and Nell (2000) describe liquidity 
preference as another approach in addition to the accommodationist and structuralist approach. Others 
– for example, Dow and Dow (1989) – explain liquidity preference as part of the structuralist 
approach. In this thesis, we maintain three different approaches. 
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because as firms rely increasingly on external borrowing (and as banks meet the 
credit demand of firms), both firms and banks will become illiquid. Hewitson (1995) 
explains that banks will vary their propensity to make advances of a given expected 
riskiness depending on expectations as to the value of alternative assets and the 
degree of confidence in those expectations. Defaults encourage a move to more 
liquid portfolios and an increase in the mark-up to the loan rate. Wray (1995) states 
that the liquidity preference of both banks and borrowers plays an important role in 
determining the price and quantity of credit; so that given a state of liquidity 
preference, any balance sheet expansion, capital and reserve leveraging, and 
exceeding of prudent margins of safety, can occur only at rising interest rates. As a 
result, banks have to charge higher rates to compensate for the risk of increased 
illiquidity, as inferred by Rochon (1999).  
 
The liquidity preference of the central bank influences the money supply 
through the short-term interest rate (the interest rate on which market rates are based).  
Therefore, it represents an important monetary policy instrument of the central bank. 
The liquidity preference of the central bank may rise as a result of changes in the 
economy, such as changes in the general level of prices or the exchange rate, or 
dramatic swings in the financial markets. In such cases, the central bank is less 
willing to accommodate the bank’s demand for reserves. If such is the case, then 
being less willing to exchange liquid for less liquid assets (that is, to make a change 
in the composition of its portfolio) means that the central bank would increase the 
short-term interest rate (Fontana, 2003). This is the feedback rule. This implies that 
the structuralist and accommodationist views are observationally equivalent.  
 
As noted above, different groups of economic agents have different 
preferences concerning how much money they wish to hold. Howells (1995) explains 
that any increase in credits may not result in a corresponding increase of deposited 
money. This is because liquidity preferences or some other motives may induce 
owners of newly created deposits to transform them at least partly into cash or into 
assets of some other kind. In this regard, the existence of an independent money 
demand function would place constraints on the ability of loans to create deposits. 
This means that not only do loans create broad money supply, as the 
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accommodationists suggest, but also that causality runs from broad money supply to 
bank loans.  
 
The discussions in the sections above have focused on the banking system as 
a whole. The nexus is that the banking system is an important factor in the economy, 
especially with respect to the monetary transmission mechanism, regardless of 
whether money supply is exogenous or endogenous. However, each bank is a profit-
maximising firm and has its own asset and liability management strategies. The 
following section discusses the behaviour of individual banks and the consequences 
of their actions towards the banking system. Following this, a discussion on how 
bank stock returns are determined is given and the efficient markets hypothesis is 
explained. 
 
2.4 Bank stock returns  
The discussion has so far focused on aggregate banks (the shaded part of Figure 2.1 
on page 10), bearing in mind the question of exogenous and endogenous money 
supply and the part that banks play in the monetary transmission mechanism. Banks 
can be seen as special in this case. However, banks can also be observed as profit-
maximising firms. In such cases, each individual bank’s behaviour may affect the 
banking system as a whole. The following section will discuss this theory further. 
Following this, a discussion on equity valuation will be provided.  
 
 
2.4.1 Bank behaviour  
Minsky (1982, 1986) developed the financial fragility hypothesis, which 
maintains that the relation between the banking system and the trend to financial 
fragility during the upturn of the business cycle illustrates how a crisis can occur as 
an endogenous result of these units’ own economic dynamics. Dymski (1988), Wray 
(1990) and Kregel (1997) build on Minsky’s (1982) theory in that banks in uncertain 
environments seek to base their behaviour on their customers’ histories and also the 
average behaviour of other banks. This means that if the banking system as a whole 
is expanding or contracting credit, most individual banks will follow suit. Under 
uncertainty, this is the safe way to compete with other banks, as it guarantees both 
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market share and institutional reputation. This behaviour tends, however, to amplify 
the scale of business cycles.  
 
As Alves Jr., Dymski and de Paula (2004) argue, the balance sheet of an 
individual bank is partially determined by the management decision on how 
aggressively to expand credit, and partly by the balance-sheet position of other banks. 
Using Minsky’s (1982, 1986) financial fragility hypothesis, they show that there are 
factors that may alter an individual bank balance sheet, such as the banks’ adoption 
of different strategies for profitability17 and the speed of the loan expansion of the 
bank. That is, the more aggressive bank will be more financially fragile (as it loses 
reserves to other banks) and at the same time it will take on higher liquidity and 
insolvency risks.  
 
Applying the PK theory, Alves Jr., Dymski and de Paula (2004) suggest that 
the bank’s pro-cyclical behaviour towards bank loans may amplify economic growth 
during the upturn of a business cycle. On the other hand, during a downturn, as the 
amount of bad loans in the banking system increases and banks’ expectation about 
the future worsens, all banks tend to contract their credit supply due to a rising 
liquidity preference. Their borrowers’ expectations also become pessimistic, thus 
causing deterioration in the quality of overall bank credit portfolios, which may 
amplify the cyclical downturn. This has consequences for the pricing of the banking 
stock.18  
 
How well a bank manages its assets and liabilities during the peak or trough 
of a business cycle is evident through its share price. In order to be able to relate the 
loan creation of the bank to its stock price, the standard dividend discount valuation 
model can be used. (In this thesis, the use of more recent models will be refrained – 
free cash flow, for example – that are sophisticated expansions of this model). The 
                                                 
17
 The authors only presented loan-making as a strategy, but acknowledge that there are other choices 
such as branch networks, whether to offer new kinds of financial services, whether to reduce credit 
risk through securitisation, whether to merge with other banks or non-bank firms, and the like. 
18
 Alves Jr., Dymski and de Paula (2004) discuss four cases regarding banking strategy and the effect 
it has on different stages of the business cycle. This thesis will not elaborate on these stages, and 
interested readers are directed to the paper. 
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next section will briefly discuss the valuation of equity, using the dividend discount 
valuation model.  
 
2.4.2 Equity valuation 
The Gordon's (1962) dividend discount valuation model specifies that stock 
price 0P  is the present value of the expected stream of dividends Dt growing at a g-
rate of growth (which can be constant or variable) discounted at the required rate of 
return or discount rate ke (the third term of equation 2.27a). The ke itself can be 
divided into risk-free rate rf and the market risk premium rp, scaled by the risk, iβ . 
Also, if the dividends grow at a constant rate indefinitely, then the numerator of the 
general model (the first term of equation 2.27a) becomes Do(1+g)t as in the second 
term of equation (2.27a).  
 
This theory was used by Keran (1971), Homa and Jaffee (1971) and 
Hamburger and Kochin (1972) to test the theory of money supply influencing stock 
prices. Over the years, the theory has been extended from the general valuation 
model to include earnings components as in equation (2.27b). Therefore, the 
activities of a bank can be calculated in terms of its stock price:  
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where P0 is the current price of the common stock, D0 and Dt are the current and 
expected dividends respectively, iβ  is the beta of the bank, g is the constant rate of 
growth of bank stock dividends, a is the payout rate, EPS1 is earnings per share in the 
next period, and ke is the discount rate, which includes the risk-free rate, rf, and the 
market risk premium, rp. Also 1-a is the retention rate and ROE is return on equity, 
which is equal to net income divided by equity. Following changes in credit creations 
in banks, changes must take place from the resulting earnings and then the dividends 
and g as well. The net effect would lead to a price effect, which can be measured as 
the industry stock returns for the whole banking sector or for each bank stock return. 
The change in the prices of the shares over any two periods (example over a month 
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or quarter) may be used as representing the reaction of shares to events such as 
money supply changes.  
 
Here, any changes, up or down, in the market interest rate by the central bank 
may change the bank’s interest-sensitive expenses and receipts. However, the change 
in interest-sensitive expenses may be offset by interest-sensitive income or interest 
sensitive income may exceed the expenses. If the interest-sensitive income and 
expenses do not equal each other, then a gap arises, and decision-making by the 
bank’s management team – for example, a decision resulting in fee income activities 
– becomes especially important. Depending on the outcome of the interest rate gap 
considerations of the bank’s management, changes in interest rates may thus lower 
the bank’s net interest income. Thus, the value of the bank’s stock will tend to fall 
because the value of future dividends is expected to decrease: the converse is true if 
otherwise. If there are decreases in expected dividends combined with an expectation 
of increasing risk by investors in the bank’s stock, then the value of the bank’s stock 
will also decrease (Rose, 2002).  
 
The dividend valuation model can be related to the bank firm and 
subsequently connected to the macroeconomic balance sheet discussed in Section 
2.3.2. An increase in loans and deposits, provided that there is still a high profitable 
margin, will affect dividends. From the dividend valuation model, this effect will 
then increase share prices: otherwise a contrary effect will result. From Table 2.1, 
one can deduce that this increase, assuming the number of shares remains constant, 
will make the net worth of the banking system positive provided non-performing 
loans are low. 
 
As the risk-free rate (rf) is a direct function of market interest rates, an 
increase (decrease) in the market interest rate will have a negative (positive) impact 
on the bank stock price, everything else held equal. The risk premium depends on the 
uncertainty of the future values of the growth rates of dividends and the level of price 
of the risk-free asset. As the variability of interest rates increases, then the 
uncertainty or variability in the economy will rise, making the risk premium increase 
and hence causing the stock price to fall. Rose (2002) explains that the value of the 
bank stock will decrease through higher risk premiums, either because the bank’s 
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perceived level of risk has increased, because there is an increase in its loan losses, or 
because of heightened investor perception of the riskiness of the bank.  
 
 
2.5 Empirical evidence on money supply and bank stock returns 
Empirical evidence relating to the PK theory of endogenous money, exogenous 
money and bank stock returns is presented in this section. 
 
2.5.1 Exogenous money supply 
The traditional Keynesian approach to test money supply effects on economic 
activity (financial activity is still not studied) uses a structural model in which a 
system of equations describes the behaviour of firms and consumers in the economy 
and how they operate. In an old study, Scott (1966) found that, consistent with the 
ISLM framework, money supply and income affected interest rates. Using dummy 
variables from reading the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee to 
indicate periods of tight money, Romer and Romer (1990) found that M1 tends to 
drop faster than bank credit in the wake of contractionary monetary policy, and that 
bank credit growth lags behind money growth. They concluded that their findings 
were consistent with the money view. 
 
Although Bernanke and Blinder (1988) extended the ISLM model to show 
that bank loans are important, they found that in the 1980s, money shocks were more 
important in the US relative to credit shocks. However, they concluded that there was 
no strong evidence to reject the credit view. Using monthly aggregate data from 1959 
to 1989, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) obtained similar findings to those of Romer 
and Romer (1990). Yet Bernanke and Blinder interpreted their evidence as being 
consistent with the credit view, because they found that contractionary monetary 
policy is followed by a decrease in the volume of aggregate bank lending. 
 
Most of the previous literature has used aggregate data in its studies. 
However, a problem of identification arises when using aggregate data in that it may 
not be possible to disentangle credit supply and demand effects, a necessary 
condition for deciding whether a distinct lending channel exists. Kashyap, Stein and 
   34 
Wilcox (1993) suggest that a decrease in loans coinciding with a decrease in output 
may not imply causation. They suggest that the decrease in loans may rather be due 
to a decrease in loan demand, and not to a decrease in supply following a 
contractionary monetary policy. Thus, the traditional money channel may cause the 
decrease in output, and bank lending follows passively.  
 
In order to solve the identification problem, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
(1993) used US disaggregated data (bank loans and commercial paper). They found 
that tighter monetary policy leads to a rise in commercial paper issuance while bank 
loans fall, suggesting that contractionary policy can reduce loan supply. They also 
found (after controlling for interest rates and output) that these shifts seem to affect 
investment. Similarly, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) 
found that there is a reduction in loan supply, mainly to households and small firms, 
following a contractionary monetary policy.  
 
Other studies of the US investigate whether monetary policy has a different 
impact for banks of different asset sizes. Kashyap and Stein (1995), Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) found that a bank lending channel exists 
and is mainly transmitted through small banks. Small banks have more problems of 
asymmetric information than large banks and thus have more difficulties substituting 
non-deposit sources of external finance (Lensink and Sterken, 2002). Large banks are 
able to shield their loans portfolio against monetary shocks as they hold a larger 
buffer of liquid assets.  
 
On an international level, evidence for the bank lending channel is mixed. In 
Europe, de Bondt (1999) found evidence of the bank lending channel in Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, France and The Netherlands; but no significant effect of a bank 
lending channel in United Kingdom. This was supported by Kakes and Sturm (2002) 
and de Haan (2003), who found the bank lending channel in Germany and The 
Netherlands respectively. Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux (2002) found, out of 11 
EMU countries tested, a bank lending channel only in Italy and Spain. 
 
Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) found no evidence of a bank lending 
channel in France, Germany, Italy and Spain during 1992, and Kakes (2000) and 
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Garretsen and Swank (2003) found none for The Netherlands. Hernando and Pagés 
(2003) supported the findings of Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) for Spain. 
However, Chrystal and Mizen (2002) and Huang (2003) did find evidence of a bank 
lending channel in the UK. 
 
 Guender (1998) did not find a bank lending channel in New Zealand, while 
Ford, Agung, Ahmed and Santoso (2003) found support for a bank lending channel 
in Japan prior to 1984 but none after 1985. Alfaro, Garcia, Jara and Franken (2005) 
and Golodniuk (2006), using a panel of bank balance sheet data, found support for a 
bank lending channel in Chile and Ukraine. Also, a bank lending channel exists in 
Portugal (Ferreira, 2007) and in Colombia and Argentina (Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Grosz, 2007). 
 
These mixed results are attributable to the difference in time periods tested, to 
differences in methodologies, and also to the different proxies used for monetary 
policy stance. Most of the empirical evidence that finds a bank lending channel 
concludes that it is transmitted mainly through small banks. The results also show 
that undercapitalised banks are more affected than average banks by a change in 
monetary policy. Table 2.2 summarises the empirical evidence on the credit view, in 
particular the bank lending channel. 
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Table 2.2 Empirical studies relating to exogenous money 
Author (Year) Country  Data Methodology Findings 
Is there a bank lending channel? 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) US Q: 1953:1-1985:4 Regression No but concluded that there was no 
strong evidence to reject the credit view 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) US M: 1959-1989 VAR Yes 
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) US Q: 1964- 1989 Causality tests Yes 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) US Q: 1975:1-1991:4 VAR Yes 
Kashyap and Stein (1995) US Q: 1976:1-1992:2 Regression Yes 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) US Q: 1973:4-1991:2 GMM estimator for DPDM Yes 
Guender (1998) New Zealand Q: 1965:1-1995:4 Regression No 
de Bondt (1999) Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, UK, France Q:1980-1996 Regression Yes for Germany, Belgium, France, Italy 
and Netherlands but No for UK 
Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi 
(1999) 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain A: 1992 Regression No  
Kashyap and Stein (2000) US Q:1976:1-1993:2 Regression Yes 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) US Q: 1980:1-1995:4 PDR Yes 
Kakes and Sturm (2002) Germany Q: 1975:1-1997:4 VECM Yes 
Kakes (2000) Netherlands Q: 1979:1-1993:4 VECM No 
Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux 
(2002) 
11 EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
A: 1991-1999 PDR Yes in Italy and Spain only 
Chrystal and Mizen (2002) UK Q: 1977:4-1998:1 VAR and dynamic structural 
modelling 
Yes 
Huang (2003) UK A: 1975-1999 GMM estimator for DPDM Yes 
Garretsen and Swank (2003) Netherlands M: 1982.12-1996.12 VAR No 
de Haan (2003) Netherlands A: 1990-1997 GMM estimator for DPDM Yes 
Hernando and Pagés (2003) Spain Q: 1991-1998 GMM estimator for DPDM No 
Ford, Agung, Ahmed and Santoso 
(2003) 
Japan M: 1965:1-1999:6 VAR Yes prior to 1984 and none after 1985 
Alfaro, Garcia, Jara and Franken 
(2005) 
Chile Q: 1990:1-2002:2 PDR  and VAR Yes 
Golodniuk (2006) Ukraine A: 1998-2003 PDR Yes 
Gomez-Gonzalez and Grosz 
(2007) 
Colombia and Argentina M: 2003:8-2005:11 PDR Yes 
Ferreira (2007) Portugal A: 1990-2002 PDR Yes 
Note: PDR=Panel data regression, GMM estimator for DPDM= Generalised Method of Moments estimator for dynamic panel data model. A, Q, M is annual, quarterly and 
monthly data respectively. 
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2.5.2 PK theory of endogenous money 
Using different methodologies, the empirical evidence on money endogeneity 
supports the PK theory in that loans cause deposits, and in turn deposits cause money 
supply, which in turn influences bank stock returns. Table 2.3 (page 38) summarises 
the empirical evidence on the PK theory of endogenous money. 
 
Arestis (1987) used a structural equation model using data over the period 
1964:Q1 to 1985:Q1 to test endogeneity of money in the UK economy. His results 
showed that bank lending to the private sector was demand-determined, with the 
monetary authorities having little means of influencing it. He also found evidence 
that the money was primarily credit money, created by the banking system in 
response to loan demands.  
 
Applying a series of Granger-Sims causality tests between bank lending, the 
monetary base and four different monetary aggregates for the US market, Moore 
(1989) found that unidirectional causality ran from bank lending to the four monetary 
aggregates, and from the monetary aggregates to the monetary base, except for 
bidirectional causality between the monetary base and M2. In addition, he found that 
the monetary aggregates were endogenous in both the US and the UK, where 
changes in the money wage bill (demand for working capital) explained the changes 
in bank credit, which in turn explained the changes in credit money stock. 
 
Foster (1992) developed a model of M3 from the money supply perspective, 
taking into account the existence of non-bank financial institutions and the use of 
collateral by banks to assess the borrowers’ risk. He found that property price 
inflation appeared to have had a crucial role to play in inflating M3 in the UK. The 
same model was then used by Foster (1994) to test the Australian M3 by using 
ordinary and two-stage least squares. It was determined that there was a very stable 
endogenous money supply model in Australia and that real property value played a 
key role in the determination of M3. 
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Table 2.3 Empirical studies relating to endogenous money 
Author (Year) Country Data Model / Method of 
estimation 
Money variable used Findings 
Arestis (1987) UK Q: 1964:1 – 1985:1 Structural equation model M3 Money is endogenous; bank lending to industrial and commercial 
companies is the most important component of bank lending to the 
private sector 
Moore (1989) US and UK Q: 1965:1 – 1979:4 and 
1965:1 to 1978:2 
Granger-Sims causality tests Monetary base to M2 Unidirectional causality from bank lending to monetary 
aggregates 
 
Foster (1992) UK Q: 1963:3 – 1988:2 OLS and recursive least 
squares 
M3 Property price inflation has a crucial role in inflating M3 
Foster (1994) Australia Q: 1967:4 – 1993:1 OLS and 2SLS M3 Money supply is endogenous and stable in Australia 
Palley (1994) US M: 1973:1 – 1990:6 Granger causality M1 and M2 Money is endogenous in favour of the structuralist approach 
Howells and 
Hussein (1998) 
G7 Q: 1957:1-1993:4 Granger causality and 
VECM 
Canada, Italy, US : M2;  
Germany, France, Japan: 
M3; UK: M4 
Broad money is endogenous 
Caporale and 
Howells (2001) 
UK  Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
causality tests  
UK: M4 Loans do cause deposits, even in the presence of total transactions 
Nell (2000) South Africa  Q: 1966:1-1997:4 Granger causality and ECM M3 Money supply is determined endogenously 
Vera (2001) Spain M: 1987:1 – 1998:10 Granger causality test Various money multipliers Money supply is credit driven and demand determined  
 
Shanmugam, Nair 
and Li (2003) 
Malaysia Q: 1985:1 – 2000:4 Granger causality tests and 
ECM 
M3 Support for accommodationist view: total bank loans cause M3 
but no support for structuralist view: no causality from total bank 
loans to M3 money multiplier 
Holtemöller (2003) Germany Q: 1975-1998 VECM M3 Money stock and monetary base are determined endogenously 
after the Bundesbank has set the interest rate 
Vymyatnina (2006) Russia M:1995:7-2004:9  Granger causality test M0 and M2 Money endogenous: support for accommodationist and 
structuralist approach 
Ahmad and Ahmed 
(2006) 
Pakistan  M: 1980-2003 Granger causality test Narrow and broad money Money endogenous in the short run but exogenous in the long run 
Cifter and Ozun 
(2007) 
Turkey Q: 1997-2006 VECM  Money base, M2 Money is endogenous and there is support for the 
accommodationist view 
Q, and M are quarterly and monthly data respectively. VECM is Vector Error-Correction Model, ECM is Error-Correction Model, OLS is Ordinary Least Squares and 2SLS is Two-stage 
least squares. 
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Palley (1994) provided Granger-causality evidence for three competing 
approaches to the determination of money supply. The first approach identified the 
conventional money multiplier approach to money supply (the pure portfolio 
approach); the second identified the PK accommodationists’ approach (pure loan 
demand); and the third identified the PK structuralist approach (the mixed portfolio-
loan demand approach). He concluded that the results are in favour of the mixed 
portfolio-loan demand approach (the structuralists). 
 
Howells and Hussein (1998), using a causality test based on cointegration and 
the error correction representation, tested whether broad money supply is 
endogenously determined in the G-7 countries. Their results suggested that, in the 
UK, the ability of the demand for loans to cause deposits was constrained by the 
demand for those deposits; that is, the willingness of agents to hold newly created 
deposits puts constraints on the ability of the demand for loans to create those 
deposits, contrary to the Moore (1988) argument that there is no reconciliation 
problem and that the demand for money is completely elastic. Caporale and Howells 
(2001) revised some of their earlier inferences, especially the reverse causality 
running from deposits to loans found in Howells and Hussein (1998). They used tests 
developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to investigate the possibility that earlier 
causal inferences made from bivariate tests were incorrect due to the presence of a 
third variable – total transactions. They found that while total transactions cause 
deposits, there is no causal connection in any direction between loans and 
transactions; thus they concluded that even with the third variable present, the core of 
the endogeneity issue holds, in that loans do cause deposits. 
 
Nell (2000) produced evidence that bank loans created money in South Africa 
over the period 1966 to 1997.  There exists a long-run cointegrating relation between 
money income and the M3 money supply over the entire sample period. Vera (2001), 
using Granger causality tests for the period 1987 to 1998, found support for both the 
structuralists’ and the accommodationists’ approach in Spain. It was established that 
Granger causality ran predominantly from bank lending to the various money 
multipliers used, and it was confirmed that liability management was significantly 
utilised for the accommodation of loan demand, in support of the structuralist view. 
It was also found that the mark-up of the prime lending rate over the interbank rate 
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appeared to fluctuate pro-cyclically, as claimed by the structuralists. However, closer 
inspection of the liquidity position of banks suggests that other factors, such as 
changing market power and changing demand elasticities over the cycle, and 
therefore not the structuralist approach, may explain the pro-cyclical pattern of mark-
ups. 
 
An interesting study by Pinga and Nelson (2001) tested the monetarists’ and 
structuralists’ theory using Granger causality tests on 26 countries. It should be 
stressed that their study focused on testing the causality between money supply and 
prices (consumer, wholesale or producer price indices, where available, as a proxy 
for inflation) and not money supply and bank loans. They found mixed evidence on 
the causality between money and inflation for each country over different lag 
structures. Their results indicated that there is strong evidence of money endogeneity 
in Chile and Sri Lanka and of money exogeneity in Kuwait, Paraguay and the US. 
Other countries – Argentina, Brazil, the Central African Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, The 
Netherlands, Pakistan, The Philippines, Singapore, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and 
Uruguay – exhibited either no causality or mixed evidence, that is, bidirectional 
causality. Pinga and Nelson concluded that countries with high inflation were shown 
to have an endogenous money supply responding to inflationary pressure, while low 
inflation environments supported the monetarist view.  
 
Similarly, utilising error-correction models and Granger causality tests to test 
the money endogeneity hypothesis, Shanmugam, Nair and Li (2003) found that 
money supply was endogenous in Malaysia between 1985 and 2000. The results 
supported the liquidity preference approach as there was a long-run cointegrating 
relationship between money income and M3 money supply; and they provided 
support for the accommodationists’ view as there was causality between total bank 
loans and the M3 money supply. However, there was no support for the structuralist 
approach in Malaysia as there was an absence of causality from total bank loans to 
the M3 money multiplier. 
 
Using a vector error-correction model (VECM) on German quarterly data 
over the period 1975 to 1998, Holtemöller (2003) found that money stock and 
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monetary base were determined endogenously after the Bundesbank had set the 
money market interest rate, a finding that opposed the money multiplier approach; 
and there was a stable relationship between money stock and monetary base. There 
was, however, one shortcoming stated in his paper in that the money stock 
formulated was simply the quantity of loans, which was representative of M1, but 
Holtemöller (2003) used M3 as a money supply variable in his tests.  
 
Vymyatnina (2006), using Granger causality over the period 1995 to 2004 (a 
relatively short period), found support for money endogeneity in Russia. There exist 
two sources of endogeneity in the results, in support of the accommodationists and 
structuralists. Similarly, using Granger causality tests over monthly data from 1980 
to 2003, Ahmad and Ahmed (2006) concluded that money is endogenous in the short 
run, spanning a time period of not more than 18 months, but is exogenous in the long 
run. Cifter and Ozun (2007) tested the monetary transmission mechanism and money 
endogeneity in Turkey. Using a VECM methodology over a sample period running 
from 1997 to 2006, they found support for the accommodationist approach of the PK 
theory of endogenous money. 
 
The empirical evidence relating to money endogeneity above is mainly 
concerned with investigating whether money is endogenous. The next section 
discusses the empirical evidence relating to bank stock returns. 
 
2.5.3 Empirical evidence on bank stock returns  
This section will explore the empirical evidence with respect to bank stock 
returns. Studies on macroeconomic variables, including money supply and stock 
index returns, will also be discussed in this section.19 This section restricts the review 
to bank and money supply relevant studies. 
 
Most of the studies that use bank stocks investigate (i) the relationship 
between the risk and returns of bank stocks (Chance and Lane, 1980; Flannery and 
James, 1984; Booth and Officer, 1985; Aharony, Saunders and Swary, 1986; Tarhan, 
                                                 
19
 Empirical evidence to support the theory proposed by Alves Jr., Dymski and de Paula (2004) to the 
author’s knowledge does not exist.  
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1987; Bae, 1990; Dinenis and Staikouras, 1998; Lajeri and Dermine, 1999; Stiroh, 
2006; Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2007; Uzun and Webb, 2007), (ii) the efficiency 
of banks and its relationship to their returns (Beccalli, Casu and Girardone, 2006; 
Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006; Fiordelisi, 2007) or (iii) the determinants of bank stock 
returns (Cooper, Jackson and Patterson, 2003; Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 
2004; Barros, Ferreira and Williams, 2007; Carbó Valverde and Rodríguez 
Fernández, 2007). Recently, Berger and Bouwman (2008) found that banks that 
create liquidity are valued highly by investors through their market-to-book ratio and 
price-earnings ratio. 
 
A number of studies, for example, Keran (1971), Homa and Jaffee (1971) and 
Hamburger and Kochin (1972) have found a significant and positive relationship 
between money supply and stock prices, with money supply leading stock prices. 
However, consistent with Fama’s (1970) efficient markets hypothesis, Rozeff (1974), 
Pesando (1974) and Rogalski and Vinso (1977) found that past money changes do 
not contain predictive information on stock prices.  
 
Since then, studies such as Pearce and Roley (1983), Cornell (1983) and 
Pearce and Roley (1985) have focused on the unanticipated changes of money supply 
and stock prices, where evidence shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the two in the US studies. Hardouvelis (1987) analysed the response of stock prices 
to the announcements of 15 macroeconomic variables and concluded that the NYSE 
Financial Index has the strongest response to monetary news as the cash flows of 
financial companies are directly affected by monetary developments. Hashemzadeh 
and Taylor (1988) found that there exists bidirectional causality between money 
supply and stock returns in the US. Mukherjee and Naka (1995) found that the 
Japanese stock market is cointegrated with six macroeconomic variables, of which 
money supply is one (perhaps this study is directly relevant to this thesis). Dhakal, 
Kandil and Sharma (1993), Abdullah and Hayworth (1993), Lee (1994), Flannery 
and Protopapadakis (2002) and Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007) tested the long-run 
relationship between macroeconomic variables (including money supply) and stock 
returns in the US and also found that there is a long-run relationship between stock 
returns and money supply (amongst other macroeconomic variables, here too money 
supply is identified).  
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Most of these studies, however, use general stock index prices and not bank 
stock prices in particular.20  
 
2.6 Discussion 
This review of the literature suggests that research has mainly focused on exogenous 
or endogenous money or stock index returns and that the effect of earnings (dividend 
model) has not yet been studied in the money supply context. But no study has 
investigated these issues together, that is, the simultaneous relationship between 
banking sector stock returns and the creation of money supply by banks. This has 
been highlighted in Figure 2.1. The first question for this integrated investigation is 
to verify the money endogeneity. That is, whether or not the G-7 countries21 have 
evidence in support of money being endogenous, as our hypothesis maintains. 
Rejection of this hypothesis for all or some countries would show that money is 
exogenous for those cases. An associated issue is that endogeneity and exogeneity 
need to be verified in terms of causality.  This can be achieved by using existing 
econometric models to test for causality. 
 
The nature of the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money is debated 
amongst its proponents. Three views, accommodationist, structuralist and liquidity 
preference, evolve from the debates, mainly concerning the amount of credit 
demanded that banks accommodate, giving rise to differences in the slope of the 
money supply curve. Empirical evidence relating to these three views has focused on 
emerging economies and the US. Another avenue of research is to investigate which 
of these three views is supported by the seven countries examined in this thesis, if 
money is found to be endogenous. These questions can also be determined using the 
latest econometric causality models. 
 
                                                 
20
 Other studies, for example, Strongin and Tarhan (1990), Li and Hu (1998), Rapach (2001) and 
Funke and Matsuda (2006) investigate the effects of macroeconomic announcements and stock returns, 
however, as this thesis investigates the relationship between the bank stock returns and money supply 
as defined through the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money, these studies are not relevant to 
this thesis in that respect.  
21
 Russia, though a member of the G-8, is not included in the thesis due to lack of data availability. 
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Most empirical research regarding endogenous money tests the causality 
between bank loans and money supply, as deposits may be held not only in the 
transactional form but also in any form that constitutes broad money supply. 
However, post-Keynesians assert that loans create deposits and in turn deposits 
create money supply. This makes it possible that deposits may be an important 
variable in the transmission from bank loans to money supply, as bank loans 
acquired are immediately transferred into demand deposits and not only into other 
types of deposits. Thus, it will be useful to use Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) 
causality technique to determine whether this trivariate causality exists. 
 
Empirical studies relating to bank stock returns have concentrated on 
investigating the relationship between the risk and return of bank stocks, the 
efficiency of the banks and its relationship with bank stock prices, or the 
determinants of bank stock returns. The unstudied issue here is the relationship 
between money supply – be it endogenous or exogenous – and bank stock returns. 
The relationship between exogenous money supply affecting bank stock returns is 
exhaustively explained via the liquidity effect or portfolio balance effect. The 
direction of the endogenous money supply effect on bank stock returns is interesting, 
as the transmission from changes in interest rates by the central bank (following the 
PK theory), as it moves through loans and is then filtered into bank stock prices, has 
not been investigated. 
 
Previous literature argues that money supply and other macroeconomic 
variables do have an important impact on stock prices in general: money supply in 
general is positively related to stock prices, given the impact of money supply 
increases on reducing the discount rate via the market interest rate. For example, an 
expansionary monetary policy may increase stock prices, as the increase in money 
supply means that the public will have more money to spend, especially in the stock 
market. In this regard, the dividend valuation theory in the finance literature appears 
to suggest that increases in money supply which reduce interest rates mean that 
investment can be financed cheaply, resulting in increased earnings and hence 
increased stock prices.  
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The central issue is the link between money supply – a monetary economics 
issue – and bank stock returns. An examination of this issue is likely to add new 
findings about the dynamics of bank stock price behaviour arising from money 
supply. In this thesis, a model will be developed for the purposes of investigating this 
central issue. By combining the findings as to whether money is endogenous and 
whether there is a relationship between money supply and bank stock returns, a 
simultaneous model may be able to answer the question of whether there is a 
simultaneous relationship in the financial economics issue. These discussions will be 
further elaborated in the ensuing chapters. Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the 
financial system and monetary policy adopted by the G-7 countries included in this 
thesis. Chapter 4 will develop testable hypotheses based on the discussion in this 
chapter and a testable model, while Chapter 5 will provide the results of the tests. 
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Chapter 3: Overview of the Financial System and 
Monetary Policy in the G-7 Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The countries examined in this thesis have developed financial systems as well as a 
history of changes in their monetary policy regimes. This chapter discusses the 
history of the financial systems and monetary policies of the G-7 countries. These 
will be discussed in the sequence of first the non-euro countries – Canada, Japan, 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) – followed by the euro countries 
of France, Germany and Italy. The Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis and the 
foundation of the euro will also be discussed in this chapter, since the data span the 
pre-euro period. Further, identification of time periods to control for the regime 
changes and regulatory changes within the econometric models to be developed in 
the next chapter will depend on verifying the monetary policy changes in the 
countries. These are fully explored in this chapter. 
 
3.2 Canada: Financial system 
In 1967, the Bank Act was amended in Canada as a first step in a financial 
deregulation that included the elimination of the 6 percent ceiling on the interest rate 
on bank loans (Freedman 1998). Banks were also prohibited from making 
agreements with any other banks on the rate of interest paid on deposits or the rate of 
interest charge on loans. Thus, as indicated by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), the 
determination of interest rates on loans was left to market forces. The amendments 
also eliminated restrictions on the banks’ involvement in residential mortgage 
financing, so that they could invest in non-insured or conventional mortgages.  
Furthermore, when the 10 percent ownership limit on the shares of banks was 
introduced, banks were prohibited from owning trust companies in order to ensure 
that Canadian banks remained under domestic ownership and control and to prevent 
any concentration of ownership. Deposit insurance for banks and for trust and 
mortgage loan companies was also introduced in Canada following the financial 
difficulties of some trust and loan companies.  
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In 1973, chartered banks were allowed to borrow abroad, and corporations 
were allowed to issue bonds abroad, although they were subject to some guidelines 
and controls (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003). No controls were in place on foreign 
exchange transactions at this time. There were also no controls over inward or 
outward portfolio investment for stocks. However, there were some specific 
restrictions on inward direct investment in broadcasting, telecommunications, 
transportation, fisheries, and energy and financial services. In 1974, chartered banks 
were given greater freedom to conduct foreign currency operations. Following this, 
in February 1975, the 1970 guideline that requested Canadians to explore fully all 
available sources in the domestic market before issuing bonds abroad was lifted. 
 
The Bank Act was again amended in 1980. This time the amendments 
allowed foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in Canada, although they had 
restrictions on the total size of the bank business. These were removed in 1989 for 
US banks as part of the Canada-US free trade agreement, in 1994 for Mexican banks 
as part of NAFTA, and in 1995 for the rest of the foreign banks’ subsidiaries as part 
of the world trade negotiations.  The Canadian Payments Association (CPA) Act was 
passed in 1980 to allow banks and non-bank deposit-taking institutions to take over 
from the Canadian Bankers Association the responsibility for running the cheque-
clearing system. The CPA was given responsibility for planning the future evolution 
of the Canadian payments system. 
 
From 30 June 1987, there was no longer any limit on investments in 
securities firms by Canadian financial institutions.  Non-residents were permitted to 
own up to 50 percent of an existing securities firm from this date, and up to 100 
percent from 30 June 1988. Direct entry into the Ontario market by foreign securities 
firms was also permitted without limit from 30 June 1987. Reserve requirements 
were phased out in the early 1990s (Williamson and Mahar, 1998). The “Four 
Pillars” system was largely eliminated in 1992, giving Federal financial institutions 
the power to diversify into new financial businesses through financial institution 
subsidiaries.  As a result of the 1987 and 1992 amendments, Canadian financial 
institutions were able to develop into financial conglomerates, with involvement in a 
wide variety of financial areas. 
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3.2.1 Canada: Monetary policy 
In 1975, in response to the persistence of high inflation during the 1970s, the 
Bank of Canada adopted a narrowly defined monetary aggregate (M1) under a 
program of “monetary gradualism” whereby M1 growth would be controlled with a 
gradually falling target range. When this aggregate became increasingly unreliable 
and turned out not to have been all that helpful in achieving the desired lessening of 
inflation pressures, it was abandoned as a target in November 1982, with Gerald 
Bouey, the governor of the Bank of Canada describing the situation by saying, “we 
didn’t abandon monetary aggregates, they abandoned us” (Mishkin, 2000, p. 102). 
As the Bank of Canada was not able to find an alternative monetary aggregate target, 
monetary policy in Canada between 1982 and 1991 was carried out with price 
stability as a long-term goal and inflation containment as the short-term goal, but 
without an intermediate target or specified path to the longer-term objective.   
 
Thiessen (1998) explained that in February 1991, the Bank of Canada and the 
Government of Canada jointly announced targets for the control of inflation, which 
confirmed price stability as the appropriate long-term objective for monetary policy 
in Canada and specified a target path to low inflation. At the end of 1992, a target 
rate of 3 percent for the 12-month increase in the Consumer Price Index was 
announced. It was to be followed by reductions to 2.5 percent from mid-1994 and 2 
percent by the end of 1995.  These targets had a band of plus or minus one 
percentage point around them.  The announcements specified that after 1995 there 
would be further reductions of inflation until price stability was achieved. In 
December 1993, it was agreed that the 1 to 3 percent target range for inflation would 
be extended through to 1998. In February 1998, the government and the bank 
announced that the 1 to 3 percent target range would be extended again, this time to 
the end of 2001. 
 
3.3 Japan: Financial system 
In 1947, the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law (TIRAL), which 
provided the principal framework for interest rate control in Japan, was introduced.  
It allowed the Bank of Japan to develop detailed guidelines for ceilings on deposit 
rates and on short-term lending rates, as well as on rates of discounted bills with an 
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amount greater than ¥1 million and a maturity of less than one year (Kanaya and 
Woo, 2001).  Due to this interest-rate control, there was very little interest-rate 
variation among different financial institutions in Japan. 
 
In 1959, controls on lending rates were loosened and the Federation of 
Bankers Association of Japan introduced a system that set short-term lending rates 
between the official discount rate and the ceiling imposed by TIRAL. This system, 
however, was abolished in 1974. In 1979, the deregulation of interest rates started, 
and controls on inflows were eased. In January of the same year, the prohibition 
regarding non-residents’ purchase of bonds with a remaining maturity of less than 
five years was entirely lifted.  
 
The Japanese authorities implemented major reforms during the 1980s that 
included the deregulation of cross-border transactions and improvements in access to 
foreign financial institutions. Starting in July 1980, Japanese corporations were 
allowed to issue bonds abroad, provided that advance notice was given. Deregulation 
continued during the 1990s, with lending rates being market-determined. Kozuka 
(2005) notes that, as a result of the massive structural reforms undertaken in the 
1990s, Japan is now characterised by a principle of competition rather than a 
“convoy system”, or a set of regulations, as it once was. 
 
By the end of 1991, interest rates in almost all time deposits held by corporate 
clients were fully liberalised. Also, the share of deposits with market-determined 
interest rates amounted to 75 percent of total deposits (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 
2003). In July 1991, direct quantitative controls on credit were abolished. In June 
1992, the liberalisation of interest rates on time deposits was completed. Controls on 
interest rates on most fixed-term deposits were eliminated by 1993, and non-time 
deposit rates were freed in 1994 (Williamson and Mahar, 1998).   
 
Williamson and Mahar (1998) note that, as a result of the extensive financial 
deregulation, a crisis loomed from 1992 onwards that affected all types of financial 
institutions. The banks suffered from a sharp decline in stock market and real estate 
prices. Concerns about the quality of jusen lending grew during 1992 and in the 
spring of 1993 (Kanaya and Woo, 2001). Jusen, or housing loan corporations, were 
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established in the mid-1970s by banks, securities companies and insurance 
companies to complement the housing loans offered by banks. In the 1980s, the jusen 
companies shifted their lending towards real estate developers, which was a mistake 
as they had little commercial lending expertise. In 1995, the aggregate losses of the 
seven jusen companies were found to be ¥6,410 billion. 
 
On 9 December 1994, two urban credit co-operatives, Tokyo Kyowa and 
Anzen, failed. The resolution package included a newly established bank, the Tokyo 
Kyoudou Bank that was to take over the business of the two failed institutions. The 
Bank of Japan and private financial institutions injected ¥20 billion each into the new 
bank, with the Deposit Insurance Corporation also providing the new bank with 
financial assistance. In 1995, the official estimate of non-performing loans was ¥40 
trillion, with the Cosmo Credit Co-operative announcing a failure in July, followed 
by Kizu Credit Cooperative in August, and the Hyogo Bank in western Japan 
(Nakaso, 2001). Following this, in September 1995, the internationally active Daiwa 
Bank announced that it had incurred a loss of approximately $1.1 billion; by 3 
November, US regulators ordered the bank to close all operations in US markets. In 
1996, rescue costs were estimated at more than $100 billion. In 1998 the government 
announced the Obuchi plan which provided ¥60 trillion in public funds for loan 
losses, bank recapitalisation and depositor protection.   
 
On November 11, 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto unveiled a plan 
called the “Big Bang”, consisting of dozens of proposals to reform Japanese financial 
institutions and markets by the year 2001 (Craig, 1998). The aim of this plan was to 
create a “free, fair and global” financial system, that is, it was to operate according to 
market principles rather than regulatory prescriptions; it was to be fair, in that it 
would be transparent and reliable; and global, as it would be sophisticated and 
internationally respected. 
 
Despite the plans, by early 1997 the Nippon Credit Bank was experiencing 
severe funding problems and opted for a bailout with a capital injection in July of 
¥290.6 billion from both the Bank of Japan and private sources. However, in 
December 1998 the bank failed and was nationalised. In October 1997, there were 
successive failures in the western part of Japan, starting with Sanyo Securities, 
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Hakkaido Takushodu bank, Yamachi Securities and Tokuyo City Bank.22  On 23 
October 1998, the Long-Term Credit Bank was nationalised. In 1999, Yatsuda Trust 
was merged with Fuji Bank, and Mitsui Trust was merged with Chuo Trust. By 2002, 
non-performing loans were 35 percent of total loans, and a total of seven banks had 
been nationalised, 61 financial institutions closed and 28 institutions merged (Caprio 
and Klingebiel, 2003). 
 
3.3.1 Japan: Monetary policy 
In order to achieve price stability, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) tried, prior to 
1962, to maintain an appropriate level of money stock and interest rates by raising or 
lowering its lending rates and so directly influencing financial institutions’ lending 
and securities investment. This made the financial institutions overly dependent on 
the BoJ. In order to address the situation, the BoJ introduced a new scheme for 
monetary control in 1962 whereby (i) the increase in money demand coming from 
economic expansion would be met by funds supplied through operations using 
bonds, and (ii) an upper limit on loans was set for major financial institutions. As the 
market grew more mature and deposit rates were deregulated in the early 1990s, the 
BoJ made more explicit its new way of controlling the money supply and interest 
rate levels by guiding the overnight call rate through the adjustment of the BoJ’s 
account balances. 
 
As of 1991, the BoJ started adopting an expansionary monetary policy. It cut 
its official discount rate, which had peaked at 6 percent in August 1990, nine times 
until it reached a record low level of 0.5 percent in September 1995 (Kato, Ui and 
Watanabe, 1999). Expansionary monetary policy was pursued further by lowering 
the BoJ’s target level of uncollateralised overnight call rate from 0.5 to 0.25 percent 
in September 1998 and finally to zero percent in February 1999.  
 
In 2001, the BoJ adopted strong monetary easing measures to prevent a 
continuous price decline and to lay the foundation for a sustainable recovery. 
Following the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, the BoJ 
took all necessary measures to secure smooth fund settlement and to maintain 
financial stability (Yamaguchi, 2004). One of the points of the framework of the 
                                                 
22
 For further explanation of the failures, see Nakaso (2001). 
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BoJ’s monetary easing measures is that they will continue to pursue the current 
monetary policy framework until the rate of increase in the consumer price index 
rises and stays at or slightly exceeds zero percent. 
 
3.4 United Kingdom: Financial system 
The 1950s and 1960s were a period of direct controls in the United Kingdom 
(UK). However, after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1971, things 
moved more towards deregulation. On 10 September 1971, the Bank of England 
announced a new regime of more flexible control over banks and finance houses. Six 
days later, ceilings on lending rates were removed.  
 
The Minimum Lending Rate was introduced to replace the Bank rate on 9 
October 1972, and on 17 December the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme 
(“the corset”) was introduced. This scheme required banks and finance houses to 
place special deposits with the Bank of England if their growth in interest-bearing 
liabilities exceeded specified limits. It was discontinued in 1980.  In 1979, the special 
exchange rate regime for capital account transactions was abolished and authorities 
eliminated all barriers to outward and inward flows of capital (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2003). On 21 August 1981, the publication of the MLR was discontinued, 
and the minimum reserve assets ratio was abolished and replaced by a universal 0.5 
percent liquidity requirement. In July 1982, hire purchase controls on cars and other 
consumer goods were abolished, and in December 1986 mortgage lending guidance 
was withdrawn. The London Stock Exchange was fully deregulated in 1986, and 
building societies were allowed to expand their lending business after this year  
(Williamson and Mahar, 1998).   
 
3.4.1 United Kingdom: Monetary policy 
On 14 May 1971, the Bank of England published a paper on Competition and 
Credit Control that set out a new framework of a much more market-related approach 
to monetary policy. The collapse of the fixed-rate regime that year saw the floating 
of sterling on 23 August 1971.  Oil price rises and wage disputes combined to push 
inflation to high levels during this period.  
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In the mid-1970s, in response to mounting inflation concerns, the UK 
introduced monetary targeting.  Informal targeting of a broad aggregate sterling M3 
began in late 1973 and formal publication of targets began in 1976. The Bank of 
England had great difficulty in meeting its M3 targets in the 1976 to 1979 period.  
Mishkin (2000) explains that not only were announced targets consistently overshot, 
but the Bank of England frequently revised its targets midstream or abandoned them 
altogether.  In 1978, inflation in UK began to accelerate, reaching nearly 20 percent 
by 1980. In early 1980, Prime Minister Thatcher introduced a medium-term financial 
strategy that proposed a gradual deceleration of M3 growth. As the relationship 
between targeted aggregate and nominal income became very unstable after 1983, 
the Bank of England began to deemphasise M3 in favour of a narrower aggregate, 
the monetary base (M0).  The target for M3 was temporarily suspended in October 
1985 and was dropped altogether in 1987. Following the Louvre Accord in 1987, the 
exchange rate became an important target. On 8 October 1990, the UK joined the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
 
Downward pressure on the exchange rate and upward pressure on interest 
rates, especially in anticipation of the Maastricht Treaty referendum in France and 
also the weak US dollar in August 1992, forced the UK to leave the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism on 16 September of that year. Three weeks later, on 8 
October 1992, the Chancellor, Norman Lamont, set out a new framework for 
monetary policy which consisted of two features: (i) an explicit inflation target and 
(ii) a much greater degree of openness and transparency in the conduct of monetary 
policy (King, 1999). The inflation target was originally set at 1-4 percent with the 
aim of getting it near the 1 percent end by 1997; however, in July 1997 the Bank of 
England set an inflation target of 2.5 percent. In December 2003, this was reduced to 
2 percent. 
 
3.5 United States: Financial system 
The passing of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act in 1932 in the United States 
(US) established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and accordingly in 1934 the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was set up to insure 
deposits at the Savings and Loan (S&L) institutions. In the 1960s, Regulation Q was 
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applied to the S&L industry in order to put a ceiling on the interest rate paid by the 
S&L institutions to depositors. 
 
Interest rate deregulation started in 1980 with the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (1980) phasing out restrictions on banks’ 
ability to pay interest on deposits. This act aimed to prevent member banks from 
leaving the Federal Reserve System and to make banks more competitive with non-
bank competitors for savings (Wells, 2004). One of the provisions of the act was that 
Regulation Q was to be phased out by 1986.  
 
Between 1979 and 1982 interest rates increased sharply, leading to an asset-
liability crisis at many S&Ls. In 1982, in response to this crisis, the Garn-St. 
Germain Act was passed, allowing banks and thrifts to compete with money market 
mutual funds by offering money market deposit accounts of their own. Regulation Q 
was phased out. Enactment of the Garn-St. Germain Act and the deregulation of asset 
powers by several key states – for example, California and Florida – led many S&Ls 
to change their operating strategies, substantially intensifying the competitive 
environment of commercial banks and placing downward pressure on bank 
profitability (Curry and Shibut, 2000).  
 
On 19 October 1987, in the midst of the S&L crisis, the US stock market 
crashed, resulting in the most dramatic single-day decline in share prices history. The 
crash created difficulties for certain financial institutions (Illing, 2003). There was an 
immediate threat to financial stability being the potential for widespread failure of 
securitised firms and the consequent impairment of loans from the banking system. 
The US stock market collapse also spilled over to equity markets around the world, 
for example, to Canada and the United Kingdom. Due to the crash, the New York 
Federal Reserve engaged in substantial, highly visible and earlier-than-normal open 
market operations almost immediately and for each date until 30 October (Illing, 
2003). As a result, the overnight Federal funds rate fell 114 basis points between 19 
and 21 October. 
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3.5.1 United States: Monetary policy 
In the United States, it is well understood that the two episodes most 
commonly seen as major monetary policy failures since the founding of the Federal 
Reserve, namely the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 
1970s, were episodes where policymakers failed to properly monitor and heed the 
warnings present in the behaviour of money (Orphanides and Porter, 2001). The 
Federal Reserve has regularly monitored the growth of money since the late 1970s in 
large part because of these experiences,.  
 
Beginning in 1970, as a result of increasing concerns about inflation, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) selected a weekly tracking path for the 
M1 money supply and indicated its preferred behaviour for M2. In 1972, it 
introduced six-month growth targets aimed at gradually reducing inflation. In 1975, 
in response to a congressional resolution, the Fed began to announce publicly its 
targets for money growth. Mishkin (2000) explains that in practice, however, the Fed 
did not consider achieving the money growth targets to be of high priority, placing 
higher weight on reducing unemployment and smoothing interest rates. This is 
reflected in the fact that, despite the declining target ranges, M1 growth had an 
upward trend after 1975. Furthermore, while unemployment declined steadily after 
1975, inflation rose sharply.   
 
Until 1979, the framework used by the FOMC to guide open market 
operations involved setting a monetary objective and encouraging the Federal funds 
rate to move gradually up or down if money had deviated from the objective. Thus, 
the Federal funds rate became an indicator of money market conditions. In October 
1979, the Fed changed its operating procedures to deemphasise the Federal funds rate 
as its operating target. While supposedly increasing its commitment to the control of 
monetary aggregates, it also adopted a non-borrowed reserves operating target. 
Mishkin (2000) asserts that the change in operating procedures made fluctuations in 
M1 growth increase, rather than decrease as expected; hence it did not result in 
improved monetary control.  
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The Fed missed its M1 growth targets in all three years of the 1979 to 1982 
period.  It appears that controlling monetary aggregates was never the intent of the 
1979 policy shift, but rather was a smokescreen to obscure the need of the Fed to 
raise interest rates to very high levels to reduce inflation, as inferred by Mishkin 
(2000). In addition, the relationship between monetary aggregates and nominal GDP, 
and between monetary aggregates and inflation, had broken down, hence raising 
concerns that monetary aggregates were no longer useful as a guide to the conduct of 
monetary policy.  Thus, in October 1982, with inflation in check, the Fed began to 
deemphasise monetary aggregates, and in February 1987, the Fed announced that it 
would no longer set M1 targets, while also finding that M2 and M3 were unreliable.  
It also moved away from borrowed reserve targets, which subsequently contributed 
to the stock market crash in October 1987.  
 
As alternative operating targets ceased to work, the FOMC in effect began 
gradually to return to targeting the Federal funds rate, which continued well into the 
1990s (Meulendyke, 1998). Finally, in July 1993, Alan Greenspan announced that 
the Fed would no longer use any monetary targets, including M2, as a guide for the 
conduct of monetary policy, because the historical relationship between money and 
income and money and price levels had broken down, thus depriving these 
aggregates of their usefulness as monetary policy guides. In 1995, announcements on 
the preferred funds rate in press releases were formalised. 
 
3.6 France: Financial system 
The first deregulatory episode in France came between 1966 and 1969, when 
the intervention rate of the Bank of France was made flexible (Melitz, 1990). 
Financial institutions were highly specialised until the mid-1980s; then, after 1984, 
universal banks were permitted to operate. Some banks in France have been 
nationalised since 1945; however, all larger banks were only nationalised in 1982, 
while several French banks were privatised in 1987 and 1993, including Banque 
Nationale de Paris  (Williamson and Mahar, 1998).  
 
In 1985 (deposit and lending) interest rate ceilings were mostly eliminated.  
In 1986, interest rates became the chief instrument by which the monetary authorities 
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sought to achieve their monetary policy aims. For this reason, Icard (1994) explains 
that the financial markets were reorganised and deregulated. During this year, the 
ceiling and selectivity of credit policies were abolished. In January 1987, credit 
controls were completely removed and the compulsory ratio for assets was abolished 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003). 
 
Subsidised loans for exports, investments and housing, as well as to local 
authorities, were slowly phased out – but not eliminated – in the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to Williamson and Mahar (1998), capital flows in and out of the country 
were largely liberalised from 1986 to 1988 and liberalisation was completed in 1990. 
 
3.6.1 France: Monetary policy 
France has set a monetary aggregate target since 1977, and it has participated 
in all the mechanisms instituted by the European Monetary System (EMS) since its 
inception in 1979. Icard (1994) explains that for many years, France combined these 
monetary targets with regulatory measures to stem the growth of bank lending 
(quantitative credit controls), and with foreign exchange controls. French monetary 
policy is based on two targets: the exchange rate and the monetary aggregate. The 
main policy instrument is short-term interest rates, with reserve requirements a 
supplementary instrument. Coinciding with the inception of deregulation in 1985, the 
relationship between monetary aggregates and nominal GDP deteriorated. In 1986, 
interest rates became the chief instrument through which the monetary authorities 
sought to achieve their objectives. As a result, the Banque de France redefined its 
money market intervention techniques and quantitative credit controls were removed.   
 
3.7 Germany: Financial system 
Ceilings on interest rates were abolished in Germany in 1967 and there were 
no credit controls after 1973 (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003). In 1973, banks were 
subject to a high minimum reserve requirement on the level of their foreign liabilities 
with maturities of less than four years. Banks’ foreign currency borrowing that was 
immediately reinvested abroad was exempted from the minimum reserve 
requirements. Cash deposit requirements were applied to certain borrowing made by 
residents from non-residents.  The prior approval of the central bank was required for 
sales to non-residents of all domestic money market paper and other fixed-interest 
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securities of German issuers with less than four years remaining to maturity. No 
special exchange rate regime for capital account transactions existed. In February 
1974, Bundesbank approval requirements were lifted for all borrowings abroad made 
by residents.  Most capital controls were dismantled in 1974. Stock market regulation 
was eased in the 1980s and money market funds were permitted in 1994 (Williamson 
and Mahar, 1998).  
 
In March 1980, Germany lowered the minimum maturity for domestic fixed 
interest securities eligible for sale to non-residents from four to two years; it was 
further reduced to one year in November. In March 1981, restrictions on the sale of 
German money market paper and fixed-interest securities to non-residents were lifted. 
This implied a de facto abolition of the remaining restrictions on capital transactions.   
 
3.7.1 Germany: Monetary policy 
The monetary aggregate chosen by Germany was central bank money, a 
narrower aggregate that was the sum of currency in circulation and bank deposits 
weighted by the 1974 required reserve ratios. When the Bundesbank first set its 
monetary targets at the end of 1974, it announced the medium-term inflation goal of 
4 percent, which has been labelled as an “unavoidable rate of price increase" 
(Mishkin, 2000). Its gradualist approach to reducing inflation led to a period of nine 
years before the medium-term inflation goal was considered to be consistent with 
price stability. When this occurred at the end of 1984, the medium-term inflation 
goal was renamed the “normative rate of price increases”. It was set at 2 percent and 
continued at this level until 1997, when it was changed to 1.5 to 2 percent.  In 1988, 
the Bundesbank switched targets from central bank money to M3. 
 
3.8 Italy: Financial system 
In Italy, the maximum interest rates on deposits and minimum interest rates 
on loans were set by Italian Bankers Association until 1974. In 1975 deposit interest 
rate ceilings were re-established, only to be eliminated again in 1981 (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2003). Credit ceilings were eliminated in 1984 and reimposed 
temporarily between 1986 and 1987. Reserve requirements were progressively 
lowered between 1989 and 1994, while foreign exchange and capital controls were 
eliminated by May 1990. Floor prices on government bonds were eliminated in 1992. 
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Bank branching was liberalised in 1990 and foreign banks were permitted in 1993. 
Due to this, a number of banks merged between 1990 and 1998 and the number of 
banks in Italy decreased by 19 percent (Calcagnini, De Bonis and Hester, 1999). 
Also, due to the “Amato Law” or law 218/90 which allowed the transformation of 
public banks into joint stock companies, some banks were also privatised, for 
example, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, Istituto Bancario San Paolo 
di Torino, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and Banca di Roma. 
 
3.8.1  Italy: Monetary policy 
Between 1984 and 1998, growth paths for the aggregate M2 were at first 
announced as point values (between 1984 and 1985). They then moved to ranges up 
until 1995, when there was a return to announcing the aggregates in point values. 
Until 1992, the announcement of growth ranges was complemented by the exchange 
rate commitment represented by the lira’s participation in the European Monetary 
System. In 1992, when the lira abandoned the Exchange Rate Mechanism due to its 
devaluation, greater emphasis was put on monetary growth, but in 1994 the focus of 
monetary policy switched to the behaviour of actual and forecast inflation. The 
following year, the Governor of the Bank of Italy announced upper limits for 
inflation; thus monetary policy actions were based on deviations of internal inflation 
forecasts from the desired path (Altissimo, Gaiotti and Locarno, 2001). 
 
3.9 The European Monetary System (EMS) and the euro 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the late 
1970s resulted in widespread currency floats and devaluations. The Werner Report, 
which detailed how Europe could reach monetary union in three stages by 1980, was 
published in 1970. However, it was not taken seriously due to (1) the creation of new 
institutions outside the existing framework not being accepted by the members, and 
(2) the emergence of inflation and unemployment as new challenges for economic 
policy due to the different policy preferences of the member countries (Gros and 
Thygesen, 1998). The Werner Report was, then, neglected.23 
 
                                                 
23
 Thanks to an examiner for pointing this out. 
 60 
 Even with the Werner Report not implemented, its fundamental thrust 
regarding preserving stability in European exchange movements was followed. In 
March 1971, the European Economic Community (EEC) member states24 agreed to 
establish a Community system known as the “snake” for the progressive narrowing 
of the fluctuation margins of the members’ currencies. It was put into operation in 
April 1972. Under this system, the spot exchange rates of the participating currencies 
were allowed to fluctuate within ±2.25 percent against the US dollar. On 19 March 
1973, the fluctuation margins in relation to the US dollar were suspended and the 
snake henceforth fluctuated freely.  
 
In March 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) took effect, based on 
a currency unit called the European Currency Unit (ECU). The ECU, designed to 
stabilise the exchange rates of the national currencies and to counter inflation, was a 
“basket” of fixed quantities of the currencies of the member states. It was meant to 
serve as the measure or numéraire of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM); as a 
unit of account to denominate operations in the intervention and credit mechanisms; 
and as a reserve asset and means of settlement among the participating central banks 
(Scheller, 2004). The EMS was not, however, just an exchange rate mechanism; it 
also covered the adjustment of monetary and economic policies as tools for 
achieving exchange rate stability.  
 
In February 1986, the Single European Act was signed. It modified the Treaty 
of Rome, formalising political cooperation between the member states and including 
six new areas of competence, including monetary cooperation. The main objective of 
the act, which came into force on 1 July 1987, was to introduce the Single Market as 
a further objective of the Community, to make the necessary decision-making 
changes to complete the Single Market, and to reaffirm the need for the 
Community’s monetary capacity in order to achieve economic and monetary union. 
 
                                                 
24
 These include the countries that signed the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome was signed in 
March 1957 between Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands to 
establish the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). 
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On 17 April 1989, the Delors Report recommended that economic and 
monetary union be achieved in three steps. Stage One was to focus on completing the 
internal market, reducing disparities between member states’ economic policies, 
removing all obstacles to financial integration, and intensifying monetary 
cooperation. This stage began on 1 July 1990 with the abolition of all restrictions on 
the movement of capital between the member states. This stage also included 
preparatory work for Stage Three as soon as the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 
1992. On 7 February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed. It elevated the project 
of European integration to a new and far more ambitious level by setting January 
1999 as the date for the replacement of national currencies by a single, shared 
currency, the euro. On June 3 1992, Denmark refused to ratify the treaty and soon 
after the pound sterling declined below its floor against the Deutsche Mark, which 
made the UK withdraw from the ERM on September 17, 1992. Four days later, on 
September 21, a French poll approved the Maastricht Treaty by the narrowest of 
margins. 
 
Under the Delors Report, Stage Two would serve as a period of transition to 
Stage Three, setting up the basic functions and organisational structure of the EMU 
and strengthening economic convergence. This included the establishment of the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) on 12 January 1994 as a precursor for a future 
European Central Bank. The EMI’s functions were to strengthen central bank 
cooperation and monetary policy coordination, and to make the necessary 
preparations for establishing the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),25 for 
the conduct of the single monetary policy and for the creation of a single currency in 
Stage Three of the EMU. In 1998, the members of the EMU joined the ESCB, and 
the individual central banks’ main charge has since been limited to implementing the 
interest rate policy set by the ESCB. While the European Central Bank was indeed 
established on 1 June 1998, its exchange rate policy remains uncertain. 
 
Stage Three of the transition to economic and monetary union aimed to lock 
the exchange rate irrevocably, and assign the various Community institutions and 
bodies their full monetary and economic responsibilities, which began on 1 January 
                                                 
25
 ESCB includes the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the European Union 
member states. 
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1999. On January 5, 1999, the euro was launched and appreciated to $1.19 against 
the dollar on its first trading day. At the end of the year, the euro fell below dollar 
parity. On January 1, 2002, euro notes and coins were launched. 
 
3.10 The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Crisis 
The establishment of the EMS26 was not without its problems. In late 1991, 
Finland – an ECU “pegger” – devalued its currency the markka by 12 per cent as a 
result of the credit boom following financial liberalisation in the mid-1980s and 
rising German and European interest rates. On 26 August 1992, the pound sterling 
fell to its ERM floor despite intervention by the Bank of England. Two days later, the 
Italian lira joined the fate of the pound. Germany refused to reduce interest rates, 
while France, Britain and Spain avoided all discussion of a general realignment of 
the ERM currencies.  
 
On 8 September, Finland abandoned its peg and the markka depreciated by 
15 percent. Following this, Italy devalued the lira by 7 percent on 13 September and 
the Bundesbank lowered its Lombard rate by 25 basis points. On 16 September 1992, 
following massive speculation against sterling and its suspension from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, opened his 
statement with the words, “Today has been an extremely difficult and turbulent day” 
King (1999, p. 1). The pound and the lira both withdrew from the ERM.  
 
The consequences of these actions were devastating. The Banque de France 
was forced to raise interest rates, despite the French having ratified the Maastricht 
Treaty; and it spent $32 billion on the franc’s defence. Sweden abandoned its ECU 
peg on November 19 and Denmark, Spain and Portugal were forced to raise interest 
rates. Following this, Norway abandoned its ECU peg on December 10 and Ireland 
devalued by 10 percent within the ERM on January 30. The Danish krone and the 
Belgian franc came under attack in early 1993. The Spanish Iberia was forced to 
devalue another 8 percent on 13 May 1993; this had a spillover effect on Portugal, 
which devalued another 6 percent. By July 1993, the Banque de France lacked the 
reserves to continue to intervene in its currency, and for the Bundesbank to intervene 
any further would have threatened its anti-inflationary objectives. Europe’s central 
 63 
bank governors and finance ministers responded and finally widened the ERM’s 
bands to 15 percent. With most of the EU members reiterating their commitment to 
move ahead with monetary unification (but with the UK remaining outside), the 
markets settled down and the crisis receded. 
 
3.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of the financial system and 
monetary policy in the G-7 countries, with a discussion of the ERM crisis of 1992 
and a detailed overview of the foundations of the euro. This discussion will be very 
useful in specifying controls for regime and regulatory changes in our test models. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the different financial systems and monetary 
policies of the G-7 countries discussed in the sections above. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of financial system and monetary policy of the G-7 countries 
Country Financial System Monetary Policy 
 Financial 
deregulation 
start 
Financial 
Crisis 
Monetary 
targeting 
Inflation 
targeting 
Interest rate 
targeting 
Other 
Canada 1967  1975-1982 1991-present  1982-1991: 
transition 
France 1985 1991-1993: 
ERM crisis 
1977-1986  1986-1998 1998: euro  
Germany 1967 1991-1993: 
ERM crisis 
1974-1984 1984-1998  1998: euro 
Italy 1981 1991-1993: 
ERM crisis 
1984-1994 1997-1998  1998: euro 
Japan 1979 1992-2002: 
Jusen, credit 
cooperatives 
and bank 
crisis 
1962 1991-present: 
target CPI 
change at or 
above zero 
percent 
  
UK 1971 1991-1993: 
ERM crisis 
1973-1987 1992-present  1987-1992: 
transition 
1992: UK 
left EMS 
US 1980 1979-1989: 
S&L crisis 
1987: stock 
market crash 
1970-1982  1987-
present 
 
Note: ERM is Exchange Rate Mechanism, S&L is Savings and Loan, and EMS is European 
Monetary System. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
26
 Details of the EMS crisis were sourced from Eichengreen (2000).  
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Chapter 4: Data Variables, Model and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In view of the discussions in Chapter 2, this chapter aims to establish testable 
hypotheses, to develop a model for this purpose, and to discuss the data sources. The 
chapter presents the research questions and hypotheses in sections 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively. This is followed by the empirical model designed for use in this thesis 
as discussed in Section 4.4, while the details of the econometric methodology to test 
the hypotheses are provided in Section 4.5. Data to be used in this thesis are detailed 
in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 discusses the Chow breakpoint analyses and Section 4.8 
summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Research questions 
As stated in Section 1.2, this thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
1. Is the money supply endogenous or exogenous in each of the G-7 countries? 
2. If the money supply is endogenous, which of the three views 
(accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) does it support? 
2a. Is the support for the views in (2) above different in the short term than in the 
long term? 
3. Following the PK theory, whereby loans cause deposits and this in turn 
causes the money supply, is the PK theory valid for the sample of G-7 
countries under study in this thesis?  
4. Is there causality between the money supply and aggregate bank stock 
returns? 
5. Does a simultaneous relationship exist between bank loans, the money supply 
and aggregate bank stock returns such that loans create deposits (in the form 
of money supply) whilst at the same time loans and deposits affect the value 
of bank stocks? 
 
 The hypotheses in the following section are based on the above research 
questions and previous literature. The last two concern bank stock returns. 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 Money endogeneity or exogeneity 
The literature review in Chapter 2 relates to the post-Keynesian (PK) theory 
on endogenous money, which is extensive. Despite the controversy on the slope of 
the money supply (horizontal or positively sloped) under the PK theory, the 
empirical research findings show that loans create money supply, thus making it 
endogenous. Past empirical research used broad money supply instead of deposits, as 
deposits may be held in different forms similar to those that constitute the broad 
money supply. 
 
The post-Keynesians assert that money supply (MS) is endogenous through 
the behaviour of commercial banks and the public dealing with the banks. The 
central bank only influences the level of interest rates. Based on this set interest-rate 
level, commercial banks adjust their loan portfolios, in which process money is 
created. These adjustments will affect deposits and in turn the money supply. 
 
Alternatively, mainstream Keynesians have maintained that the money supply 
is controlled by the central bank and that changes in the money supply will change 
interest rates. This makes money supply exogenous, as it is controlled by the central 
bank. Any changes in money supply through the monetary base (MB) will affect 
deposits. Any changes in deposits will have an impact on the bank’s ability to extend 
bank loans (BL). Thus, it is hypothesised: 
 
H1.1: MS causes BL only (suggesting money is exogenous) 
H1.2: BL cause MS or there is bidirectional causality between MS and BL 
(implying money is endogenous) 
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4.3.2 Monetarist27 and three money endogeneity views 
4.3.2.1 Monetarist 
Proponents of Keynes (the money view) assume the central bank directly 
influences the quantity of money by adjusting the money supply. The central bank 
may, for example, decrease money supply and so increase real interest rates (without 
regard to what actually happens inside the bank), therefore raising a firm’s cost of 
capital. With a higher cost of capital, there are fewer profitable projects. The result is 
a decrease in investment, leading to a decline in aggregate output or income (Y). If 
the bank takes the opposite course and increases the money supply, economic 
activity increases. 
 
Similarly, the credit view maintains that banks themselves are important. 
Hence, a contractionary monetary policy decreases money supply through reserves. 
This will reduce bank deposits and the banks’ ability to extend credit. The lower 
credit availability will reduce gross investment in the economy and in turn cause a 
decline in output. In both cases, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2.1: MB causes BL 
H2.2: MS causes BL 
H2.3: MS causes Y. 
 
4.3.2.2 Accommodationist 
Under the accommodationist view, the central bank determines the level of 
interest rates and banks fully accommodate any demand for credit at any level of 
interest rates. If demand for reserves is fully accommodated by the central bank, and 
the loan supply schedule of commercial banks is horizontal, the accommodationist 
view predicts unidirectional causality from total bank loans to the monetary base and 
the money supply. Accommodationists assert that changes in the expected income 
lead to changes in bank loan demand. This results in changes in deposits and hence 
money supply. However, changes in the volume of loans, and in turn of the money 
                                                 
27
 In this thesis, monetarists are synonymous with Keynesians as both view the money supply as 
exogenous and perfectly inelastic with respect to the central bank influencing the quantity of money.  
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supply, imply changes in economic growth, thus influencing income in the next 
period. 
 
H3.1: BL cause MB 
H3.2: BL cause MS 
H3.3: There is bidirectional causality between MS and Y. 
 
4.3.2.3 Structuralist 
Structuralists, on the other hand, insist that full accommodation as suggested 
by accommodationists is not necessary, as they believe that central banks only 
partially accommodate the demand for reserves, which will increase interest rates 
due to market pressures. This is also due to the banks always using a combination of 
price and quantity rationales in their loan-making decisions. 
 
The structuralist hypothesis can be described as a mixed model that 
incorporates some of the ideas of the monetarist approach and some of the 
accommodationist view. The accommodationist part of the model depicts causality 
from total bank loans to the monetary base, and the monetarist part of the model 
depicts causality from the base and the broad money multiplier (MM) to total bank 
loans. If the monetary base does not proportionately support an increase in the 
demand for bank loans, that is, if it is less than one and total bank loans is exogenous, 
then structuralists identify liability management practices as an alternative to 
supplement the shortage in reserves. Increased lending causes liability 
transformations so that bank loans cause an increase in the money multiplier. Given 
that the main components of the money multiplier consist of the currency/deposit 
ratio (cd) and reserve/deposit ratio (rd), the Palley (1994) test implies that liability 
management frees up reserves, which subsequently alters cd and rd. The 
structuralists share accommodationist views on the relation between income and 
broad money supply.  
 
H4.1:  There is bidirectional causality between BL and MB 
H4.2: There is bidirectional causality between BL and MM 
H4.3:  There is bidirectional causality between MS and Y.  
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4.3.2.4 Liquidity preference 
The empirical hypothesis of the liquidity preference view predicts causality 
from total bank loans to the broad money supply when the money supply is 
endogenously determined. If the demand for money and the demand for loans were 
independent, the supply of deposits created by the net flow of new bank lending 
would not need to be willingly held by new deposit owners, who have independent 
liquidity preferences about the amount of money they wish to hold. If this were the 
case, the independent demand for money would place a constraint on the ability of 
loans to create deposits. Causality can also be expected from the money supply to 
bank credit. 
 
H5: There is bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply. 
 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of hypotheses 2 to 5. Hypothesis 1 is not 
summarised in this table because the hypothesis is focused on examining whether 
money supply is exogenous or endogenous only and not which approach of monetary 
theory it falls under. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of causality implications of different approaches towards 
monetary theory 
Monetarist Accommodationist Structuralist Liquidity 
Preference 
MB⇒  BL BL⇒MB BL ⇔ MB BL ⇔ MS 
MS⇒  BL BL⇒MS BL ⇔ MM  
MS⇒Y Y ⇔  MS Y ⇔  MS  
Note: BL denotes bank loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money multiplier, MS is money supply and 
Y is  income. ⇒ and ⇔ denote unidirectional and bidirectional causality respectively. 
 
4.3.3 Bank loans, deposits and money supply 
Post-Keynesians assert that bank loans cause deposits (DEP) and in turn 
deposits cause money supply: these are financial variables in the model. However, 
previous literature on money endogeneity focuses on investigating the causality 
between bank loans and money supply, even though loans may cause deposits, and 
deposits may be held not only in the transactional form, but also in any form that 
 69 
constitutes broad money supply.28 It is possible that deposits may be an important 
variable in the transmission from bank loans to money supply, as bank loans 
acquired are immediately transferred into demand deposits and into other types of 
deposits, as Howells and Hussein (1998) have inferred. 
 
Thus it is hypothesised under the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money 
that causality exists such that: 
 
H6.1:  BL cause DEP and DEP cause MS. 
 
However, it could also be that the monetarist view of exogenous money holds where:  
 
H6.2:  MS causes DEP and DEP cause BL. 
 
4.3.4 Money supply and bank stock prices  
Money supply can be linked to bank stock prices through two ways: portfolio 
substitution or liquidity effects. A rise in money supply could enhance stock prices 
via the liquidity effect. Expansionary monetary policy means consumers will have 
more money to invest in bond and stock markets. With the increase in demand for 
stocks, stock prices will increase: the converse occurs otherwise. The increase in 
money supply also reduces interest rates, meaning that borrowings from the banks 
are cheaper. This will also raise stock prices as consumers can use these borrowings 
to buy more stocks or bonds.  
 
However, under the PK theory the relationship is more complex in the case of 
bank stocks and endogenous money supply, with the central bank only exercising 
control over short-term interest rates. The central bank may decide to exercise an 
expansionary monetary policy by reducing interest rates to stimulate the economy. 
This action increases loan demand, which will increase money supply via the banks. 
If the bank is seen as a business entity and the loan is the product being sold, then 
increases in loans would lead to a rise in profits and ultimately in stock prices 
                                                 
28
 Moore (1989) ran causality tests for a variety of monetary aggregates and found strong causality 
between bank loans and broad monetary aggregates.  
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according to a cash-flow effect on earnings then on dividends, as in the dividend 
valuation theory. An opposite effect occurs otherwise. 
 
In the case of the portfolio-balance model (and as suggested by the quantity 
theory of money), an increased money supply may re-balance other assets, including 
securities in the portfolio. An increase in the money supply may raise the discount 
rate through inflationary expectations. Under the post-Keynesian theory, changes in 
interest rates mean that deposit rates are also affected. Thus, an increase in interest 
rates will see a move in portfolios more towards deposit accounts, thus reducing 
stock prices, as investors can earn more with deposit accounts relative to stocks or 
bonds. The empirical test will determine which of the processes dominate. 
 
Although Hashemzadeh and Taylor’s (1988) study focused on general stock 
prices and not on bank stock prices, they found that increases in stock prices may 
also have a feedback effect and cause money supply. Thus, our hypothesis using 
bank stock returns (RET) is: 
 
H7:  MS causes RET or/and RET cause MS. 
 
4.3.5 Simultaneous effects  
Once all the causality links are established, the empirical model discussed in 
the next section will be tested. Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2 is reproduced here as the 
central issues of this thesis are brought together. 
 
Extracted from Chapter 2, Figure 2.1, p. 10 
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The debate among economists is that money may be exogenous, as 
maintained by mainstream Keynesians or monetarists, or it could be endogenous, as 
argued by post-Keynesians. Loans and deposits as earning products of a bank will 
have an effect on bank stock returns through the bank’s profit margins (via interest 
and non-interest incomes or even fee incomes), in accordance with the equity 
valuation theory. Besides this behaviour, the literature suggests a flow-through effect 
of money supply affecting stock returns (general and not bank stock returns), thus: 
 
H8 : There is a simultaneous relationship (or effect) between RET and MS 
and MS and BL. 
 
4.4 Empirical model 
The discussion in Chapter 2 provides the basis for an empirical model. In order 
to analyse the relationship between bank stock returns, money supply and bank loans, 
a robust and stable simultaneous equation model is required, which is what we 
developed.29 Firstly, bank loans may be related to money supply through the post-
Keynesian theory of endogenous money. Banks adjust their loan portfolios 
depending on the demand for bank loans. The changes in loans by the banks will 
affect deposits and in turn money supply. 
 
It is expected that a rise in money supply may enhance stock prices. The idea 
behind this is that if inflation is within the central bank’s target, then the central bank 
may exercise a reduction in interest rates to stimulate the economy via an 
expansionary policy. This reduction in interest rate in turn increases demand for 
loans, which subsequently raises the money supply. If the bank is seen as a business 
entity and its loans are the product being sold, then increases in loans would lead to a 
                                                 
29
 The basis of the model in this section stems from Foster (1992). However, as the model developed 
in this section is different from Foster’s (1992) model, his model is not summarised here. The model 
in this thesis differs from Foster’s (1992) model in two ways. Firstly, Foster uses his variables in a 
linear regression in an attempt to determine money supply in the UK, whereas we allow a 
simultaneous relationship between the variables. Secondly, not all the variables used by Foster (1992) 
were used in this thesis. 
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rise in profits for the bank and ultimately in its stock prices, according to cash-flow 
effect as in the dividend valuation theory.  
 
With the bidirectional causality hypothesised, then an increase in bank stock 
returns would indicate that the economy is in strong growth. This means that any 
increases in inflation or expected inflation may increase interest rates. The reduced 
interest rates may lead to more affordable investments funded through loans, which 
in turn increases money supply. Hence, a positive relationship is expected between 
stock returns and money supply. A contractionary policy will lead to the opposite 
result with the money supply being curtailed, interest rates going up, and bank 
returns being adversely affected by decline in loan growth. 
 
An increase in bank loans is expected to raise money supply through deposits, 
as hypothesised by the post-Keynesians. Additionally, an increase in money supply 
may also increase bank loans. This is hypothesised according to the structuralist view 
that there is bidirectional causality between money supply and bank loans.  
 
There may also be other factors that may have an influence on the 
endogenous variables: bank stock price, money supply and bank loans. According to 
the dividend valuation theory discussed in Chapter 2, there is a positive relationship 
between the bank’s earnings and stock prices. As earnings are an item on the 
individual bank’s income statement and this thesis is focused on aggregate banks, the 
bank earnings spread (ES) will be used as a proxy for earnings. Bank earnings spread 
is calculated as: 
ES = [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−×        (4.1) 
 
where Rl and Rd are loan rates and deposit rates respectively and L and DEP are 
bank loans and bank deposits respectively.  
 
Inflation and money supply are expected to have a positive relationship 
because an increase in inflation means that real interest rates are reduced through the 
Fisher Effect: 
 
e
r ii pi−=           (4.2) 
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where ir, i and epi  are real interest rates, nominal interest rates and expected inflation 
respectively. A variable on inflation (INF) is included in the model for this reason. A 
reduction in interest rates will likely lead to a rise in loans needed to fund 
investments. The increase in loans, according to the post-Keynesians, would in turn 
increase money supply.  
 
Another variable included in the model is the domestic-to-foreign interest rate 
differential (RbRf), which is needed to take account of Fisher’s International Effect 
Hypothesis. Foster (1992) found a positive relationship between money supply and 
the domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential. He argued that a rise in the domestic 
interest rate would increase domestic deposits. This will increase money supply not 
only because deposits are more attractive, but also because banks may make 
matching switches from foreign currency denominated to domestic currency 
denominated marketable financial assets. This variable is included as a proxy for an 
open economy, since the member economies of the G-7 group are all open 
economies.  
 
It is expected that there is a positive relationship between income and bank 
loans because when income increases, individuals will have more money to pay for 
their loans or other liabilities. There is evidence that this is the case in most countries 
in markets with a low level of competitive banking (Ariff and Lamba, 2007).30 
Income is used as an assessment by the banks for loan approvals. Thus, income is 
also added into the model.  
 
Loan and deposit rates are important for bank earnings. Thus, the net interest 
margin is calculated as: 
RlRd = RdRl −         (4.3) 
 
where Rl is bank loan rates and Rd is bank deposit rates, and it is included in the 
model. It is expected that RlRd will have a negative relationship with bank loans as 
increases in loan rates higher than deposit rates increase the net interest margin. With 
                                                 
30
 Also, this impact of interest rate behaviour is different in the US with a competitive banking 
market as shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  
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higher loan rates, loans would be less affordable; thus the amount of loans would 
decrease. 
 
By including all the variables discussed above, the simultaneous equation 
model becomes:31 
[ ]
++
= MSESfPit ,         (4.4) 




=
++++
PRbRfINFBLfMS it ,,,       (4.5) 
[ ]
−++
= RlRdYMSfBLit ,,        (4.6) 
 
where Pit is the bank stock price in country i at time t, BL is bank loans, MS is money 
supply, INF is inflation, Y is income, ES is bank earnings spread 
= [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential 
= RfRb − , and RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − . 32  All variables are in 
logarithmic form except RbRf and RlRd.  
 
Using the simultaneous equation model above, the following testable 
equations will be used to test hypotheses 1 to 8:  
 
[ ]
+
= MSfPit          (4.4a) 
[ ]
++
= PBLfMSit ,         (4.5a) 
[ ]
+
= MSfBLit          (4.6a) 
where Pit is the aggregate bank stock price in country i at time t, BL is bank loans and 
MS is money supply. All variables are in logarithmic form. The use of the testable 
equations will be further elaborated below. 
 
                                                 
31
 It would be interesting to include EPS and ROE in the model to reflect the dividend valuation theory 
and control for bank-specific factors, but data are available only on an annual individual bank basis. 
This would not have been consistent with the macroeconomic quarterly data used in this thesis. Thus, 
we did not use these variables. 
32
 As this thesis investigates the contemporaneous relationship between the macroeconomic variables, 
the model will not differentiate between expected and unexpected changes in the macroeconomic 
variables. 
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From the above section, it is hypothesised under Hypothesis 1.2 that there 
may be unidirectional or bidirectional causality from bank loans to money supply. 
Using vector error-correction models (VECM) and Granger causality tests discussed 
in the next section, equations (4.5a)33 and (4.6a) will be employed to determine this 
hypothesis. These equations will also be used to test Hypothesis 5 on whether there is 
bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply, suggesting the 
existence of the liquidity preference view. Under hypotheses 1.1 and 2.2, money 
supply is expected to cause bank loans only, thus implying that money is exogenous 
under the monetarist view. By employing a VECM and Granger causality tests, 
equation (4.6a) will be useful to determine whether these hypotheses are true. On the 
other hand, equation (4.5a) will determine whether Hypothesis 3.2 is true in that 
bank loans cause money supply, thus supporting the structuralists’ view of the PK 
theory of endogenous money. 
 
 The robustness of findings on hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 is then tested under 
hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2. In order to test their validity, the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
trivariate VAR methodology as discussed in Section 4.5.4 below will be used. 
Equations (4.5a) and (4.6a), with the inclusion of deposits as a variable, will also be 
used. Hypothesis 7, which suggests that there is either unidirectional or bidirectional 
causality between bank stock returns and money supply, will be tested using a 
VECM and Granger causality test using equations (4.4a) and (4.5a). 
 
Hypothesis 8, which suggests that there is a simultaneous relationship (or 
effect) between bank stock returns and money supply, and between money supply 
and bank loans, will be tested by using equations (4.4) to (4.6). The empirical model 
(equations 4.4 to 4.6) will be tested using panel data, as this approach allows for the 
individual heterogeneity of the countries to be controlled and gives more informative 
data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency (Hsiao, 1985). Other benefits of using panel data include 
allowing the construction and testing of more complicated behavioural models than 
purely time-series; a greater ability to identify and measure effects that are simply 
not detectable in pure time-series data; and a greater ability to study the dynamics of 
                                                 
33
 It should be noted that only bank loans and money supply (excluding price) are used under these 
hypotheses and that the variable price (without money supply) is used to test Hypothesis 7 only. 
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adjustment (Klevmarken, 1989). The next section discusses the empirical 
methodology used to test the hypotheses that have been posed in this chapter.  
 
4.5 Methodology 
This section explains a number of econometric methodologies that will be used to 
test the eight hypotheses discussed in Section 4.3. The discussions start with the unit 
root tests followed by the Johansen cointegration and the vector error-correction 
models. Trivariate causality tests are detailed next. This is followed by the panel unit 
root, panel cointegration tests and the panel Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) used to test Hypothesis 8. 
  
4.5.1 Unit root tests 
Unit root tests are performed on the variables so as to prepare the data set for 
cointegration and causality tests. For cointegration analysis to be valid, the unit root 
test investigates whether the order of integration of the variables of interest is similar 
– specifically, whether the order of integration is shown to be greater than zero. Thus, 
we first validate the stationarity properties of the variables, prior to conducting the 
cointegration tests.  
 
An economic time-series that follows a random walk process is called “non-
stationary” over time. It may be made stationary by differencing d times. The 
variable, once established as stationary, is then referred to as integrated of order d or 
I(d). In order to test for unit roots, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and 
Fuller 1979, 1981) test is performed. The ADF test can control for higher-order serial 
correlation when higher-order lags are used, such that: 
t
p
i
ititt uXbtaXaaX ∑
=
+−− +∆+++=∆
2
12110      (4.7) 
where p is the number of lagged changes in tX  necessary to make tu serially 
uncorrelated. Testing the null against the alternative hypothesis 0: 1 <aH a , the null 
hypothesis of the unit root is rejected if the observed t-statistic is sufficiently 
negative compared to the MacKinnon (1996) lower tail critical values at the accepted 
level of significance. Equation (4.7) is a test on whether the series can be 
characterised as an I(1) process with a constant (drift) and time trend. Two other tests 
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can be conducted. One of those tests, equation (4.8), allows for the series to be 
characterised as an I(1) process with a drift, while equation (4.9) tests for the series 
to be an I(1) process without a drift or time trend: 
t
p
i
ititt uXbXaaX ∑
=
+−− +∆++=∆
2
1110       (4.8) 
t
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2
111       (4.9)  
Thus, in all three cases, the hypotheses tested are: H0: the series contain a unit 
root, against H1: the series is stationary. The test statistic (equation 4.4) is then tested 
against the critical values at the accepted level of significance: 
( )1
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
aES
a
statisticTest =         (4.10) 
The Phillips and Perron (1988) test is a generalisation of the ADF test 
procedure that allows for weak assumptions regarding the distribution of errors. This 
thesis employs the Phillips-Perron test to test for the existence of unit roots in the 
variables. The advantage of the Phillips-Perron test is that it allows for the effect of 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. There is evidence that the Phillips-Perron 
test has more power than the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993).  If the variables are found to be I(1) stationary, the next step is to 
test whether they are cointegrated using the Johansen cointegration test, as discussed 
in the next section. 
 
4.5.2 Johansen cointegration tests 
It is known that the cointegration results based on Johansen’s (1988) 
procedure are sensitive to the choice of lag length in VAR (Cheung and Lai, 1993). 
Thus, the optimum lag lengths of the VAR are determined by minimising the 
Schwarz (1978) Bayesian Information Criteria (SBC). This criterion is designed to 
select the model with the maximum information available. This is to be determined 
first before the Johansen (1988) cointegration tests are performed and the results 
presented later.  
 
The general concept of cointegration between variables suggests that there 
exists an equilibrium or a long-run relationship between a set of time-series variables, 
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provided that the series is integrated of the same order. This will be confirmed using 
the Phillips-Perron test. 
 
The Johansen (1988) multivariate cointegration test is essentially a likelihood 
ratio test based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that allows for possible 
dynamic interactions among variables. The Johansen (1988) cointegration test is a 
more robust test than the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test. According to 
Dickey, Jansen and Thornton (1991), the Engle and Granger (1987) test is sensitive 
to the choice of dependent variables, and thus may not be robust.  
 
The general VAR model is specified as follows: 
tktkktktt XXXX εµ ++∆Γ+∆Γ++∆Γ=∆ −−−−− 1111 Κ     (4.11) 
where: 
tX = An n x 1 vector of the variables; 
Γ  = An n x n coefficient matrix; 
µ  = An n x 1 constant vector; and 
tε  = An n x 1 vector of white noise with a mean of zero and a finite variance. 
 
The rank of the coefficient matrix Γ  represents the number of cointegrating 
vectors. The likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that there are at most r 
cointegration vectors is called the Trace Test statistic: 
( )∑
+=
−−=
p
ri
iTTestTrace
1
ˆ1ln λ ,       (4.12) 
where T is the sample size and pr λλ ˆ,,ˆ 1 Κ+  are the p-r smallest squared canonical 
correlations. The MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) critical values are used to 
determine whether the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegration vectors is 
rejected or not. The critical values differ depending on whether a linear trend is 
included or not and are summarised in Table 4.2. 
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Another restricted maximum likelihood ratio test is referred to as the 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistic: 
( ) ( ){ }∑
=
−−=
r
i
iiTTestEigenvalueMaximal
1
* ˆ1/ˆ1ln λλ ,   (4.13) 
where **1 ,, rλλ Κ are the r largest squared canonical correlations. Similar to the Trace 
Test, the Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistics will be compared against the 
MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) critical values given in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) critical values 
 1 percent 5 percent 10 percent 
Trace Test 
Linear trend 31.15 25.78 23.34 
Constant only and no trends 25.07 20.26 17.98 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test 
Linear trend 23.97 19.38 17.23 
Constant only and no trends 20.16 15.89 13.90 
There are instances when there is a discrepancy between the results of the 
Trace Test and the Maximal Eigenvalue Test, where one test will indicate the 
presence of cointegration and the other will not. In such cases, Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) suggest that the Trace Test may lack power relative to the Maximal 
Eigenvalue Test, and thus any discrepancies will be resolved through acceptance of 
the Maximal Eigenvalue Test. This procedure will be followed in our analysis. The 
results of the tests are detailed in the next chapter. 
 
4.5.3 Causality tests: VECM and Granger causality 
If cointegration can be identified between dependent and independent 
variables as presented in the results discussed in the last section, then it can be 
understood that there is at least a single aspect of causality (Granger, 1969). 
Causality refers to the ability of one variable to predict (and thus cause) the other. 
The Granger (1969) causality test for two variables tx  and ty  involves the following 
Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model to be estimated: 
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where it is assumed that both ytε and xtε are uncorrelated white-noise error terms. 
Thus, tx  does not Granger cause ty  if 0...21 ==== iβββ , where the latter 
hypothesis is tested using the F test. 
 
If no cointegration is found between variables, then the standard causality test 
(Granger, 1969) can be applied. If there is cointegration, then causality can be 
examined using the vector error-correction model (VECM) (Granger, 1988) as 
below: 
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The short-term causality of the VECM can be tested using the Wald test ( 2χ test), 
and the long-term causality is tested by examining whether the error-correction 
coefficient 3α  in the model is significantly different from zero. 
 
The same test will be used to test for causality in the panel data equations. If 
the Pedroni (1997) panel cointegration tests (discussed in Section 4.5.6 below) 
confirm that the variables in equations (4.4) to (4.6) are cointegrated, a modified 
version of equation (4.16) to account for the panel data will be used:  
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where 1−∆ ty  and 1−∆ tx are the endogenous variables from each equation while 1−∆ tz  
are the exogenous (predetermined) variables in the equations. 
 
The three tests – namely, the unit root test, Johansen cointegration and the 
causality test discussed in this section and the former two sections – will be used to 
determine the validity of hypotheses 1 to 5 and 7. 
 
4.5.4 Trivariate VAR 
Post-Keynesians assert that bank loans cause deposits and in turn deposits 
cause money supply. However, most empirical tests on money endogeneity focus on 
investigating the causality between bank loans and money supply as, even though 
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loans may cause deposits, deposits may be held in any form that constitutes broad 
money supply, not only in the transactional form.34 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results of money endogeneity, a trivariate 
causality test that includes bank loans, deposits and money supply is conducted.  
These trivariate vector autoregressive models also allow for the investigation of the 
possibility that earlier inferences were incorrect because of the omission of a third 
relevant variable, in this case, deposits. 
 
In the presence of I(1) variables, the Wald test statistic is likely to have non-
standard asymptotic distribution. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and 
Lutkepohl (1996) suggest an approach to causality testing which allows the 
researcher to use standard asymptotic theory and thus obtain valid statistical 
inferences. They point out that Wald tests that do not restrict the coefficients of all 
lagged terms under the null hypothesis still have their usual 2χ distribution. For 
example, consider the augmented VAR model: 
tikt
k
i
d
i
ikitit Yyy ε+∏+∏= −−
= =
+−∑ ∑
1 1
      (4.17) 
where yt is at most integrated of order d, that is, it is I(d). Wald test statistics based on 
testing restrictions involving the coefficients contained in k∏∏ ,,1 Κ have asymptotic 
2χ null distributions. This is explained further in Theorem 1 in Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995). 
 
The basic idea is to augment artificially the correct order, k, of the VAR by 
the maximal order of integration (dmax) that characterises the series being used. Thus, 
a level VAR model augmented by an extra redundant lag is estimated and a Wald test 
is performed on the first k non-redundant lags.  
 
The advantages of the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach are that it does 
not require any pre-testing for the cointegration properties of the system and that it is 
easy to implement. However, the extra redundant lagged terms result in a loss of 
                                                 
34
 Moore (1989) ran causality tests for a variety of monetary aggregates and found strong causality 
between bank loans and broad monetary aggregates.  
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efficiency and power, although the power loss is relatively small in trivariate or 
higher-order systems, for moderate to large sample sizes and for systems in which 
the true lag order is large. Giles and Mirza (1999) and Clarke and Mirza (2006) 
suggest that this loss is frequently minimal and the approach often results in more 
accurate Granger non-causality outcomes than the VECM method, which conditions 
on the outcome of preliminary cointegration tests.  
 
In order to test whether the existence of a third variable, deposits, causes an 
invalid inference in the previous result, the following system of VAR (k, dmax) will be 
used: 
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where 0β is a 3 x 1 vector that takes the constants of the model, iβ and jβ are 
matrices 3 x 3 that represent the coefficients, and vector ( )ε  is white noise. 
 
The Granger causality test proposes the following null hypothesis: 
rRH =γ:0          (4.19) 
where R is the rank N matrix, r is a null vector, N is the number of restrictions of the 
estimated coefficients and γ is a vector of ( )kββ ,,0 Κ . Thus in order to test the null 
hypothesis of no causality between bank loans and deposits, the following test is 
applicable: 
012122
12
10 ===== kbbbH Κ  
where 12kb are the coefficients corresponding to the k first lag lengths of itBLg −,  
expressed in equation (4.18). 
 
If it is found that deposits (DEP) affect both bank loans (BL) and money 
supply (MS), then it means that inference on the causality between BL and MS is 
invalid in both directions. Thus, in the next section, if it is found that BL causes DEP 
and in turn DEP causes MS, then it shows that DEP is an important variable such that 
bank loans acquired are immediately transferred into demand deposits and not only 
into other types of deposits, as Howells and Hussein (1998) have inferred. However, 
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if only part of the above causality is found – for example, DEP cause MS – and it is 
also found that BL cause MS but no causality link between BL and DEP is found, 
then earlier inference on the causality between BL and MS holds true.  
 
On the other hand, it is expected that MS causes DEP as demand deposits are 
a component of MS. Also, if there is causality flowing from MS to DEP and from 
DEP to BL, then the monetarist view that deposits are used to create loans still holds 
true. 
 
This methodology will be used to test Hypothesis 6. 
 
4.5.5 Panel unit root tests 
In order to test Hypothesis 8, it is imperative that preliminary tests such as the 
panel unit root test as discussed in this section and the panel cointegration test 
detailed in the next section are conducted before the simultaneous equation model is 
estimated using panel data Generalised Method of Moments. This is to ensure that 
the variables are stationary, as before. 
 
Panel unit root tests are similar but not identical to unit root tests carried out 
on a single series, such as those discussed in Section 4.5.1. However, the panel unit 
root tests proposed by Levin and Lin (1993), Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) and 
Maddala and Wu (1999) are known to have more power than the conventional 
univariate time series tests. 
  
In keeping with the unit root test in Chapter 4, the panel unit root test used 
will be the Fisher Phillips-Perron test. Maddala and Wu (1999) propose the use of the 
Fisher (1932) test, which is based on combining the p-values of the unit-root test 
statistics in each cross-sectional unit. One of the advantages of this test is that it can 
use different lags in the individual ADF (or PP) regressions. Also, unlike the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (1997) test, the Fisher test does not require a balanced panel.  
 
Based on combining the p-values of the test statistics (of iβ ) of N 
independent ADF regressions from equation (5.1), Maddala and Wu (1999) propose 
a non-parametric test statistic based on Fisher (1932). Like Im, Pesaran and Shin’s 
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(1997), this test allows for different first-order autoregressive coefficients. Thus, for 
a sample of N groups observed over T time periods, the panel unit root regression of 
the conventional ADF test is written as: 
TtNieyyy itit
P
j
ijitiiit
i
,,1,,,1,1
1
1 ΚΚ ==+∆++= −
=
− ∑γβα   (4.20) 
where ity is the variable in country i at time t; ∆ is the first difference operator, 
ii βα ,  and ijγ  are the coefficients to be estimated and ite is the error term. 
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel data is thus defined as: 
0=iβ  for all i, 
against the alternative that at least one of the individual series in the panel is 
stationary: 
0<iβ  for all i. 
The equation of the alternative hypotheses allows for iβ  to differ across groups. 
 
The Fisher-type test statistic is given as: 
( ) ( )∑
=
−=
N
i
iP
1
ln2 piλ          (4.21) 
where ipi is the p-value of the test statistic for unit i. The Fisher test statistic ( )λP  has 
a 2χ distribution with 2N degrees of freedom. Maddala and Wu (1999) show that the 
Fisher test achieves more accurate size and high power relative to the Levin and Lin 
(1993). In practice, the Fisher test is straightforward to use and may decrease the bias 
caused by the lag selection (Banerjee, 1999, Maddala and Wu, 1999).  
 
Besides Maddala and Wu (1999), Choi (2001) proposes another test statistic, 
the inverse normal test: 
( ) ( )∑
=
−Φ= N
i i
pNZ
1
1/1         (4.22) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Since 10 ≤≤ ip , 
( )ip1−Φ is a )1,0(N random variable and as ∞→iT for all i, )1,0(NZ ⇒ . Choi 
(2001) asserts that there are similar advantages to the Maddala and Wu (1999) test in 
that: (1) the cross-sectional N can be either finite or infinite, (2) the time-series 
dimension T can be different for each i, (3) the alternative hypothesis allows some 
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groups to have unit roots and not others, and (4) each group can have different types 
of stochastic and non-stochastic components. 
 
Both tests were carried out under the Phillips and Perron (1988) method as 
opposed to ADF in order to be consistent with the unit root tests discussed in Section 
4.5.1. The results are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.5.6 Panel cointegration tests 
If the panel variables are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1), then testing for the 
presence of cointegration can be undertaken. In conventional time-series, the Engle 
and Granger (1987) cointegration test based on an examination of the residuals of a 
regression is usually performed using I(1) variables. If the variables are cointegrated, 
then the residuals should be I(0). In such cases, the same unit root tests can be 
applied for both raw data and residuals, with proper adjustments to the critical values 
when applied to the latter. 
 
 Pedroni (2004) showed that testing for cointegration in panel data is not as 
simple as the conventional Engle-Granger way unless the regressors are strictly 
exogenous and the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) slope is constrained to be 
homogeneous. He argued that proper adjustments should be made to the test statistics 
themselves if the alternative hypothesis is that the cointegrating relationship is not 
constrained to be homogeneous across members, and that the parameters’ estimates 
are allowed to vary across individual members. If this is not done, then the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration will certainly be rejected, regardless of the true 
relationship, as the sample size grows large. Also, imposing homogeneity falsely 
across members when the true relationship is heterogeneous generates an integrated 
component in the residuals, making them non-stationary, thus leading to the 
conclusion that the variables are not cointegrated even if they really are. 
 
Extending the Engle-Granger framework to tests that involve panel data, 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes several tests for cointegration that allow for 
heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across cross-sections. Consider the 
following regression: 
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itmitmiiiit exty +++= βδα        (4.23) 
 
for MmNiTt ,,1;,,1;,,1 ΚΚΚ === ; where y and x are assumed to be integrated 
of order one, I(1). The parameters iα and iδ are individual and trend effects 
respectively that may be set to zero if desired. Under the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration, the residuals ite  will be I(1).  
 
Pedroni’s tests can be classified into two categories: the within dimensions 
and the between dimensions. The former are based on estimators that effectively pool 
the autoregressive coefficient across different members for the unit root tests on the 
estimated residuals, while the latter are based on estimators that simply average the 
individually estimated coefficients for each member i. A consequence of this 
distinction arises in terms of the autoregressive coefficient, iγ , of the estimated 
residuals under the alternative hypothesis of cointegration.  
 
Both tests were designed to test for the null of no cointegration for the case of 
heterogeneous panels: 1:0 =iH γ . Two alternative hypotheses, the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous alternatives, were proposed depending on the two categories. The first 
set involves averaging test statistics for cointegration in the time-series and cross-
sections, that is, pooling the residuals along the within dimension of the panel, so that 
the alternative hypothesis becomes: 
1:1 <= γγ iH  for all i. This presumes a common value γγ =i  
 
On the other hand, the second set is the heterogeneous alternative which 
involves pooling the residuals along the between dimension of the panel, so that: 
1:1 <iH γ  for all i. This allows for heterogeneous autocorrelations parameters across 
members. 
 
The panel within statistics includes four statistics that are similar to the ‘panel 
variance ratio’ wZν ,‘panel rho’ 
wZ ρ , and ‘panel t’ wtZ statistics in Phillips and Ouliaris 
(1990), such that: 
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On the other hand, the panel between statistics include three statistics as set 
out below: 
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and where the residuals are extracted from the above regressions: 
ititit ee µρ ˆˆˆˆ 1 += −         (4.37) 
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and Li represents the ith component of the Cholesky decomposition of the residual 
variance-covariance matrix, λˆ and NT are two parameters used to adjust the 
autocorrelation in the model, and 2ˆis and iσ are the contemporaneous and long-run 
individual variances. 
 
The Pedroni (1997) statistics are one-sided tests with a critical value of − 1.64 
where Z  < − 1.64 implies rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration; except 
the panel v-statistic that has a critical value of 1.64, so that wZν  > 1.64 suggests 
rejection of the null of no cointegration. Each of the statistics has an asymptotic 
distribution in the form: 
( )
( )
)1,0(
2
1
2
1
, N
NX TN ⇒
−
ν
µ
       (4.40) 
where TNX , is the corresponding form of the test statistic, while µ and ν are the 
mean and variance of each test, respectively.  
 
In a Monte Carlo experiment, Pedroni (1997) compared the performance of 
the seven statistics in terms of size, distortion and power. He concluded that 
concerning power and small samples, the group ADF generally performed best, 
followed by the panel ADF and the panel rho; hence these are more reliable. These 
will be used as to guide the interpretation of the results in Chapter 5.  
 
4.5.7 Panel data estimation: Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)  
If there is causality between the variables in each equation, the research 
question that this chapter sets out to answer can be explored using the panel data 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) method. The GMM method allows for a 
number of advantages: it exploits the time-series element of the data and controls for 
firm-specific effects, like the fixed-effect method; it allows for the inclusion of 
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lagged dependent variables as regressors; and it controls for the endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables. Like the fixed-effect model, the GMM is designed for panel 
data.  
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a GMM procedure that allowed for 
additional instruments to be obtained in a dynamic panel data model, if the 
orthogonality condition that exists between lagged values of yit and the disturbances 
itv are used. Consider the autoregressive model with predetermined regressors: 
TtNiuxyy itittiit ,,1;,,11, ΚΚ ==+′+= − βδ     (4.41) 
where δ is a scalar, itx′  is K×1 and β is 1×K . itiit vu += µ with iµ ~ IID(0, 2µσ ) and 
itv ~ IID(0, 2vσ ) are independent of each other and among themselves.  
 
In order to get a consistent estimate of δ , equation (4.41) is differenced to 
eliminate the individual effects: 
( ) ( ) ( )1,1,2,1,1, −−−−− −+′−′+−=− tiittiittititiit vvxxyyyy βδ    (4.42) 
 
where ( )1, −− tiit vv  is MA(1) with unit root. As the regressors itx  are predetermined, 
with ( ) 0≠isit vxE for all Tst ,,2,1, Κ=  and for ts < and zero otherwise, then only 
[ ])1(21 ,,, −′′′ siii xxx Κ  are valid instruments for equation (4.42) at period s.  
 
For 3=t , the first-differenced equation of (4.41) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )23231223 iiiiiiii vvxxyyyy −+′−′+−=− βδ     (4.43) 
so that 1ix′ and 2ix′ are valid instruments as neither is correlated with ( )23 ii vv − . 
Similarly, for 4=t : 
( ) ( ) ( )34342334 iiiiiiii vvxxyyyy −+′−′+−=− βδ     (4.44) 
 
and there are additional instruments as now 1ix′ , 2ix′ and 3ix′  are not correlated with 
( )34 ii vv − . If this is continued, then: 
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Premultiplying equation (4.42) in vector form by W ′makes it: 
( ) ( ) vWXWyWyW ∆′+∆′+∆′=∆′
−
βδ1      (4.46) 
where X∆ is the stacked KTN ×− )2( matrix of observations on itx∆ . 
 
The one- and two-step estimators of ( )βδ ′, can be obtained from: 
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where ( )( ) ii
N
i
iiN WvvWV
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=1
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Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a test for the hypothesis that there is no 
second-order serial correlation based on the residuals from the first-differenced 
equation. This test is important as the consistency of the GMM estimator relies upon 
the condition [ ]0, 2, =−tiit vvE . The test statistic takes the form: 
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where vˆ  is given by: 
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and 2ˆ−∆v is a vector of residuals lagged twice, *v∆ is a 1×q vector of trimmed v to 
match 2−v and this is similar for *X . 2m is only defined if min 5≥iT . 
 
In order to test for overidentifying restrictions, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed the Sargan (1958) test given by: 
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where p refers to the number of columns of W and vˆ∆ is the residuals from the two-
step estimation given in equation (4.47). The test determines whether any correlation 
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between instruments and errors exists. For an instrument to be valid, there should be 
no correlation between instruments and errors. 
 
Using Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM panel data estimation, the 
simultaneous equations (4.4 to 4.6) can be specified as: 
itititit eMSESR +∆+∆+= 1α        (4.4b) 
itititititit uRRbRfINFBLMS +++∆+∆+=∆ 2α     (4.5b) 
ititititit vRlRdYMSBL ++∆+∆+=∆ 3α      (4.6b) 
 
where ∆ denotes first difference and α  is a constant for each equation. Rit is bank 
stock returns or first difference of logarithm of bank stock price in country i at time t, 
BL is bank loans, MS is money supply, INF is inflation, Y is income. ES is bank 
earnings spread = [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate 
differential = RfRb − , RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − .e, u and v are error 
terms. The results of the GMM panel data estimation are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.6 Sources of data 
All variables are downloaded from the Datastream database and the 
macroeconomic variables are checked against the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that there are no 
errors.35 The empirical analysis is conducted using quarterly data for different sample 
periods. It is important to note that income is included as an explanatory variable in 
some models specified here. Real gross domestic product is used as a proxy for 
income and only quarterly data is available for income. Hence quarterly data is 
employed in the empirical estimation in this thesis.  The sample periods are dictated 
by the availability of the data for the seven countries so that each country has a 
balanced sample. Table 4.3 (page 92) lists the sample periods for each country. 
 
The sample periods for the non-euro countries start from different periods due 
to data availability of some variables. The United Kingdom’s sample period ends in 
2006:2, as data for gross domestic product lags a number of quarters. As 1999 is the 
start of the euro, the sample size for these European countries ends in 1998:4. For 
                                                 
35
 This is carried out following the findings of Ince and Porter (2006). 
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Germany and Italy, currency in circulation, deposits and loans were only available in 
Datastream from 1999. Thus, these data are taken from the IMF IFS database 
following the same codes as the other non-euro countries. For Italy, the bank lending 
rate is only available from 1982:4, so the sample takes this into consideration. France 
has a small sample size because the banking industry price index is only available 
from 1987:1. The sample ends 1998:2, as some variables are incomplete.  
 
Table 4.3 Sample periods used for each country 
Country Sample periods 
Canada 1976:3 – 2007:1 
France 1987:1 – 1998:2   
Germany 1980:1 – 1998:4 
Italy 1982:4 – 1998:4 
Japan 1973:3 – 2007:1 
United Kingdom 1975:3 – 2006:2 
United States 1975:3 – 2007:1 
 
Datastream’s banking industry price index is used as a proxy to calculate 
banking industry stock returns. The price indices comprise a number of banks, as 
summarised in Table 4.4. For the US, the Nasdaq Financial Index is used as it has 
519 banks included in it, which is a better representative of the US financial sector.  
 
Table 4.4 Number of banks included in Datastream Bank Price Index 
Country Number of banks 
Canada 7 
France 9 
Germany 9 
Italy 30 
Japan 79 
United Kingdom 10 
United States (Nasdaq Financial Index) 519 
 
Data for money supply are each country’s broad form of money supply: M3 
for Canada, France, and Germany; M2 for Italy; M3+ for Japan; M4 for the United 
Kingdom (UK) and M2 for the United States (US). 36  Monetary base is reserve 
money while the money multiplier is the ratio of broad money supply to reserve 
money. Deposits are the demand deposits of the banking institutions, while loans are 
the domestic credit of the banking sector in each country. The local bill rate and the 
foreign bill rate are the domestic treasury-bill rate and the US 3-month Treasury bill 
rate respectively. For the US, however, the foreign bill rate is the UK Treasury bill 
                                                 
36
 Howells and Hussein (1998) used the same money definitions. 
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rate. The consumer price index is used as a proxy for inflation. The bank lending rate, 
deposit rates and real gross domestic product are also obtained for use in the 
empirical models.  
 
All variables are seasonally adjusted where available and transformed to 
logarithmic form, with the exception of the bank lending rate, bank deposit rate, local 
bill rate and foreign bill rate. Descriptive statistics of the variables used for empirical 
analyses are given in Table 4.5. Unit root test results for the variables listed in Table 
4.5 and cointegration test results are provided in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Med  Max  Min S.D.  Mean  Med  Max  Min S.D. 
 Canada France 
P 5.99 5.79 7.83 4.58 0.92 5.13 5.13 5.97 4.56 0.26 
DEP 6.19 6.23 7.77 4.60 0.83 7.19 7.18 7.42 7.07 0.09 
BL 6.33 6.40 7.80 4.67 0.81 8.84 8.90 9.06 8.48 0.16 
MB 3.18 3.20 3.87 2.34 0.41 10.37 10.33 10.62 10.14 0.14 
MM 9.69 9.79 10.03 9.20 0.22 -3.77 -3.69 -3.44 -4.32 0.27 
MS 12.88 13.00 13.90 11.54 0.61 6.59 6.65 6.73 6.27 0.13 
Y 13.57 13.55 14.00 13.15 0.25 14.01 14.02 14.11 13.87 0.06 
 Germany Italy 
P 5.26 5.39 6.33 4.48 0.47 6.59 6.56 7.69 6.03 0.32 
DEP 5.67 5.55 6.54 4.99 0.50 5.82 5.88 6.36 5.13 0.33 
BL 7.89 7.77 8.61 7.21 0.42 7.00 7.05 7.55 6.16 0.44 
MB 4.67 4.67 5.07 4.19 0.29 4.82 4.95 5.10 4.16 0.27 
MM 8.70 8.66 8.96 8.49 0.11 8.10 8.03 8.49 7.93 0.15 
MS 13.37 13.31 13.99 12.76 0.38 12.92 12.97 13.38 12.19 0.38 
Y 14.20 14.15 14.45 13.97 0.18 13.80 13.84 13.94 13.60 0.10 
 Japan UK 
P 5.52 5.76 6.92 4.08 0.89 7.35 7.11 9.12 5.51 1.19 
DEP 4.71 4.58 5.91 3.52 0.68 5.66 5.99 7.44 3.50 1.21 
BL 6.59 6.93 7.19 5.07 0.61 6.00 6.52 7.69 3.93 1.20 
MB 3.62 3.73 4.75 2.33 0.67 2.95 3.05 3.76 2.03 0.46 
MM 9.16 9.22 9.40 8.72 0.19 9.82 10.01 10.41 8.86 0.49 
MS 12.79 13.08 13.48 11.42 0.61 12.77 13.08 14.16 10.95 0.93 
Y 19.79 19.91 20.14 19.27 0.27 13.61 13.60 14.00 13.26 0.22 
 US      
P 6.25 6.13 8.14 4.27 1.21      
DEP 6.29 6.43 6.80 5.45 0.37      
BL 8.40 8.46 9.49 7.12 0.64      
MB 5.71 5.70 6.68 4.62 0.62      
MM 2.30 2.31 2.52 2.03 0.13      
MS 8.01 8.12 8.88 6.90 0.53      
Y 15.79 15.78 16.26 15.28 0.28      
Note: Med, Min, Max and S.D. are Median, Minimum, Maximum and Standard Deviation respectively. P, DEP, 
BL, MB, MM, MS and Y are bank stock price, deposits, bank loans, monetary base, money multiplier, money 
supply and income respectively. All variables are in logarithmic form except for money multiplier. Sample sizes 
are Canada = 123 observations, France = 46 observations, Germany = 76 observations, Italy = 65 observations, 
Japan = 135 observations, UK = 124 observations and US = 127 observations.  
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Data used for the panel data estimation are cross-sectional data (data of each 
country) pooled over several time periods. Table 4.6 provides the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used for panel data estimation. Unit root tests for the 
variables and cointegration tests for equations (4.4b) to (4.6b) are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics: Panel data variables 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  S.D.  Observations 
P 5.95 5.80 9.15 3.98 1.21 805 
MS 10.75 12.23 14.24 4.52 2.89 799 
BL 6.91 7.03 9.49 3.56 1.31 804 
Y 15.10 13.97 20.14 13.02 2.27 806 
INF 4.21 4.41 4.78 2.16 0.50 806 
RlRd 2.52 2.68 11.07 -6.00 2.21 733 
RbRf 0.74 0.43 15.10 -9.41 3.54 806 
ES 8.34 8.24 10.98 2.20 1.41 718 
Note: S.D. is Standard Deviation. P, MS, BL, Y, INF, RlRd, RbRf and ES are bank stock price, money 
supply, bank loans, income, inflation, net interest margin, domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential 
and bank earnings spread respectively. All variables are in logarithmic form except for RlRd and RbRf. 
 
4.7 Chow breakpoint test 
Given the long sample period used in the empirical estimation and the 
overview of the history of the sample countries in Chapter 3, it is clear that each 
country experienced some internal or external shocks during the period under study. 
Thus, the Chow test is performed to see whether a model changed after a certain 
event. In this thesis, however, the choice of events is limited only to changes in 
monetary policy regimes, as this relates directly to the exogenous or endogenous 
nature of money supply with consideration to the conduct of monetary policy in each 
country. The Chow test is commonly used to test the structural stability of a model. 
 
Consider the simple linear regression (restricted model): 
TTT uXY ++= 10 ββ ,       (4.51) 
where T denotes the full sample period, T = 1,…,T. 
 
If an event z happened within that period, the sample is divided into two such that: 
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ttt uXY ++= 10 αα         (4.52) 
ztztzt uXY ++= 10 γγ         (4.53) 
where t = 1,…, t are the periods before event z happened and zt = z,…, T are the 
periods since event z happened. This is the unrestricted model. The null hypothesis 
11000 : γαγα == andH is tested against the alternative that either the intercepts, 
the slopes or both are not equal. 
 
Tested against the F-statistic, the test statistic is: 
( )
k
kT
RSSRSS
RSSRSSRSS
statistictest
ztt
ztt 2−×
+
+−
=
    (4.54) 
where: RSS = residual sum of square for the whole sample, 
tRSS  = residual sum of squares for sample with t periods, 
ztRSS  = residual sum of squares for the sample with zt periods, 
T = number of observations, and 
k = number of regressors in the unrestricted model. 
 
The monetary policy events summarised in Table 4.7 are tested using the 
simple linear regression model taken from equation (4.4A) on page 74. The results of 
the test are discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 4.7 Changes in monetary policy regime 
Country Event Start date End date 
Canada Inflation targeting announced 
(Thiessen (1998)) 1991:1 2007:1  
United Kingdom Chancellor wrote to the Chairman 
setting out new framework for 
monetary policy (Boe diary of events) 1992:4 2006:2 
United States Fed announced that it would no 
longer set M1 targets and moved 
away from borrowed reserve targets  1987:1 2007:1 
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4.7.1 Results of the Chow breakpoint test 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the Chow breakpoint test results. The null 
hypothesis of the Chow breakpoint test is that the model does not change after the 
date the event occurred. 
 
Table 4.8 Chow breakpoint test results 
 F-statistic Log likelihood ratio 
Canada: 1991q1 140.97 *** 149.41 *** 
UK: 1992q4 152.28 *** 156.68 *** 
US: 1987q1 17.14 *** 31.23 *** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of the model being stable after 
the occurring dates is rejected in Canada, UK and US at the one percent level of 
significance. This is evident through the probabilities of the F-statistic and the log-
likelihood ratio in all three countries. As it is found that there is a change in the 
model after the monetary policy event, split samples will be used (together with the 
full sample) to test the hypotheses presented in Section 4.3. The split samples used in 
the rest of this thesis are labelled as follows: Canada 1 and 2 are for 1976:3 to 1990:4 
and 1991:1 to 2007:1 respectively; UK 1 and 2 are 1975:3 to 1992:3 and 1992:4 to 
2006:2 respectively; and US 1 and 2 are 1975:3 to 1986:4 and 1987:1 to 2007:1.  
 
 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the hypotheses to be tested in this 
study, along with the data sources and the empirical model to be used to test the 
hypotheses. Chow breakpoint tests and the results are discussed to determine the 
stability of the model. 
 
Hypotheses 1 to 7 will be tested using vector error-correction models and 
Granger causality tests. The results of these tests will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. It was found that the model is not stable after a change in monetary policy 
regimes in Canada, the UK and the US. Thus, the causality tests will be performed 
on a full sample as well as on split samples to account for the change in monetary 
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policy regimes. A simultaneous equation model was developed to test Hypothesis 8. 
The model will be tested using panel data and the results discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5: Results of the Causality Tests and Panel Data 
Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports findings relating to the research questions in this thesis. The 
questions are repeated here for ease of reference: 
1. Is the money supply endogenous or exogenous in each of the G-7 countries? 
2. If the money supply is endogenous, which of the three views 
(accommodationists, structuralists or liquidity preference) does it support? 
2a. Is the support for the views in (2) above different in the short term than in the 
long term? 
3. Following the PK theory where loans cause deposits and this in turn causes 
the money supply; is the PK theory valid for the sample of G-7 countries 
under study in this thesis?  
4. Is there causality between the money supply and aggregate bank stock 
returns? 
5. Does a simultaneous relationship exist between bank loans, the money supply 
and aggregate bank stock returns such that loans create deposits (in the form 
of money supply) whilst at the same time loans and deposits affect the value 
of bank stocks in the market? 
 
The first question will be answered by investigating whether one-way or two-
way causality exists between bank loans and broad money supply. The answers to 
questions 2 and 2a will be provided using vector error-correction modelling (VECM) 
and Granger causality on the hypotheses set out in Chapter 4. VECM and Granger 
causality will allow for causality to be determined both in the long term and in the 
short term. In order to test for the robustness of the results for Question 1, a VAR 
causality test is performed with the inclusion of deposits in a trivariate test, while 
Question 4 will be answered by conducting a bivariate VECM and Granger causality 
test between money supply and bank stock returns. Once causality is determined, the 
findings will be extended by investigating whether a simultaneous relationship exists 
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between bank loans, money supply and bank stock returns such that loans create 
deposits (in the form of money supply) at the same time that loans and deposits affect 
shareholder value. This will provide the answer to the final research question. 
 
Investigating this relationship allows one to understand the importance of 
banks in creating money supply and also to determine whether this role has an effect 
on the bank’s share price. Past literature has found that a relationship exists between 
money supply (amongst other macroeconomic variables) and general stock prices. 
However, no study has investigated the relationship between money supply and bank 
stock prices.  
 
The answers will be organised as follows. Section 5.2 contains a discussion 
of the results of the unit root tests, which is followed by the Johansen (1988) 
cointegration tests results. The long-run and short-run causality tests employing 
respectively the vector error-correction models and Granger causality tests are also 
discussed in this section. Following this, Section 5.3 answers questions 2 and 2a. 
Trivariate VAR causality tests and the results are described in the ensuing section. 
Section 5.5 discusses the results of causality tests between money supply and bank 
stock returns, which answers research question 4. A simultaneous equation model 
was developed for identifying the existence of these simultaneous relationships in 
Chapter 4 to assist in answering Question 5. Section 5.6 provides a discussion of the 
preliminary test results: panel unit root, panel cointegration and vector error-
correction model. This section also discusses the results of the panel data Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) and the sensitivity analyses results. Section 5.7 
summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Money supply: Is it exogenous or endogenous? 
Mainstream Keynesians have maintained that changes in money supply by 
the central bank will affect interest rates. Any changes in money supply through the 
monetary base will affect deposits and in turn loans. This makes money supply 
exogenous, as it is controlled by the central bank. The post-Keynesians (PK), 
however, assert that money supply is endogenous through the behaviour of 
commercial banks and the public. The central bank only determines the level of 
interest rates, and the banks then adjust their loan portfolios based on this given rate. 
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Changes in loans by the banks will affect deposits and in turn money supply (which 
will in turn influence bank stock returns). This section investigates whether money 
supply is exogenous or endogenous in the G-7 countries, using vector error-
correction models and/or Granger causality tests. 
 
5.2.1 Results of the unit root tests 
The results of the unit root tests are summarised in Table 5.1. Two variables 
were tested – bank loans (BL) and broad money supply (MS) – as these variables are 
used in our analysis to determine whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Prior 
to the unit root test, we tested for the sign of a trend and/or intercept in the series by 
plotting a line graph of the variables. Significant trends are included in subsequent 
tests. 
 
Table 5.1 Unit root test results (Phillips-Perron) 
 Bank Loans (BL) Broad Money Supply (MS) Critical values 
 Level Difference Level Difference 1% 5% 10% 
Canada -2.564 -10.715*** 7.295 -3.045*** -4.034 -3.447 -3.148 
Canada 1 -1.567 -5.146*** -2.224 -4.166** -4.356 -3.595 -3.233 
Canada 2 -1.952 -8.264*** 0.817 -9.539*** -4.055 -3.457 -3.154 
France -1.760 -6.782*** -1.637 -4.41*** -4.166 -3.509 -3.184 
Germany -1.093 -8.782*** -2.184 -9.022*** -4.085 -3.471 -3.162 
Italy 0.112 -12.426*** -1.300 -15.578*** -4.106 -3.480 -3.168 
Japan -1.134 -11.73*** -1.384 -7.528*** -4.027 -3.443 -3.146 
UK -0.836 -11.103*** -1.038 -7.67*** -4.034 -3.446 -3.148 
UK 1 -2.296  -8.459*** 0.151 -4.97*** -4.095 -3.475 -3.165 
UK 2 -0.663 -6.335*** -0.605 -6.208*** -4.137 -3.495 -3.177 
US -2.171 -9.627*** -2.633 -6.601*** -4.032 -3.446 -3.148 
US 1 -1.671 -6.73*** -2.747 -5.702*** -4.171 -3.511 -3.186 
US 2 -0.612 -7.59*** -0.907 -6.02*** -4.075 -3.466 -3.160 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2= 
(1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
 
 
  The Chow breakpoint tests in Chapter 4 indicated the existence of a break in 
the sample for Canada, the UK and the US. Thus a full sample and the split samples 
were tested for money endogeneity or exogeneity. For simplicity, the split samples 
are labelled as follows: Canada 1 and 2 refer to 1976:3 to 1990:4 and 1991:1 to 
2007:1 respectively; UK 1 and 2 are 1975:3 to 1992:3 and 1992:4 to 2006:2 
respectively; and US 1 and 2 are 1975:3 to 1986:4 and 1987:1 to 2007:1. 
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The results indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be 
rejected in levels for both variables. This is because the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
statistic is higher than the respective critical value. However, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected at the one percent significance level in first difference for both variables, 
thereby showing that they are stationary in first difference or I(1). In Canada 1, the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level for money supply because the PP 
test statistic is lower than the critical value of -3.595. This confirms that the Johansen 
(1988) cointegration test can be performed, as both variables are integrated of order 
one. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
5.2.2 Results of Johansen cointegration tests  
Table 5.2 presents the results of the optimal lag length of the VAR using 
Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). VAR (1) is suggested as the most appropriate 
model to test for cointegration between bank loans and money supply in most of the 
samples: Canada 1 and 2, France, UK 1 and 2 and US 1 and 2. However, lag lengths 
two and five are also preferred in some cases.  
 
Table 5.2 VAR optimal lag length 
BL and MS        
 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Canada 0.475 -9.227 -9.286* -9.225 -9.164 -9.042 -9.016 
Canada 1 -1.944 -11.027* -10.928 -10.733 -10.628 -10.398 -10.210 
Canada 2 -1.261 -9.322* -9.115 -8.906 -8.723 -8.527 -8.571 
France -5.728 -12.827* -12.824 -12.643 -12.464 -12.258 -12.011 
Germany -2.362 -11.041 -11.142* -10.939 -10.733 -10.838 -10.861 
Italy -4.036 -9.978 -9.763 -9.639 -10.071 -10.785* -10.587 
Japan 0.033 -12.252 -12.537* -12.445 -12.329 -12.318 -12.273 
UK 1.283 -9.241 -9.268* -9.164 -9.052 -8.951 -8.837 
UK 1 1.034 -8.522* -8.452 -8.264 -8.054 -7.913 -7.713 
UK 2 -4.179 -12.694* -12.464 -12.222 -11.997 -11.903 -11.671 
US -2.216 -13.293 -13.377 -13.264 -13.186 -13.555* -13.529 
US 1 -3.913 -13.371* -13.192 -13.040 -12.829 -12.975 -12.783 
US 2 -3.688 -13.931* -13.843 -13.787 -13.592 -13.834 -13.668 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2= 
(1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank loans and 
MS is money supply. * indicates optimal lag length. 
 
 
In the case of Canada, Germany, Japan and UK, VAR (2) is preferred to test 
for cointegration between bank loans and money supply, as reported in Table 5.2 
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where -9.286, -11.142, -12.537 and -9.286 are the lowest values among the SBC. Lag 
length five is chosen for cointegration tests between the two variables in Italy and the 
US as the lowest SBC are -10.785 and -13.555 respectively. These lags are used for 
the subsequent cointegration tests. 
 
The Johansen cointegration test results summarised in Table 5.3, show that 
most of the variables are cointegrated. The null hypothesis of the cointegration tests 
is that there is no cointegrating vector against the alternative that there is at most one 
cointegrating vector. The tests include a linear trend following from the unit root 
tests. Thus, the MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) critical values at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels of significance for the Trace Test are 31.15, 25.78 and 23.34 
respectively and for the Maximal Eigenvalue Test, the critical values are 23.97, 
19.38 and 17.23 at the significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
Table 5.3 Johansen cointegration test results 
BL and MS 
Country Trace M.E. Lag 
Canada 16.37 10.87 2 
Canada 1 31.30*** 23.23** 1 
Canada 2 56.05*** 50.78*** 1 
France 33.3*** 26.97*** 1 
Germany 26.05** 21.15** 2 
Italy 26.78** 22.88** 5 
Japan 39.16*** 34.27*** 2 
UK 31.63*** 22.00*** 2 
UK 1 12.01 8.15 1 
UK 2 28.58*** 24.88*** 1 
US 33.19*** 21.57** 5 
US 1 33.89*** 22.5** 1 
US 2 55.62*** 51.89*** 1 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2= 
(1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank loans and MS 
is money supply. Trace is Trace Test statistic and M.E. is Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistic. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The Trace Test and Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistics are above the 
MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) critical values at the one and five percent 
levels of significance for all cases except Canada and UK 1. This indicates a long-run 
equilibrium between bank loans and money supply in all the sample countries except 
Canada and UK 1. 
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The variables that are found to be cointegrated will be tested for long-run and 
short-run causality using vector error-correction modelling (VECM), and those that 
are found not to be cointegrated will be tested using the standard Granger (VAR) 
causality test, as explained in the next section. 
 
5.2.3 Results of the causality tests 
In order to assess whether money supply is exogenous or endogenous in the 
seven countries, the causality results between bank loans and money supply are 
examined. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 (p. 104) summarise the results.  
 
Table 5.4 Error-correction terms 
DV INDV ECT t-stat ECT t-stat 
Canada 1    UK  
BL MS -0.191 [-3.268]*** -0.002 [-0.684] 
MS BL -0.134 [-4.783]*** -0.004 [-6.607]*** 
Canada 2    UK 2  
BL MS 0.003 [ 1.010] -0.095 [-4.619]*** 
MS BL -0.003 [- 8.50]*** -0.095 [-3.967]*** 
France    US  
BL MS -0.11 [ -5.45]*** -0.071 [-2.336]** 
MS BL -0.068 [-3.255]*** 0.086 [ 3.147]*** 
Germany    US 1  
BL MS -0.016 [-1.499] -0.099 [-5.017]*** 
MS BL -0.25 [-4.142]*** -0.07 [-1.131] 
Italy    US 2  
BL MS -0.051 [-0.190] -0.17 [-5.825]*** 
MS BL -0.774 [-2.612]*** -0.123 [-6.919]*** 
Japan      
BL MS -0.066 [-5.447]***   
MS BL -0.014 [-3.293]***   
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2= 
(1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank loans and 
MS is money supply. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The results in Table 5.4 show that the error-correction terms are negative and 
significant. Money supply reacts to a deviation from the equilibrium relationship 
between 0.3 percent (Canada 2) and 77.4 percent (Italy), while bank loans react to 
the same deviation adjusting from 6.6 percent (Japan) to 19.1 percent (Canada 1). 
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Table 5.5 Results of causality test: BL and MS 
 LR SR Granger Conclusion Monetary Policy 
Canada   BL ⇒  MS ENDO MT 
Canada 1 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO INF 
Canada 2 BL ⇒  MS   ENDO MT/INF 
France BL ⇔  MS MS⇒BL  ENDO MT/INF 
Germany BL ⇒  MS BL⇒MS  ENDO MT/INF 
Italy BL ⇒  MS   ENDO MT 
Japan BL ⇔  MS BL ⇒  MS  ENDO MT/INF 
UK BL⇒MS MS⇒BL  ENDO MT 
UK 1   MS ⇒  BL EXO INF 
UK 2 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO MT/INF 
US BL ⇔  MS MS⇒BL  ENDO MT 
US 1 MS ⇒  BL   EXO INT 
US 2 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO MT/INT 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2= 
(1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ⇒  indicates unidirectional 
causality and ⇔  indicates bidirectional causality. BL denotes bank loans and MS is money supply. 
EXO and ENDO indicate money supply as exogenous and endogenous respectively. 
 
Bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply or 
unidirectional causality from bank loans to money supply in Table 5.5 indicates 
money supply as being endogenous, for example, in the case of Japan. Overall, it was 
found that money is endogenous in all the countries except for UK 1 and US 1, 
where money supply was found to be exogenous. During this period, monetary 
policy in UK 1 and US 1 was focused on targeting monetary aggregates. In line with 
the monetarist view, a change in money supply caused by the central bank has an 
effect on bank loans through the bank lending channel. Thus, it is not surprising that 
money supply is found to be exogenous in these two countries during those periods 
only. The results for UK 1 and US 1 are supportive of the existence of exogenous 
money found by Huang (2003) and Romer and Romer (1990) respectively for those 
years.37 
 
The other monetary targeting sample is Canada 1. However, money supply 
was found to be endogenous during this period. A natural explanation for this could 
be that the Canadian central bank abandoned monetary targeting in 1982 and 
changed its monetary policy to price stability by targeting inflation, which it only 
                                                 
37
 Huang (2003) found existence of the bank lending channel in the UK, while Romer and Romer 
(1990) concluded that the money view (exogenous money) exists in the US. 
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announced in February 1991, as reported by Thiessen (1998). The reason for this 
could be that as the demand for loans in the financial system changes, the flow from 
loans to monetary aggregates as predicted by the post-Keynesian theory also changes 
the monetary aggregates, resulting in the central bank not being able to hit the 
predetermined rates.  
 
A causality test between bank loans and money supply was conducted up to 
1982; however, the result was inconclusive as it was found that there was no 
causality between the two variables. This could be due to the small sample size. Thus, 
in this thesis, the sample period for Canada 1 was determined to be 1976:3 to 1990:4. 
 
These results are in line with Howells and Hussein’s (1998) findings, even 
with an extended sample period of nine years. Similarly, the results appear to suggest 
bidirectional causality in the long run in France and the US, and to suggest that loans 
cause money supply in Italy and the UK. However, in their paper Howells and 
Hussein (1998) concluded that money was endogenous in Canada and Germany in 
the short run, but did not mention that in the long run it was found to be exogenous. 
One factor that Howells and Hussein (1998) did not consider was to split the sample 
for the UK and the US; the results in this thesis indicate that there was a difference 
between monetary policy regimes.  
 
As money supply was found to be endogenous in most samples, the next 
question is: which of the three views of the post-Keynesian theory 
(accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) is supported? This will be 
answered in the next section. 
 
5.3 Three views of endogenous money 
Debate exists under the PK theory of endogenous money regarding whether money 
supply has unidirectional or bidirectional causality on bank loans. The controversy 
over this issue impinges on the causality between monetary base and bank loans and 
the money multiplier and bank loans. These arguments of PK theory fall into three 
views: accommodationist, structuralist and liquidity preference. With the above 
findings of the nature of money supply, it is interesting to investigate which view the 
endogenous money supports or whether the components of the money supply follow 
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the monetarist view. Empirical tests of unit roots and cointegration are employed 
before the VECM causality tests are performed.  
 
5.3.1 Results of the unit root tests 
As in Section 5.2 above, unit root tests are first conducted on the variables to 
test whether they are stationary or not. The results of the unit root tests are 
summarised in Table 5.6 (p. 107).  
 
Three variables were tested:  monetary base (MB), broad money multiplier 
(MM), and nominal income (Y). Prior to the unit root tests, we tested for the sign of a 
trend and/or intercept in the series by plotting a line graph of the variables.  
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be 
rejected at level for all the variables.  
 
The null hypothesis, however, can be rejected for all variables when these 
variables were differenced once, thereby showing that they are stationary in first 
differenced or I(1). This confirms that the Johansen (1988) cointegration test can be 
performed on the variables. 
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Table 5.6 Unit root test results (Phillips-Perron) 
 
 Monetary Base (MB) Broad Money Multiplier (MM) Nominal Income (Y) Critical values 
 Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference 1% 5% 10% 
Canada -1.860 -15.399*** -2.342 -15.119*** -2.144 -6.569*** -4.034 -3.447 -3.148 
Canada 1 -2.425 -9.537*** -1.762 -9.318*** -1.931 -4.776*** -4.356 -3.595 -3.233 
Canada 2 -0.281 -14.466*** -2.370 -12.365*** -3.104 -4.275*** -4.055 -3.457 -3.154 
France -2.540 -6.657*** -1.745 -6.24*** -1.821 -4.238*** -4.166 -3.509 -3.184 
Germany -1.898 -11.689*** -2.348 -13.207*** -2.119 -9.046*** -4.085 -3.471 -3.162 
Italy 0.186  -6.407*** -1.845 -13.02*** -1.023 -6.316*** -4.106 -3.480 -3.168 
Japan -2.853 -11.301*** -1.437 -11.461*** -0.596 -11.196*** -4.027 -3.443 -3.146 
UK -3.020 -14.429*** -1.344 -13.968*** -2.134 -11.627*** -4.034 -3.446 -3.148 
UK 1 -2.348  -10.481*** -2.169 -10.244*** -1.570 -8.801*** -4.095 -3.475 -3.165 
UK 2 -2.626 -9.648*** -3.028 -9.165*** -1.326 -5.17*** -4.137 -3.495 -3.177 
US -2.755 -16.374*** -1.988 -14.192*** -2.985 -8.443*** -4.032 -3.446 -3.148 
US 1 -2.721 -10.64*** -2.360 -9.988*** -1.900 -4.849*** -4.171 -3.511 -3.186 
US 2 -2.284 -11.628*** -0.485 -10.712*** -1.881 -7.142*** -4.075 -3.466 -3.160 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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5.3.2 Results of the cointegration tests 
Table 5.7 (p. 109) presents the results of the optimal lag length of the 
VAR using Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). VAR (1) is suggested as the most 
appropriate model to test for cointegration between two variables in most of the 
samples. 
 
Lag lengths of order two, three and five are preferred in all other cases. 
VAR (2) is chosen to test for the cointegration between money supply and 
income in Canada, Canada 1 and 2, Japan, UK, US and US 2. VAR of order 
three is preferred for cointegration tests between bank loans and monetary base 
and bank loans and money multiplier in France as the SBC is -9.553 and -9.483 
respectively, showing the lowest among the seven lags included. The results for 
Germany also preferred lag length three to use for testing for cointegration 
between money supply and income as the SBC of -10.403 is the lowest at this lag. 
SBC gives preference to a lag length of five in the US as the lag employed for 
testing cointegration between bank loans and monetary base and bank loans and 
money multiplier. Similarly for Italy, SBC of -8.746, -8.536 and -11.873 are the 
lowest among all the lags, making VAR (5) the preferred lag to be used for the 
subsequent cointegration tests. 
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Table 5.7 VAR optimal lag length 
 
BL and MB       
 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Canada -0.346 -7.698* -7.660 -7.522 -7.374 -7.239 -7.094 
Canada 1 -2.381 -10.064* -10.058 -9.796 -9.654 -9.452 -9.248 
Canada 2 -1.254 -6.690* -6.566 -6.345 -6.114 -5.885 -5.663 
France -3.557 -9.538 -9.287 -9.553* -9.287 -9.060 -8.841 
Germany -1.332 -10.027* -9.991 -9.883 -9.716 -9.636 -9.482 
Italy -0.817 -8.583 -8.419 -8.221 -8.138 -8.746* -8.586 
Japan 2.070 -8.618* -8.476 -8.355 -8.213 -8.085 -7.945 
UK 1.250 -6.382* -6.272 -6.269 -6.156 -6.031 -5.884 
UK 1 0.244 -5.914* -5.706 -5.686 -5.517 -5.342 -5.111 
UK 2 -2.124 -9.351* -9.085 -9.070 -8.862 -8.696 -8.463 
US 0.072 -10.965 -11.054 -10.925 -10.843 -11.263* -11.141 
US 1 -3.741 -10.829* -10.602 -10.430 -10.414 -10.366 -10.316 
US 2 -1.261 -11.388* -11.317 -11.154 -11.067 -11.332 -11.160 
BL and MM       
Canada -0.109 -7.489* -7.426 -7.274 -7.121 -6.977 -6.856 
Canada 1 -2.855 -9.551* -9.517 -9.294 -9.111 -8.885 -8.696 
Canada 2 -1.916 -6.522* -6.369 -6.135 -5.896 -5.670 -5.453 
France -3.086 -9.367 -9.148 -9.483* -9.176 -8.974 -8.704 
Germany -2.660 -10.280* -10.170 -10.207 -10.005 -9.887 -9.694 
Italy -0.762 -8.286 -8.133 -7.980 -8.006 -8.536* -8.436 
Japan 1.236 -8.644* -8.502 -8.387 -8.246 -8.115 -7.975 
UK 1.494 -6.342* -6.222 -6.238 -6.131 -6.010 -5.863 
UK 1 1.274 -5.715* -5.512 -5.551 -5.407 -5.211 -4.980 
UK 2 -1.772 -9.274* -9.004 -8.972 -8.720 -8.547 -8.293 
US 0.330 -10.774 -10.832 -10.705 -10.679 -11.031* -10.910 
US 1 -2.816 -10.553* -10.374 -10.258 -10.193 -10.197 -10.134 
US 2 -1.212 -11.254* -11.164 -11.045 -10.965 -11.199 -11.041 
MS and Y 
Canada -1.186 -13.267 -13.444* -13.331 -13.315 -13.218 -13.132 
Canada 1 -2.910 -12.588 -12.634* -12.413 -12.300 -12.141 -12.028 
Canada 2 -3.964 -14.097 -14.430* -14.190 -14.151 -13.954 -13.747 
France -6.520 -14.407* -14.265 -14.000 -13.811 -13.831 -13.668 
Germany -3.177 -10.103 -9.897 -10.403* -10.207 -10.241 -10.016 
Italy -3.837 -10.744 -10.704 -10.690 -11.285  -11.873* -11.694 
Japan -3.040 -13.956 -14.193* -14.063 -13.990 -13.952 -13.931 
UK -0.154 -12.692 -12.723* -12.659 -12.604 -12.521 -12.432 
UK 1 -1.879 -11.987* -11.926 -11.803 -11.670 -11.578 -11.403 
UK 2 -5.384 -15.120* -14.980 -14.704 -14.424 -14.164 -13.938 
US -1.493 -13.614 -13.837* -13.722 -13.663 -13.529 -13.438 
US 1 -3.903 -13.051* -12.863 -12.611 -12.350 -12.040 -11.728 
US 2 -3.462 -14.771 -14.841* -14.759 -14.657 -14.459 -14.449 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2= (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank 
loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income.  
*
 indicates optimal lag length. 
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The Johansen cointegration test results summarised in Table 5.8 show 
that most of the variables are cointegrated. If there is a discrepancy between the 
tests, for example in UK 2 between the variables BL and MM, the Maximal 
Eigenvalue Test will be upheld for the reasons noted in Section 4.5.2 above.  
 
Table 5.8 Johansen cointegration test results 
 BL and MB  BL and MM  
Country Trace M.E. Lag Trace M.E. Lag 
Canada 29.00** 17.1* 1 16.95 10.04 1 
Canada 1 42.65*** 32.58*** 1 9.59 6.32 1 
Canada 2 25.25*** 19.42** 1 10.67 6.16 1 
France 24.72* 17.73* 3 21.27** 16.34** 3 
Germany 23.67* 17.59* 1 26.8** 23.12** 1 
Italy 34.31*** 22.17** 5 30.48** 20.57** 5 
Japan 60.23*** 52.11*** 1 60.2*** 49.19*** 1 
UK 13.65 11.70 1 40.62*** 34.57*** 1 
UK 1 12.91 10.51 1 9.93 7.15 1 
UK 2 25.62* 22.4** 1 23.24 20.47** 1 
US 20.78 17.29* 5 26.07** 19.30* 5 
US 1 11.35 8.95 1 20.4 14.11 1 
US 2 19.1 14.3 1 47.51*** 41.44*** 1 
 MS and Y   
Country Trace M.E. Lag    
Canada 33.09*** 26.99*** 2    
Canada 1 24.75* 19.54** 2    
Canada 2 30.54** 20.28** 2    
France 26.36*** 22.01*** 1    
Germany 23.83* 16.67 3    
Italy 28.75** 23.59** 5    
Japan 31.86*** 25.56*** 2    
UK 25.81*** 20.94*** 2    
UK 1 4.89 3.39 1    
UK 2 20.26*** 15.89*** 1    
US 20.49 10.35 2    
US 1 18.82 11.41 1    
US 2 27.76*** 23.66*** 2    
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank 
loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income. 
Trace is Trace Test statistic and M.E. is Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistic. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The null hypothesis of the cointegration tests is that there is no 
cointegrating vector against the alternative that there is at most one cointegrating 
vector. The cointegration tests include a linear trend for all samples with the 
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exception of testing for cointegration between bank loans and money multiplier 
in France and between money supply and income in France, UK, UK 1 and 2 as 
the unit root tests showed that the trend was insignificant. Thus, for a 
cointegration test that includes a linear trend, the MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis 
(1999) critical values for the Trace Test are 31.15, 25.78 and 23.34 and for the 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test the critical values are 23.97, 19.38 and 17.23 for 1, 5 
and 10 percent level of significance respectively. For cointegration tests that 
include a constant only, the critical values for the trace tests are 25.07, 20.26 and 
17.98 and the Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistics will be tested against the 
critical values of 20.16, 15.89 and 13.90 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance respectively.  
 
The results suggest that the non-cointegration hypothesis between the 
bank loans and monetary base is rejected at one and five percent for Canada 1 
and 2, Italy, Japan and UK 2. The null hypothesis of no cointegration between 
bank loans and monetary base is also rejected at the ten percent level in Canada, 
Germany, and France. As non-cointegration is rejected for the Maximal 
Eigenvalue Test in the US but not for the Trace Test, the results for the Maximal 
Eigenvalue Test were used.  
 
The cointegration results are supportive of the hypothesis that the 
relationship between bank loans and broad money multiplier is stable in the long 
run in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US 2, since the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the one and five percent level of significance but significant at the five 
percent level for the Trace Test. UK 2 was found to have a discrepancy between 
the Trace Test and Maximal Eigenvalue Test. Since the Maximal Eigenvalue 
Test of 20.47 was found to be significant at the five percent level of significance, 
it was deduced that there is at least one cointegrating vector between bank loans 
and money multiplier. 
 
Most of the samples have a cointegrating vector between money supply 
and income at the one and five percent levels of significance. However, UK 1, 
US and US 1 were found to have no cointegrating vector present between the two 
variables. For Germany, the Trace Test indicates that the non-cointegration 
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hypothesis between money supply and income is rejected at the ten percent level. 
But the opposite is true according to the Maximal Eigenvalue Test. Thus, it was 
concluded that there is no cointegrating vector between money supply and 
income in Germany. 
 
From the results of the cointegration tests, the causality tests using 
VECM and Granger causality are performed. The results of these tests are 
provided in the next section. 
 
5.3.3 Results of the causality tests 
Results for the long-run and short-run causality tests are summarised in 
Table 5.10 (page 116). The detailed results are provided in Appendix A5.1. Table 
4.1 outlines the hypotheses of all three post-Keynesian views of money 
endogeneity as well as the monetarist view, reproduced here from Chapter 4 for 
the convenience of the reader. 
 
Extracted from Chapter 4, Table 4.1, p. 68 
Monetarist Accommodationist Structuralist Liquidity 
Preference 
MB⇒  BL BL⇒MB BL ⇔ MB BL ⇔ MS 
MS⇒  BL BL⇒MS BL ⇔ MM  
MS⇒ Y Y ⇔  MS Y ⇔  MS  
Note: BL denotes bank loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money multiplier, MS is money 
supply and Y is income. 
 
The variables that were found to be cointegrated will be tested for long-
run and short-run causality using vector error-correction modelling (VECM) and 
those that are found not to be cointegrated will be tested using the standard 
Granger (VAR) causality test, as explained in Section 4.5.3. 
 
The error-correction terms in Table 5.9 (page 114) indicate all the signs 
are correct, that is, they are negative. This is consistent with the earlier results 
that all series are cointegrated. The US results indicate some positive and 
significant error-correction terms; however, these error-correction terms are 
calculated from the same cointegrating vector – that is, one cointegrating vector 
is used to calculate the error-correction term, as opposed to calculating a 
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different cointegrating vector for each causality pair. Thus, these terms are 
acceptable as they are the opposite sign of the other error-correction term.  
 
The results suggest that the speed of adjustment for bank loans varies 
from 0.6 percent (Japan) to 26.2 percent (Italy) and the speed of adjustment for 
monetary base varies from 0.3 percent (Canada) to 44.6 percent (France). For 
bank loans and money multiplier, the magnitude of the error-correction term 
varies from 0.1 percent (Japan) to 42.2 percent (Germany). Furthermore, the 
speed of adjustment for income varies from 0.2 percent (UK) to 6.5 percent (UK 
2). 
 
In this section, the results in sub-section 5.3.3 are revisited and analysed 
in terms of the four views (including monetarist) of money supply. Table 5.10 (p. 
116) consolidates the results. On which view of money endogeneity is supported, 
the evidence from our tests is mixed.  
 
As mentioned above, UK 1 and US 1 show money is exogenous, a result 
in line with the monetarist view since causality runs from money supply to loans. 
This is due to the monetary policy regime adopted by the two countries during 
these two sample periods. From 1975 to 1992, the UK’s monetary policy regime 
focused on monetary aggregates and the US followed a similar policy from 1975 
to 1986, targeting monetary aggregates as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Consistent with its monetary policy of targeting monetary aggregates, the 
evidence for Italy also supports the monetarist view, as causality runs from loans 
to monetary base and money multiplier in the long and short run. However, 
causality runs from loans to money supply in the long run, supporting the 
accommodationist view. It was also found there is bidirectional causality 
between money supply and income, as the error correction terms of 2.5 and 0.6 
percent in Table 5.9 are significant at the one and five percent level of 
significance respectively. 
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Table 5.9 Error-correction terms 
DV INDV ECT t-stat ECT t-stat 
Canada    Japan  
BL MB -0.003 [-0.448] -0.006 [-7.641]*** 
MB BL -0.012 [-4.198]*** -0.003 [-1.743]* 
BL MM   -0.012 [-7.567]*** 
MM BL   -0.001 [-0.163] 
MS Y -0.027 [-4.473]*** -0.001 [-5.118]*** 
Y MS -0.009 [-2.254]** 0.002 [ 0.404] 
Canada 1    UK  
BL MB -0.15 [-4.214]***   
MB BL -0.136 [-4.783]***   
BL MM   -0.017 [-5.818]*** 
MM BL   -0.008 [-2.779]*** 
MS Y -0.033 [-4.038]*** -0.005 [-4.130]*** 
Y MS 0.013 [ 1.977]** -0.002 [-1.955]* 
Canada 2    UK 2  
BL MB -0.029 [-3.146]*** -0.215 [-3.652]*** 
MB BL -0.015 [-3.326]*** -0.358 [-2.467]** 
BL MM   -0.138 [-3.692]*** 
MM BL   -0.306 [-2.452]** 
MS Y 0.079 [ 2.636]*** -0.024 [-4.587]*** 
Y MS -0.056 [-4.044]*** -0.065 [-3.333]*** 
France    US  
BL MB 0.081 [ 2.846]***   
MB BL -0.446 [-3.021]***   
BL MM -0.069 [ -3.16]*** -0.069 [-3.747]*** 
MM BL -0.318 [-2.441]** 0.121 [ 2.145]** 
MS Y -0.087 [-3.356]***   
Y MS -0.035 [-3.315]***   
Germany    US 2  
BL MB 0.029 [ 2.576]***   
MB BL -0.202 [-3.146]***   
BL MM -0.147 [-2.951]*** -0.001 [-6.921]*** 
MM BL -0.422 [-3.809]*** 0.001 [ 2.431]** 
MS Y -0.087 [-3.356]*** -0.033 [-4.824]*** 
Y MS -0.035 [-3.315]*** -0.005 [-0.951] 
Italy      
BL MB -0.262 [-4.600]***   
MB BL -0.062 [-0.556]   
BL MM -0.113 [-4.398]***   
MM BL -0.067 [-0.857]   
MS Y -0.025 [-3.561]***   
Y MS -0.006 [-2.330]**   
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 
2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 
2007:1). ECT is error-correction term. BL denotes bank loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money 
multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4.1 indicates support for both the accommodationist and the 
structuralist views. This means that money supply occurs from banking credit 
creation as changes in money income affect demand in bank loans. The new 
loans created also create deposits, which are then used to finance the change in 
demand. This would also explain the support for the monetarist view in the short 
run between loans and monetary base and multiplier. 
 
In the case of Japan, the evidence indicates mixed results between the 
four hypotheses tested. Causality between bank loans and monetary base 
supports the structuralist view, evident from the significant error-correction terms 
of 0.6 and 0.3 percent in Table 5.9, while causality between bank loans and 
money supply supports the liquidity preference view in the long run as the error-
correction terms are found to be 6.6 and 1.4 percent in Table 5.9. Both views are 
consistent with the PK theory. However, it was also found that the money 
multiplier causes bank loans in Japan, which is a support for the monetarist view. 
This may mean that liability management practices are lacking in Japan. The 
Japanese literature recognises the non-independence of corporations to manage 
liability given the nature of the main banking system (one long-standing 
relationship-based bank provides capital in times of need as this bank holds about 
30 percent of the share capital of the firm) and the practice of keiretsu firms 
providing financing to each other. Structuralists identify liability management 
practices as an alternative to supplement reserve shortages; thus an increase for 
loan demand causes liability transformation, so that credit causes an increase in 
the money multiplier. In the short run, loans cause money supply and there is 
bidirectional causality between money supply and income. 
 
For the rest of the countries – Canada, Canada 1, Canada 2, France, 
Germany, UK, UK 2, US and US 2 – the evidence leans towards the three views 
of money endogeneity theory in the long run. For instance, in France, the results 
indicate that causality between bank loans and monetary base, bank loans and 
money multiplier, and money supply and income, support the structuralist38 view 
in that there is bidirectional causality between the variables. In addition, it was 
                                                 
38
 The accommodationist view is also supported in the case of money supply and income. 
 116 
found that the liquidity preference view is supported as there is bidirectional 
causality between bank loans and money supply.  
 
Table 5.10 Summary of endogenous money views found in G-7 countries 
 VECM  GR VECM  GR VECM  GR 
 LR SR  LR SR  LR SR  
 Canada (MT/INF)  Canada 1 (MT)  Canada 2 (INF)  
BL & MB AC   ST   ST   
BL & MM 
  MO   AC    
BL & MS 
  AC LP   AC   
MS & Y AC / ST   AC / ST MO  AC / ST MO  
 France (MT/INF)  Germany (MT/INF)     
BL & MB ST MO  ST AC     
BL & MM ST ST  ST MO     
BL & MS LP MO  AC AC     
MS & Y AC / ST     MO    
 Italy (MT)  Japan (MT/INF)     
BL & MB MO MO  ST      
BL & MM MO MO  MO      
BL & MS AC   LP AC     
MS & Y AC / ST   INC AC / ST     
 UK  (MT/INF)  UK 1 (MT)  UK 2  (INF)  
BL & MB 
  AC    ST   
BL & MM ST      ST   
BL & MS AC MO    MO LP   
MS & Y AC / ST      AC / ST   
 US (MT/INT)  US 1  (MT)  US 2 (INT)  
BL & MB 
         
BL & MM ST      ST AC  
BL & MS LP MO  MO   LP   
MS & Y 
  INC    INC INC  
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). LR and SR are 
long-run and short-run conclusion based on the Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM), while 
GR stands for Granger causality. BL denotes bank loans, MB is monetary base, MM is money 
multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income. AC is Accommodationist, ST is Structuralist, 
LP is Liquidity Preference, MO is Monetarist view and INC indicates the results are inconclusive. 
Monetary policies are given in parentheses where MT, INF and INT are monetary, inflation and 
interest rate targeting respectively.  
 
The long-run evidence supports the structuralist view for causality 
between bank loans and monetary base and also between bank loans and money 
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multiplier. Liquidity preference view was found in Canada 1, France, UK 2, US 
and US 2 as there is bidirectional causality between money supply and bank 
loans. This implies that both the demand for money and the demand for loans are 
independent, as new deposit owners have independent liquidity preferences about 
the amount of money they wish to hold. Palley (1994), however, classifies the 
same finding under the structuralist approach. Bank loans cause money supply in 
Canada 2, Germany and UK, supporting the accommodationist view. The 
causality between money supply and income was found to be bidirectional in 
most cases except in US 2.  
 
In summary, countries with a pure monetary targeting regime, that is, UK 
1, Italy and US 1 still had the monetarist view supported in our tests in the long 
run. Canada 1 was the exception to this pattern. With the mixed monetary policy 
regimes (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US), the money endogeneity 
views were more evident in our tests. 
 
In the short run, the evidence on the conduct of monetary policies of the 
central banks is mixed. In interpreting the results, the Granger causality tests are 
also included as short-run causality. Most of the short-run results indicate support 
for either the monetarist view or the accommodationist view, with the exception 
of bank loans and money multiplier in France, where there is bidirectional 
causality giving support for the structuralist view. It is interesting to note that 
countries with monetary aggregate targeting as their monetary policy (Canada 1, 
Italy, UK 1 and US 1) had results consistent with monetarist view in the short 
term, while those with a mixed monetary policy regime over the years (for 
example, France, Germany and Japan) yielded results indicative of a mixed 
endogenous (mostly accommodationist) and exogenous view in the short term. 
This means that even though money is endogenous in the long run in some of 
these countries, central banks still maintain an intervening operation in the short 
run – for example, the UK and the US are found to have unidirectional causality 
from money supply to bank loans, supporting the monetarist view. In the UK, 
loans also cause monetary base in the short run, which means any demand for 
reserves is fully accommodated by the Bank of England.  
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Canada, Germany and Japan are found to support the accommodationist 
view, with Canada and Germany also supporting the monetarist view as the 
money multiplier causes bank loans only. An explanation for this could be that as 
the demand for reserves is fully accommodated, true to the accommodationist 
beliefs, this change in reserves also changes the reserves ratio in the money 
multiplier. This in turn affects loans.  
 
As the sample period for France and Italy ends before the start of the 
European Monetary System, the short-run results are indicative of the type of 
monetary policy adopted by these countries before the full advent of the euro. 
Both countries set monetary aggregate targets during this time. It is interesting to 
note that Germany was also a monetary targeting country but has an 
accommodationist view between bank loans and monetary base. This could be a 
reason why Germany was found to have an endogenous money supply in both 
the short run and the long run. The evidence towards money endogeneity in 
Germany is similar to Holtemöller's (2003) results.  
 
There has been little evidence of which money endogeneity view 
(whether accomodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) is in favour in the 
G-7 countries. Most studies of this kind concentrate mainly on emerging 
economies, for example, Shanmugam, Nair and Li (2003), Vymyatnina (2006) 
and Cifter and Ozun (2007) for Malaysia, Russia and Turkey respectively. 
Results of the bivariate tests, especially between bank loans and money supply, 
have been used in a number of studies, for example Howells and Hussein (1998) 
and Vera (2001). However, these tests may have suffered from the possibility 
that the results were invalid because of an omitted variable. In this thesis, we 
have used a variety of hypotheses specifically to test not only the money 
endogeneity, but also the question of whether it supports the accommodationist, 
structuralist or liquidity preference view. The results clearly answer these 
questions for each country, both in the short run and the long run. Having 
obtained evidence from G-7 countries on this important issue could be 
considered a significant contribution of this thesis.   
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The next section will use the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) trivariate VAR 
to test for the validity of earlier inferences between bank loans and money supply, 
with the existence of a third variable: deposits. 
 
5.4 Results of the trivariate VAR 
As the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) analysis requires the maximum order 
of integration (dmax) of the variables and the lag length (k), unit root tests 
(Phillips-Perron) and the VAR optimal lag length tests are conducted in the first 
instance. Unit root tests for the logarithm of deposits were conducted similar to 
Section 4.5.1, to test for stationarity. Unit root tests for bank loans and money 
supply have been conducted in Section 5.2.1. Thus, Table 5.11 summarises the 
results of unit root tests for deposits only.  
 
Table 5.11 Unit root test results (Phillips-Perron) 
 Deposits (DEP) Critical values 
 Level Difference 1% 5% 10% 
Canada -2.177 -11.004*** -4.035 -3.447 -3.149 
Canada 1 -1.742 -6.512*** -4.127 -3.491 -3.174 
Canada 2 -1.956 -8.343*** -4.106 -3.480 -3.168 
France -0.504 -6.508*** -4.176 -3.513 -3.187 
Germany -2.818 -8.622*** -4.085 -3.471 -3.162 
Italy -2.214 -7.299*** -4.108 -3.482 -3.169 
Japan -2.051 -16.249*** -4.027 -3.443 -3.146 
UK -1.591 -11.425*** -4.034 -3.446 -3.148 
UK 1 -1.277 -8.442*** -4.095 -3.475 -3.165 
UK 2 -1.447 -7.563*** -4.137 -3.495 -3.177 
US 0.028 -10.251*** -4.032 -3.446 -3.148 
US 1 -0.144 -7.832*** -4.176 -3.513 -3.187 
US 2 -1.044 -8.023*** -4.075 -3.466 -3.160 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1).  *** denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
The results show that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity could not be 
rejected for all countries. The series was then tested for stationarity in first 
difference form and the results indicate that the series was I(1) for all countries. 
Both bank loans and money supply are also found to be I(1) from Section 5.3.1. 
Thus, the maximum order of integration (dmax) is 1 in all countries.  
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As in Section 5.2.2, the VAR optimal lag length was determined using 
Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). VAR (1) is preferred in most cases as the 
optimal lag length between bank loans, deposits and money supply in Canada, 
Canada 2, France, UK, UK 1 and 2, US, and US 1 and 2, as provided in Table 
5.12. The lag length of two is preferred for Canada 1, Germany and Japan as the 
SBC of -17.247, -15.711 and -15.707 respectively are the lowest among all the 
SBC, while in Italy SBC of -15.345 indicates VAR of lag length 5 should be 
employed. Following this, the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) VAR causality test is 
performed. 
 
Table 5.12 VAR optimal lag length 
BL, DEP and MS 
 Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Canada -3.176 -14.290* -14.050 -13.758 -13.467 -13.269 -13.032 
Canada 1 -8.398 -17.205 -17.247* -16.739 -16.371 -16.233 -16.066 
Canada 2 -5.007 -14.128* -13.723 -13.331 -12.831 -12.635 -12.420 
France -10.198 -17.875* -17.778 -17.489 -17.253 -17.260 -16.641 
Germany -6.385 -15.562 -15.711* -15.359 -14.922 -15.052 -14.550 
Italy -7.596 -14.765 -14.225 -13.868 -14.172 -15.345* -14.896 
Japan -1.361 -15.523 -15.707* -15.620 -15.576 -15.628 -15.440 
UK 0.070 -12.520* -12.295 -11.986 -11.698 -11.438 -11.131 
UK 1 -0.864 -11.524* -11.071 -10.605 -10.145 -9.892 -9.427 
UK 2 -6.784 -16.661* -16.216 -15.621 -15.217 -14.948 -14.618 
US -2.910 -17.998* -17.846 -17.533 -17.295 -17.510 -17.293 
US 1 -8.194 -17.678* -17.113 -16.557 -15.984 -16.083 -15.563 
US 2 -5.191 -18.632* -18.346 -18.056 -17.686 -17.887 -17.578 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank 
loans, DEP is deposits, and MS is money supply. * indicates optimal lag length 
 
Table 5.13 summarises the results of the trivariate VAR tests. In order to 
compare the results from previous findings, Table 5.5 is reproduced for the 
reader. The results are detailed in Appendix A5.2.  
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Table 5.13 Trivariate VAR results 
DV INDV Canada Canada 1 Canada 2  
BL DEP DEP⇒BL    
BL MS MS⇒BL MS⇒BL MS⇒BL  
BL DEP & MS DEP&MS⇒BL DEP&MS⇒BL DEP&MS⇒BL  
DEP BL     
DEP MS  MS⇒DEP   
DEP BL & MS BL&MS⇒DEP BL&MS⇒DEP BL&MS⇒DEP  
MS BL BL⇒MS    
MS DEP DEP⇒MS    
MS BL & DEP BL&DEP⇒MS BL&DEP⇒MS   
  France Germany Italy Japan 
BL DEP DEP⇒BL 
  
DEP⇒BL 
BL MS   
 
MS⇒BL 
BL DEP & MS DEP&MS⇒BL  
 
DEP&MS⇒BL 
DEP BL BL⇒DEP  
 
BL⇒DEP 
DEP MS   MS⇒DEP 
 
 
DEP BL & MS   
 
BL&MS⇒DEP 
MS BL BL⇒MS BL⇒MS  BL⇒MS 
MS DEP  DEP⇒MS DEP⇒MS  
MS BL & DEP  BL&DEP⇒MS BL&DEP⇒MS BL&DEP⇒MS 
  UK UK 1 UK 2  
BL DEP     
BL MS MS⇒BL MS⇒BL   
BL DEP & MS DEP&MS⇒BL DEP&MS⇒BL   
DEP BL   BL⇒DEP  
DEP MS MS⇒DEP  MS⇒DEP  
DEP BL & MS BL&MS⇒DEP  BL&MS⇒DEP  
MS BL BL⇒MS BL⇒MS BL⇒MS  
MS DEP DEP⇒MS DEP⇒MS   
MS BL & DEP  BL&DEP⇒MS BL&DEP⇒MS  
  US US 1 US 2  
BL DEP DEP⇒BL    
BL MS  MS⇒BL MS⇒BL  
BL DEP & MS DEP&MS⇒BL DEP&MS⇒BL DEP&MS⇒BL  
DEP BL BL⇒DEP  BL⇒DEP  
DEP MS MS⇒DEP  MS⇒DEP  
DEP BL & MS BL&MS⇒DEP  BL&MS⇒DEP  
MS BL BL⇒MS  BL⇒MS  
MS DEP DEP⇒MS  DEP⇒MS  
MS BL & DEP BL&DEP⇒MS  BL&DEP⇒MS  
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2= (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ⇒  indicates 
unidirectional causality. BL denotes bank loans, DEP is deposits and MS is money supply. 
 
Overall, the results show that causality exists either between loans and 
deposits or between deposits and money supply. In France, Japan and UK 2, it 
was found that bank loans cause deposits but deposits do not cause money supply. 
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In Canada, Germany, Italy, UK and UK 1, it was found that deposits cause 
money supply but loans do not cause deposits.  
 
Extracted from Table 5.5, p. 104 
 LR SR Granger Conclusion 
Canada   BL ⇒  MS ENDO 
Canada 1 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO 
Canada 2 BL ⇒  MS   ENDO 
France BL ⇔  MS MS⇒BL  ENDO 
Germany BL ⇒  MS BL⇒MS  ENDO 
Italy BL ⇒  MS   ENDO 
Japan BL ⇔  MS BL ⇒  MS  ENDO 
UK BL⇒MS MS⇒BL  ENDO 
UK 1   MS ⇒  BL EXO 
UK 2 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO 
US BL ⇔  MS MS⇒BL  ENDO 
US 1 MS ⇒  BL   EXO 
US 2 BL ⇔  MS   ENDO 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ⇒  indicates 
unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates bidirectional causality. BL denotes bank loans and MS 
is money supply. EXO and ENDO indicate money supply as exogenous and endogenous 
respectively. 
 
The results also show that in all these countries, bank loans cause money 
supply. Also, it can be deduced that money supply causes bank loans in Canada, 
Japan, UK and UK 1, as it was found that there was either causality from money 
supply to deposits, or from deposits to loans (but not both); and that there is also 
an existing causality link between money supply and bank loans. These links 
were not found for France, Germany and UK 2. For UK 2, the finding is similar 
to that of Caporale and Howells (2001), who found causality from loans to 
money supply but not from money supply to loans. This makes the earlier 
findings in Section 5.3.3 for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK, UK 1, and 
UK 2 robust.  
 
For the UK, this also confirms the earlier findings of Howells and 
Hussein (1998) and Caporale and Howells (2001). However, where Caporale and 
Howells (2001) used total transactions as the third omitted variable, in this thesis 
demand deposits have been used. Caporale and Howells found that transactions 
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do not cause deposits and/or loans; thus their finding, and also the Howells and 
Hussein (1998) finding for the UK that loans cause money supply, appears to be 
valid.  
 
There is a strong causal link between money supply and bank loans in 
Canada 1 and US 1. For US 1, the results are similar to those from Table 5.5, but 
for UK 1 and Canada 1, there are differences in the results. In Canada 1, 
causality was bidirectional in the previous result, whereas money supply causes 
bank loans only when deposits are included. However, for UK 1 it was found that 
there is bidirectional causality between money supply and loans, but money 
supply was found to be exogenous in Section 5.2. 
 
Conflicting results are also found for Canada 2 and Italy. Canada’s 
monetary policy regime during this period (1991:1 to 2007:1) was inflation 
targeting, while Italy conducted monetary aggregate targeting as its monetary 
policy regime before the euro, as discussed in Chapter 3. Previous results for 
Canada and Italy in Section 5.2.3 showed causality running from bank loans to 
money supply, in support for endogenous money. For both samples, the result 
that bank loans cause money supply was not found with the inclusion of deposits. 
For Canada 2, money supply causes bank loans, and for Italy, the relationship 
does not exist at all.  
 
In the case of US and US 1, the results show that demand deposits play an 
important role in the financial system, as it was found that bank loans cause 
deposits and in turn deposits cause money supply. However, on top of this, other 
types of deposits are also important, as the causal link between bank loans and 
money supply exists. This is interesting as, unlike the other countries under 
investigation, the US and US 2 have a monetary policy of targeting interest rates. 
Besides Caporale and Howells (2001), there has been no research that focused on 
running trivariate VAR causality between bank loans, deposits and money supply 
in the G-7 countries. This may be taken as another important contribution of this 
thesis. 
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As loans and deposits are an important factor in money endogeneity and 
also in equity valuation, it would be interesting to investigate whether there is a 
causal link between money supply and bank stock returns. This will be provided 
in the next section. 
 
 
5.5 Money supply and bank stock prices 
In the post-Keynesian theory, the central bank only exercises control over 
short-term interest rates.  If inflation is below the central bank’s target, then the 
central bank may reduce interest rates to stimulate the economy, which increases 
demand for loans, subsequently raising money supply. As loans have an effect on 
banks’ profit margins, then any changes in loans would affect profits and 
ultimately stock prices under the dividend valuation theory. The decrease in 
interest rates might also mean that one can earn less through deposit accounts 
relative to stocks or bonds. Thus, stock prices will be affected. This section will 
investigate whether there is a relationship between money supply and bank stock 
prices (returns), using VECM. As in previous sections, unit root and 
cointegration tests are conducted beforehand. 
 
5.5.1 Results of the unit root tests 
Before the VECM test can be conducted, a few preliminary tests need to 
be performed, as in previous sections. Again, the unit root test in the context of 
Phillips and Perron (1988) is used to test the stationarity of the bank price index.  
 
The results provided in Table 5.14 show that the variables are non-
stationary in levels but stationary in first differences. As money supply was also 
found as I(1) in Section 5.2.1, the two series are integrated of the same order and 
cointegration can be tested using the Johansen (1988) method. 
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Table 5.14 Unit root test results (Phillips-Perron) 
 Bank stock prices (P) Critical values 
 Level Difference 1% 5% 10% 
Canada 0.640 -11.064*** -4.035 -3.447 -3.149 
Canada 1 -1.348 -5.810*** -4.127 -3.491 -3.174 
Canada 2 -0.447 -9.486*** -4.106 -3.480 -3.168 
France -0.774 -5.436*** -4.176 -3.513 -3.187 
Germany -1.130 -7.317*** -4.085 -3.471 -3.162 
Italy -1.514 -7.308*** -4.108 -3.482 -3.169 
Japan -1.296 -11.309*** -4.027 -3.443 -3.146 
UK -0.704 -14.309*** -4.034 -3.446 -3.148 
UK 1 -0.944 -15.716*** -4.095 -3.475 -3.165 
UK 2 2.147 -7.091*** -4.137 -3.495 -3.177 
US -0.495 -10.399*** -4.032 -3.446 -3.148 
US 1 1.858 -6.418*** -4.176 -3.513 -3.187 
US 2 -0.333 -8.173*** -4.075 -3.466 -3.160 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). *** denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
5.5.2 Results of the cointegration tests 
Prior to the Johansen cointegration test, the optimal lag length to be used 
in the cointegration test is determined using vector autoregression (VAR). This is 
similar to the procedure described in Section 5.2.2. Table 5.15 shows that the lag 
length of one is chosen by the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) as the optimal 
lag length in Canada 2, France, Germany, UK 1, UK 2, US 1 and US 2. VAR(2) 
is the optimal lag length preferred in Canada, Canada 1, Japan, UK and US as the 
SBC is the lowest among the seven lags tested – for example, in Canada the SBC 
of -7.908 is the lowest. The lag length of five is chosen for Italy as the SBC of -
5.47 is the lowest among all the lags. These lag lengths will be used to determine 
whether a long-run equilibrium exists between bank stock returns and money 
supply.  
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Table 5.15 VAR optimal lag length 
MS and RET 
Country Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Canada 2.248 -7.907 -7.908* -7.827 -7.750 -7.668 -7.604 
Canada 1 -0.271 -7.529 -7.717* -7.504 -7.317 -7.225 -7.208 
Canada 2 -0.352 -8.479* -8.294 -8.067 -8.003 -7.761 -7.605 
France -2.479 -7.133* -7.070 -6.806 -6.464 -6.257 -6.205 
Germany 0.837 -6.444* -6.270 -6.064 -5.909 -5.690 -5.483 
Italy 1.261 -4.373 -4.492 -4.480 -4.871 -5.470* -5.365 
Japan 3.527 -7.984 -8.150* -8.015 -7.920 -7.897 -7.855 
UK 3.512 -7.391 -7.412* -7.377 -7.268 -7.160 -7.085 
UK 1 0.784 -7.490* -7.440 -7.356 -7.171 -7.120 -6.956 
UK 2 0.398 -7.668* -7.438 -7.193 -6.922 -6.746 -6.696 
US 2.093 -8.810 -8.894* -8.754 -8.642 -8.499 -8.454 
US 1 0.140 -9.929* -9.623 -9.390 -9.215 -8.973 -8.771 
US 2 1.190 -8.562* -8.483 -8.283 -8.121 -7.995 -8.008 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). 
 
Both Trace and Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics are reported in Table 
5.16. As the tests included only a constant, the MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis 
(1999) critical values for the Trace tests are 25.07, 20.26 and 17.98 and for the 
Maximal Eigenvalue tests are 20.16, 15.89 and 13.90 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance respectively.  
 
Table 5.16 Johansen cointegration test 
MS and RET    
Country Trace M.E. Lag 
Canada 27.48*** 20.48*** 2 
Canada 1 24.28* 18.79* 2 
Canada 2 56.83*** 52.67*** 1 
France 19.80* 16.24** 1 
Germany 40.84*** 33.72*** 1 
Italy 21.62*** 14.14* 5 
Japan 29.72*** 25.82*** 2 
UK 30.96*** 27.59*** 2 
UK 1 27.48*** 25.02*** 1 
UK 2 38.12*** 31.58*** 1 
US 20.18* 15.26* 2 
US 1 15.32 11.24 1 
US 2 32.16*** 30.15*** 1 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1).  Trace is Trace 
Test statistic and M.E. is Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistic. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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The results show that bank stock returns and money supply were not 
cointegrated in US 1. In the rest of the sample, bank stock returns and money 
supply have a long-run equilibrium relationship, and this is significant at the one 
percent level in Canada, Canada 2, Japan, Germany, UK, UK 1 and 2 and US 2.  
 
Bank stock returns and money supply are also cointegrated at the five 
percent level of significance in France, and ten percent significance in Canada 1, 
Italy, and US. Where there are discrepancies between the results, for example in 
Italy, where the Trace Test statistic is significant at the one percent level and the 
Maximal Eigenvalue is significant at the ten percent level, the result of the 
Maximal Eigenvalue dominates, following Johansen and Juselius (1990).39 As 
US 1 was found not be cointegrated, then only the Granger causality test will be 
performed on the two variables in this sample. 
 
5.5.3 Results of the causality tests 
The long-run and short-run conclusions of the VECM results are 
summarised in Table 5.18. Details of the results are provided in Appendix A5.3. 
The results in Table 5.17 show that the error-correction terms are of the expected 
sign, that is, negative. The magnitude of the error-correction term for money 
supply causing returns ranges from 0.6 percent (UK) to 49.7 percent (UK 1), 
while causality running from returns to money supply ranges from 0.1 percent 
(UK 2) to 3.7 percent (Italy).  
                                                 
39
 This is also mentioned in Section 4.5.2 
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Table 5.17 Error-correction terms 
DV INDV Country ECT t-stat Country ECT t-stat 
RET MS Canada -0.05 [-1.943]* Japan -0.036 [-1.642]* 
MS RET  0.008 [ 2.888]***  -0.002 [-1.762]* 
RET MS Canada 1 -0.485 [-4.435]*** UK -0.006 [-1.951]* 
MS RET  0.014 [ 0.949]  -0.001 [-4.755]*** 
RET MS Canada 2 -0.022 [-1.262] UK 1 -0.497 [-5.007]*** 
MS RET  -0.012 [-8.365]***  0.021 [ 1.616] 
RET MS France -0.029 [-0.717] UK 2 -0.062 [-2.510]** 
MS RET  0.012 [ 4.260]***  -0.01 [-5.296]*** 
RET MS Germany -0.009 [-6.173]*** US -0.052 [-1.642]* 
MS RET  -0.015 [-1.643]*  0.007 [ 3.150]*** 
RET MS Italy -0.156 [-1.640]* US 2 -0.011 [-0.351] 
MS RET  0.037 [ 3.057]***  0.007 [ 3.670]*** 
Note: Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:3), 
UK 2 = (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. MS is money supply and RET is bank 
returns. 
 
Table 5.18 Results of causality test: MS and RET 
Country LR Conclusion SR Conclusion 
Canada MS ⇔ RET MS⇒RET 
Canada 1 MS⇒RET  
Canada 2 RET⇒MS   
Japan MS ⇔ RET   
Germany MS ⇔ RET   
France RET⇒MS   
Italy MS ⇔ RET MS⇒RET 
UK MS ⇔ RET   
UK 1 MS⇒RET RET⇒MS 
UK 2 MS ⇔ RET   
US MS ⇔ RET   
US 2 RET⇒MS   
Note: LR = long run and SR = short run, ⇒  indicates unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates 
bidirectional. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 
1992:3), UK  2= (1992:4 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). MS is 
money supply and RET is bank returns. 
 
Overall, there exists at least one-way causality from money supply to 
bank stock returns in the long run and in the short run. It was found that money 
supply caused bank stock returns in UK 1 in the long run; however, in the short 
run, returns caused money supply. In Canada 1 in the long run and Canada and 
Italy in the short run, the evidence shows that money supply causes bank stock 
returns only. In the case of Canada 2, France and US 2, it was found that bank 
stock returns caused money supply instead. There was no causality found 
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between money supply and bank stock returns when the Granger causality test 
was performed for US 1. The results are provided in Appendix A5.3, Panel C. 
 
 
5.6 Simultaneous equations estimation 
The causality tests between bank stock returns and money supply in Section 5.5.3 
confirm the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the two variables. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that there is bidirectional causality between the 
two variables. Thus, since it is hypothesised that profit-making by banks and 
movements from loans to money supply vis-à-vis money endogeneity occur 
simultaneously, panel data estimation is performed. The model proposed in 
Chapter 4 is repeated below: 
[ ]
++
= MSESfPit ,         (4.4) 




=
++++
PRbRfINFBLfMS it ,,,       (4.5) 
[ ]
−++
= RlRdYMSfBLit ,,        (4.6) 
 
where Pit is bank stock price in country i at time t, BL is bank loans, MS is money 
supply, INF is inflation, Y is income, ES is bank earnings spread 
= [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential 
= RfRb − , and RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − . All variables are in 
logarithmic form except RbRf and RlRd.  
 
Split samples for Canada, the US and the UK, as in previous sections (5.2 
to 5.5), are not applied here, as the purpose of the panel data estimation is to 
investigate whether there is a simultaneous relationship between loans, money 
supply and bank stock returns.  
 
Before the panel data are estimated, a number of preliminary tests are 
conducted. These are to ensure that the variables are stationary and subsequently 
that there is causality, not merely correlation, between the predetermined and 
endogenous variables. The tests include panel unit root tests proposed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), panel cointegration following Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) and vector error-correction model estimation. Discussion of the 
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tests and their results is provided in the next sections, beginning with panel unit 
root tests. 
 
5.6.1 Results of the panel unit root tests 
Table 5.19 summarises the results of the Maddala and Wu (1999) and 
Choi (2001) Fisher tests. All variables are in logarithmic form except for 
domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential (RbRf) and interest rate margin 
(RlRd). For RbRf and RlRd, these variables are the difference between two 
percentages; thus there is no need to transform these variables. The hypotheses 
tested are: H0: each series in the panel contains a unit root, against H1: at least 
one of the individual series in the panel is stationary. 
 
Table 5.19 Unit root test – Fisher Phillips-Perron tests 
 Fisher chi-square statistic Choi Z-statistic 
Variables Level Difference Level Difference 
P 5.496 405.587*** 2.858 -18.323*** 
 (0.9776) (0) (0.9979) (0) 
MS 17.835 186.885*** 0.025 -11.515*** 
 (0.2144) (0) (0.51) (0) 
ES 8.628 292.975*** 3.074 -14.863*** 
 (0.8541) (0) (0.9989) (0) 
BL 5.819 440.749*** 1.688 -19.724*** 
 (0.9708) (0) (0.9543) (0) 
RbRf 39.455***  -4.057***  
 (0.0003)  (0)  
INF 5.501 176.706*** 1.332 -10.981*** 
 (0.8712) (0) (0.9086) (0) 
Y 6.119 345.168*** 3.330 -16.714*** 
 (0.9634) (0) (0.9996) (0) 
RlRd 28.319**  -1.830**  
 (0.0129)  (0.0336)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. ***, **denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels 
respectively. P is bank stock price, ES is bank earnings spread, BL is bank loans, MS is money 
supply, INF is inflation, RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential, RlRd is net interest 
margin and Y is income. 
 
The results indicate that, besides RbRf and RlRd, the null hypothesis that 
the series contains a unit root cannot be rejected for all variables at the one 
percent level of significance. For example, the Fisher chi-square statistic and 
Choi Z-statistic were 17.84 and 0.025 respectively for money supply, with p-
values of 0.21 and 0.51. The p-values are above the 10 percent level of 
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significance, indicating the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The variables 
(except for RbRf and RlRd) are then tested for stationarity in first differences. 
The results show that the null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary when 
first differenced is rejected for the same variables. This means that all variables 
(besides RbRf and RlRd) are integrated of order one or I(1). 
 
For RbRf, both the Phillips-Perron Fisher tests based on Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and Choi (2001) reject the null hypothesis that the series contains a unit 
root, thus making the variable stationary. The Fisher chi-square statistic of 28.32 
and Choi Z-statistic of -1.83 together with the p-value of less than 5 percent 
indicate that RlRd is stationary at level under both tests at the 5 percent level of 
significance. The results indicate that RbRf and RlRd are I(0). Thus these 
variables are left in level form. 
 
As most of the variables are found to be integrated of order one (I(1)), the 
next step is to test these series to determine whether they are cointegrated. The 
panel cointegration test is based on Pedroni (1999, 2004) and the results are 
reviewed in the next section. 
 
5.6.2 Results of the panel cointegration tests 
Four lags are chosen as the optimal number of lag lengths as the series are 
quarterly data. The Pedroni (1997) panel cointegration test results are provided in 
Table 5.20. The results for equation (4.4) show that the null of no cointegration is 
rejected for panel v, panel ADF, group rho and group ADF. The panel v-statistic 
was found to be 2.44, which is higher than the critical value of 1.64. Similarly, 
the panel ADF, group rho and group ADF were found to be -5.58, -1.79 and -
7.19 respectively. As the Pedroni (1997) statistics are one-sided tests and these 
statistics are smaller than the critical value of -1.64, the panel ADF and group 
ADF statistics are found to be significant at the one percent level of significance, 
while the group rho was found to be significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 5.20 Panel cointegration results - Pedroni (1997) test 
Panel A: Within-dimension 
 Eq 4.4 Eq 4.5 Eq 4.6 
Panel v-Statistic 2.44** 4.4*** 0.72 
Panel rho-Statistic -1.34 -3.64*** -3.03*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -1.11 -0.12 -0.59 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.58*** -4.18*** -4.94*** 
    
Panel B: Between-dimension 
 Eq 4.4 Eq. 4.5 Eq4.6 
Group rho-Statistic -1.79* -4.09*** -3.31*** 
Group PP-Statistic -1.04 -0.29 -0.25 
Group ADF-Statistic -7.19*** -7.21*** -5.77*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Pedroni (1997) 
tests are one-sided tests with critical values of 1.64 for the panel v-statistic and -1.64 for all others. 
The equations are: 
[ ]
++
= MSESfPit ,     (Eq. 4.4) 




=
++++
PRbRfINFBLfMSit ,,,   (Eq. 4.5) 
[ ]
−++
= RlRdYMSfBLit ,,    (Eq. 4.6) 
 
 
For equation (4.5), the panel v statistics of 4.4 are above the critical value 
of 1.64. Furthermore, the panel rho, panel ADF, group rho and group ADF all 
show a lower value than the critical value of -1.64, and these statistics are 
significant at one percent level of significance. This shows that there is 
cointegration.  
 
In addition, for equation (4.6), the panel rho, panel ADF, group rho and 
group ADF statistics are all lower than -1.64 and significant at the one percent 
level of significance. This suggests that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected based on these four statistics. As mentioned above, due to power and 
small sample size, the top three statistics in terms of performance are the group 
ADF, panel ADF and panel rho. Thus, the results from these tests are more 
reliable. For all three equations, the results are consistently significant for group 
ADF and panel ADF. 
 
As cointegration is present in the equations, the vector error-correction 
model can be used to test for long-run and short-run causality in the equations. 
This is discussed in the next section. 
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5.6.3 Results of the VECM tests 
The Pedroni (1997) panel cointegration tests confirm that the variables in 
equations (4.4) to (4.6) are cointegrated. VECM tests are then performed to test 
for long-run and short-run causality, using equation (4.16). 
 
The resulting long-run coefficients as summarised in Table 5.21 are 
obtained through the normalisation of the cointegrating vectors. It should be 
stressed that the VECM are individually run for each equation and that it is not 
run together as a system. This is because the purpose of this section is to 
determine whether the predetermined variables and the endogenous variables that 
are on the right hand side have a causal effect on the dependent variable. 
 
 The evidence of cointegrating relations in Table 5.21 shows that there is a 
positive relationship in equation (4.4) between money supply and bank stock 
price, a major concern of this thesis. There is a negative relationship between 
bank stock price and money supply for equation (4.5). Bank loans and money 
supply are found to have a positive relationship for equations (4.5) and (4.6), 
suggesting the presence of a bidirectional relationship similar to earlier results. 
 
Table 5.21 Cointegrating relations 
Equations Cointegrating relation [ ]
++
= MSESfPit ,                          (4.4) 0.38MS-20.28 




=
++++
PRbRfINFBLfMSit ,,,        (4.5) 8.38BL-0.84P-95.62 
[ ]
−++
= RlRdYMSfBLit ,,                (4.6) 0.18MS-9.06 
Note: P is bank stock price, ES is bank earnings spread, BL is bank loans, MS is money supply, 
INF is inflation, RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential, RlRd is net interest margin 
and Y is income. 
 
The VECM results provided in Table 5.22 (p. 135) suggest whether the 
endogenous and exogenous (predetermined) variables have a causal relationship. 
All the error-correction terms have the correct expected sign, which is negative. 
For example, under equation (4.4) the error correction terms are -0.0012 and -
0.0002, which indicate that money supply reacts to a deviation from the 
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equilibrium relationship by 0.12 percent, while bank stock prices react to a 
deviation from the equilibrium relationship by 0.02 percent respectively. 
 
For equation (4.4), the results show there is bidirectional causality 
between money supply and returns in the long run but not in the short run. This is 
consistent with the findings for most of the countries in Section 5.4.3. About 0.12 
percent of disequilibrium is corrected by changes in returns each quarter and 0.02 
percent of disequilibrium is adjusted by changes in money supply. Earnings 
spread is found to have an effect on returns as the coefficient is found to be 
significant at the five percent level from the t-statistics in Table 5.22 (p. 135). 
 
Thus, bank loans and bank stock returns jointly were found to cause 
money supply, and money supply and bank stock returns together were found to 
cause bank loans, according to the VECM results of equation (4.5). However, 
bank loans and money supply were found not to have an effect on bank stock 
returns in the long run. In the short run, only money supply and bank stock 
returns jointly cause bank loans, and this is found to be significant at the one 
percent level of significance. This result is acceptable as it is more important to 
determine the causality from returns and bank loans to money supply, as this is 
the predetermined equation. In addition, it was found that in the short run there is 
bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply. This is consistent 
with the results in Section 5.2.3 where money was found to be endogenous in 
most countries. The exogenous variables, inflation and domestic-to-foreign 
interest rate differential, were also found to be significant at the one percent and 
ten percent levels of significance respectively.  
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Table 5.22 VECM causality test 
        SRC   Conclusion  
Endo ECT t-stat Exo t-stat Exo t-stat RET MS BL 
2χ test LR SR 
Equation 3.7   ∆ ES          
RET-MS -0.0012 [-2.553]** 0 [-2.443]**      1.656 MS ⇔ RET   
MS-RET -0.0002 [-5.161]*** 0 [ 1.638]      1.876    
Equation 3.8   ∆ INF  RbRf        
MS-BL&RET -0.0002 [-8.411]*** 0.0809 [ 2.588]*** -0.0001 [-1.657]*  0.505 0.028 4.707 BL&RET⇒MS   
BL–MS&RET -0.0004 [-4.467]*** 0.0172 [ 0.202] 0.0005 [ 1.572]  0.365  23.836*** MS&RET⇒BL MS&RET⇒BL 
RET – MS & BL -0.0005 [-1.569] -0.1984 [-0.563] -0.0024 [-1.707]* 0.089  0.266 5.557     
MS – BL          4.647*  BL⇒MS 
MS- RET          0.059   
BL-MS          23.012***  MS⇒BL 
BL – RET          0.87   
RET-MS          1.99   
RET-BL          3.733   
Equation 3.9   ∆ Y  RlRd        
BL-MS -0.0029 [-2.316]** 0.2527 [ 1.913]* 0.0002 [ 1.704]*  0.585  22.791*** MS ⇔ BL MS ⇔ BL 
MS-BL -0.0024 [-5.261]*** 0.0272 [ 0.572] -0.0006 [-2.930]***  0.52 0.032 7.42*   
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10  percent levels respectively, Endo and Exo are endogenous and exogenous 
variables respectively, ECT denotes error-correction term; SRC is short-run coefficient; only significant lags are summed under SRC. LR = long run and SR = short run, ⇒  
indicates unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates bidirectional causality. ∆ denotes first difference. RET is bank returns, ES is bank earnings spread, BL is bank loans, MS is 
money supply, INF is inflation, RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential, RlRd is net interest margin and Y is income. The equations are: 
[ ]
++
= MSESfPit ,    (4.4)  



=
++++
PRbRfINFBLfMSit ,,,   (4.5)  [ ]
−++
= RlRdYMSfBLit ,,   (4.6) 
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There is bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply in the 
VECM results of equation (4.6). The error-correction terms are both significant at the 
one and five percent levels, and about 0.29 and 0.24 percent of disequilibrium is 
corrected by bank loans and money supply respectively each quarter. The 
bidirectional causality is supportive of earlier results in Section 5.2.3. Bidirectional 
causality was also found in the short run under equation (4.6), as the 2χ test statistic 
of 22.79 for money supply causing loans and 7.42 for loans causing money supply 
are significant at the one and ten percent levels respectively. Furthermore, income 
and net interest margin are also found to be weakly significant as the t-statistic 1.93 
and 1.74 in the table are both higher than the critical value of 1.64 for a ten percent 
level of significance.  
 
The results of these causality tests will be used in the subsequent Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) panel data estimation. Statistics relating to how the 
model fits will be discussed in the next section as the causality tests are a preliminary 
test to show that the predetermined independent variables do cause, and are not just 
correlating with, the independent variables. 
 
5.6.4 Results of the GMM panel data estimation 
Table 5.23 (p. 137) provides the summary of results of the GMM panel data 
estimation as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Two important statistics are 
discussed first.  
 
From the results, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of the hypothesis that 
there is no second-order serial correlation based on the residuals of the first 
differenced equation is not rejected. This suggests that the GMM estimators are 
consistent. Secondly, the Sargan (1958) test statistic in Table 5.23 is 0.0187 with a p-
value of 1. The Sargan test is used to test for overidentifying restrictions, that is, it 
determines whether any correlation between instruments and errors exists. For an 
instrument to be valid, there should be no correlation between instruments and errors. 
From the results, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, thus providing evidence of 
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the validity of lagged levels dated t-2 and earlier lags as instruments in the first-
difference equations. 
 
Table 5.23 Results of GMM panel data estimation  
 Variables  Coefficients t-statistic 
Equation 4.4b α  0.0211 [3.853]*** 
 
∆ ES 0 [-2.415]** 
 
∆ MS 4.2923 [1.925]* 
Equation 4.5b α  0.003 [1.416] 
 
∆ BL 0.9995 [3.923]*** 
 
∆ INF 0.1468 [1.786]* 
 
RbRf -0.001 [-1.777]* 
 
R -0.119 [-1.813]* 
Equation 4.6b α  -0.0021 [-1.878]* 
 
∆ MS 1.154 [12.433]*** 
 
∆ Y 0.1791 [2.117]** 
 
RlRd 0.0007 [1.755]* 
 
AR(2) 0.0332 [1.596] 
 
Sargan statistic  
(p-value) 0.0187 (1) 
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and in parentheses are p-values. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. ∆ denotes first difference and α  is a 
constant for each equation. R is bank stock returns, BL is bank loans, MS is money supply, INF is 
inflation, Y is income. ES is bank earnings spread = [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign 
interest rate differential =Rb-Rf, and RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − . AR(2) is the second-order 
serial correlation term.  
 
Most of the variables show the expected signs. Table 5.24 compares the signs 
that were expected for each coefficient and the actual sign obtained from the GMM 
panel data estimation. Four signs were different from the expected sign: The bank 
earnings spread (ES) in equation (4.4), the domestic-to-foreign interest rate 
differential (RbRf) and returns (R) in equation (4.5) and the net interest margin 
(RlRd) in equation (4.6). These will be further discussed below. 
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Table 5.24 Expected and actual signs for variables in GMM estimation 
Variables Expected sign Actual sign 
Equation 4.4b   
ES + - 
MS + + 
Equation 4.5b   
BL + + 
INF + + 
RbRf + - 
R + - 
Equation 4.6b   
MS + + 
Y + + 
RlRd - + 
Note: R is bank stock returns, BL is bank loans, MS is money supply, INF is inflation, Y is income. ES 
is bank earnings spread = [ ]DRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential 
= RfRb − , RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − .  
 
 
An increase in money supply growth by one percent increases growth of bank 
stock returns by 4.29 percent. This positive relationship is similar to the one found in 
the cointegrating equation in Section 5.5.4. The results support Ratanapakorn and 
Sharma (2007) and Abdullah and Hayworth (1993), who found a relationship 
between money supply (among other macroeconomic variables) and stock prices in 
the US. In Japan, Mukherjee and Naka (1995) obtained similar findings. One 
explanation for the positive result could be that a rise in money supply could enhance 
stock prices via the liquidity effect, that is, the higher liquidity in the economy 
reduces the interest rate and, consequently, raises stock prices. Another explanation 
is that the central bank may reduce interest rates to stimulate the economy. This in 
turn increases demand for loans, which subsequently raises money supply. If the 
bank is seen as a business entity and loans are the product being sold, then increases 
in loans would lead to a rise in profits and ultimately stock prices according to cash-
flow effects as in the dividend valuation theory.  
 
Another reason could be that as demand for loans increases and is satisfied 
through any means necessary, be it the central bank or other sources, money supply 
increases. Berger and Bouwman (2008) found a positive correlation between 
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liquidity creation by banks and their market value, concluding that banks that create 
more liquidity are valued more by investors. Liquidity creation in this sense is the 
ability to transform illiquid assets such as business loans into liquid liabilities – for 
example, transaction deposits. However, Berger and Bouwman (2008) calculate a 
bank’s value using market-to-book ratio and price-earnings ratio rather than the stock 
prices. Following from this, the creation of loans to deposits (and in turn money 
supply), which creates liquidity in the banks, is valued more by investors. 
 
In addition, even though it is significant at a five percent level of significance, 
bank earnings spread was found to have a negligible effect.  
 
A one-percentage increase in bank loan growth increases money supply 
growth 0.99 percent. This confirms the earlier findings in Section 5.2.3 that loans 
cause money supply, thus supporting the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous 
money. Inflation and money supply are found to have a positive relationship. From 
Table 5.23, a one-percentage change in inflation growth leads to a rise in money 
supply growth by 0.1468 percent; this is significant at the ten percent level of 
significance as the t-statistic is higher than the critical value of 1.64. An increase in 
inflation means that real interest rates are reduced through the Fisher Effect 
e
r ii pi−=  where ir, i and 
epi  are real interest rates, nominal interest rates and 
expected inflation respectively. With the real interest rates reduced, it is likely that 
this leads to a rise in loans needed to fund investments. According to the post-
Keynesians, the increase in loans would in turn increase money supply.  
 
The domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential was found from Table 5.24 
to have a negative relationship rather than a positive one. An increase in the 
domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential decreases money supply growth by 
0.001, which is negligible. A natural explanation for this is that as the domestic rate 
increases more than the foreign rate, thus increasing the differential, there is capital 
flow out of the country as it is now cheaper to obtain funding internationally. This is 
the opposite of the currency effect, which suggests that short-term money foreign 
cash will flow into the country to earn its higher deposit rates. This means that the 
grwoth of domestic loans will decrease, which in turn will decrease money supply 
growth. This is contrary to Foster (1992), who found a positive relationship between 
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money supply and the domestic-to-foreign interest rate differential. Foster (1992) 
argued that a rise in the domestic interest rate would increase domestic deposits. This 
will increase money supply not only because deposits are more attractive but also 
because banks may make matching switches from foreign-currency-denominated to 
domestic-currency-denominated marketable financial assets.  
 
An increase in the growth of bank stock returns, through bank stock prices, 
reduces money supply growth by 0.12 percent. From Table 5.24, this was not 
expected, as increases in bank stock prices would indicate that the economy is in 
strong growth, which may relate back to increased inflation. This means that any 
increases in inflation or expected inflation may decrease the real interest rate. The 
reduced real interest rate leads to more affordable investments funded through loans, 
which in turn increases money supply. Hence, a positive relationship is expected. 
 
An explanation for the negative relationship could be related to the changes 
in interest rates prompted by the central banks. Increases in bank stock returns 
growth reflecting strong economic growth in the country may lead to rises in 
inflation. In order to slow the economy, central banks may increase interest rates to 
negate the rising inflation. The rise in interest rates leads to increases in loan rates, 
leading to reduced money supply growth.  
 
The results also confirm the bidirectional relationship between bank stock 
returns and money supply found previously in Section 5.5.3. They also support the 
results by Rogalski and Vinso (1977) and Hashemzadeh and Taylor (1988) that there 
exists bidirectional causality between money supply and stock returns, even though 
these two studies concentrated on general stock indices and not on the bank stock 
index. 
 
In Table 5.24, for equation (4.6b), money supply and bank loans have a 
positive relationship. This is consistent with the long-run cointegrating relationship 
discussed in Section 5.6.3. An increase in money supply raises bank loans by 115 
percent, from the results in Table 5.23. Following on from the positive relationship 
between bank loans and money supply results in equation (4.6b), this result confirms 
the existence of a feedback effect as found in Section 5.2.3.  
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A one percent increase in income growth leads to a rise in bank loan growth 
by 0.179 percent. The positive relationship is expected because, given income 
increases, individuals will have more money to pay their loans or other liabilities. 
From Table 5.24, net interest margin was expected to have a negative relationship 
with bank loans as increases in loan rates higher than deposit rates increase net 
interest margin. With higher loan rates, loans would not be affordable, so that the 
amount of loans would decrease. However, this was not the case. The results show 
that an increase in net interest margin increases bank loan growth by 0.0007 percent. 
Although the amount is small, the positive relationship suggests that even with loan 
rate increases, banks were still lending money. Maybe competition from sub-prime 
mortgage lenders was pushing banks to lend without any concern to ration credit to 
high-risk borrowers. 
 
5.6.5 Results of the GMM panel data estimation: Sensitivity analysis 
In order to check the robustness of the results, two more GMM panel data 
tests were carried out. The first included three countries – Japan, the UK and the US 
(called Group A) – and the second consisted of Canada, France, Germany and Italy 
(termed Group B). The first three countries were grouped together as they all had a 
developed banking sector, such that it had good money-market depth and few 
barriers to entry.  
 
Due to smaller sample sizes, the results in Table 5.25 show that some of the 
variables have become insignificant – for example, money supply no longer has an 
effect on bank stock returns in Group A. Furthermore, none of the variables has an 
effect on money supply in Group A. However, it should be stressed that despite the 
insignificance of variables, none of the signs of the coefficients was contrary to 
theory. The signs were found to be the same as the previous results in Table 5.24. 
 
Two important tests, the second-order serial correlation test and the Sargan test, 
are reported in Table 5.25. For both groups, it was found that there is no second-
order serial correlation based on the residuals of the first differenced equation. This 
indicates that there is no correlation between instruments and errors, hence making 
the instruments used in the equations valid as before. 
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Table 5.25 Results of GMM estimation: Sensitivity analysis 
  Group A: US, UK, Japan Group B: EUR & CAN 
 
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics 
Equation 4.4b α  0.0226 [2.452]** 0.0123 [1.485] 
 
∆ ES 0 [-0.746] 0 [-1.901]* 
 
∆ MS 6.8843 [1.25] 3.1821 [1.761]* 
Equation 4.5b α  0.0052 [0.45] 0.005 [2.548]** 
 
∆ BL 1.1172 [1.15] 0.8946 [2.936]*** 
 
∆ INF 0.0734 [0.246] 0.1697 [1.634] 
 
RbRf -0.0013 [-0.612] -0.0005 [-0.919] 
 
R -0.2617 [-0.571] -0.0469 [-1.495] 
Equation 4.6b α  -0.0012 [-0.874] -0.0059 [-3.603]*** 
 
∆ MS 1.3549 [13.607]*** 0.7667 [9.025]*** 
 
∆ Y 0.2387 [2.137]** 0.1401 [1.591] 
 
RlRd 0.0005 [1.009] 0.0006 [1.307] 
 
AR(2) 0.0492 [1.276] 0.0043 [0.207] 
 
Sargan statistic 
(p-value) 0.0554 (0.999) 0.0433 (0.999) 
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and in parentheses are p-values. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. ∆ denotes first difference and α  is a 
constant for each equation. R is bank stock returns, BL is bank loans, MS is money supply, INF is 
inflation, Y is income, ES is bank earnings spread = [ ]DEPRdLRl ×−× , RbRf is domestic-to-foreign 
interest rate differential = RfRb − , and RlRd is net interest margin = RdRl − . AR(2) is the second-order 
serial correlation term.  
 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we sought to answer the five research questions. First, whether 
money supply was exogenous or endogenous in the G-7 countries. Second, evidence 
for three views of the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money was sought, 
followed by an investigation of whether these results differ in the long run and the 
short run. Next, using trivariate VAR causality tests, earlier inferences as to whether 
money was exogenous or endogenous were validated in the presence of a third 
variable, deposits. Fourth, whether there was causality between money supply and 
bank stock returns. Finally, using panel data, we investigated whether a simultaneous 
relationship exists such that loans create deposits in the form of money supply as 
suggested by post-Keynesian theorists, at the same time that loans and deposits affect 
shareholder value. 
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A number of econometric tests were performed: Phillips-Perron unit root tests, 
Johansen cointegration tests, vector error-correction modelling and Granger (VAR) 
causality tests were employed to answer questions 1, 2 and 4.  
 
It was found that money supply is endogenous in most countries except UK 1 
and US 1. In terms of which PK theory view was supported, the structuralist view 
was mainly supported for Canada 1 and 2, France, Germany, Japan, UK 2, US and 
US 2, as there was bidirectional causality between bank loans and monetary base 
and/or bank loans and money multiplier and/or money supply and income. The 
liquidity preference view was supported by these countries (except Canada 2 and 
Germany) as there was bidirectional causality between bank loans and money supply. 
Canada and UK were found to support the accommodationist view, with Italy 
supporting both the monetarist and the accommodationist views, while UK 1 and US 
1 support the monetarist view. 
 
The results also indicate that there is a difference between long-term and 
short-term causality. Where there is support for structuralist or liquidity preference in 
the long run, in the short run the evidence for Japan, Canada 1 and US 2 supports the 
accommodationist view, while France and Germany appear to conduct monetary 
policy in accordance with the monetarist view. Most of the short-run results indicate 
support for either the monetarist or the accommodationist view, with the exception of 
France, which supported the structuralist view (for bank loans and money multiplier). 
These results suggest that even though money is endogenous in the long run in some 
of these countries, central banks still intervene in the short run. For Question 4, it 
was found that with the exception of US 1, there is a relationship between bank stock 
returns and money supply. 
 
Trivariate VAR causality tests proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) were 
then used to answer Question 3. The results are robust to the inclusion of deposits for 
all samples except Canada 2 and Italy, while deposits were found to be important in 
US and US 2. 
 
 The final question was answered using the panel data Generalised Method of 
Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Panel unit root tests, panel 
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cointegration tests and VECM causality were performed firstly to determine whether 
the characteristics of the variables entering the tests were satisfactory and also 
whether the predetermined variables should be omitted from the equations. The panel 
data GMM results show that there is a positive relationship between money supply 
growth and growth in bank stock returns but a negative relationship from the growth 
in bank stock returns to money supply growth. It was also found that there is a 
bidirectional positive relationship between bank loan growth and money supply 
growth, which supports earlier results in this chapter, as well as the post-Keynesian 
theory of endogenous money. 
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion, Limitations and Further 
Research 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Summary of the main findings of the thesis  
Monetary economists have long debated the nature of the money supply. Mainstream 
Keynesians and monetarists insist that the money supply is exogenous in that the 
central bank controls money supply, which in turn affects interest rates and 
subsequently output. Post-Keynesians, on the other hand, argue that the money 
supply is in fact endogenous and is created through the behaviour of commercial 
banks and the public’s demand for loans. In such cases, the central bank’s role is 
only to determine the level of interest rates and banks will adjust their loan portfolios 
based on this rate, or help change the liquidity of firms. Under this scenario, 
provision of liquidity and portfolio rebalancing of banks will lead to a money supply 
effect on bank stock returns, which is a little-researched topic in finance and banking. 
Here, changes in loans will affect deposits and this in turn will affect money supply.  
 
The aim of this thesis centres around two main issues: (a) whether the money 
supply is determined by banking behaviour or by the behaviour of the central banks 
and (b) the impact of the money supply on bank stock returns. The first issue was 
investigated through a series of econometric tests to establish (1) whether the money 
supply was exogenous or endogenous, (2) which of the three views 
(accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) is supported, and whether 
this support differs between the long run and the short run, and (3) whether earlier 
inferences were valid in the presence of a third variable, deposits, used in this thesis. 
The second issue was tested by investigating whether there was causality between 
the money supply and bank stock returns, and whether there was a simultaneous 
relationship such that loans create deposits, in the form of money supply as 
suggested by post-Keynesian theorists, at the same time that loans and deposits affect 
shareholder value. A simultaneous model was developed to test the simultaneous 
relationship. 
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Before determining whether the money supply was exogenous or endogenous, 
Phillips-Perron unit root tests were conducted to check for the stationarity of 
variables. If the variables were found to be I(1), the Johansen cointegration tests were 
performed to determine whether there is a stable long-run relationship between bank 
lending and monetary base, bank loans and broad money multiplier, bank loans and 
broad money supply, and broad money supply and income. Vector error-correction 
modelling and Granger (VAR) causality tests were employed to test for long-run and 
short-run causality respectively once cointegration was determined. Table 6.1 
summarises the findings in this thesis. 
 
Table 6.1 Summary of findings 
 
Country H1: Money 
supply 
endogenous? 
H2, 3 & 4: Monetarist, 
Accommodationist, 
Structuralist or Liquidity 
Preference? 
H6: Deposits 
appropriate? 
H7: Money 
supply and 
bank stock 
returns? 
Monetary 
Policy 
  LR SR    
Canada 1 Yes ST, LP AC, MO No Yes MT 
Canada 2 Yes ST, AC INC No* Yes INF 
Canada Yes AC AC, MO No Yes MT/INF 
France Yes ST, LP MO, ST No Yes MT/INF 
Germany Yes ST, AC MO, AC No Yes MT/INF 
Italy Yes AC, MO MO No* Yes MT 
Japan Yes ST, LP AC No Yes MT/INF 
UK 1 No MO MO No Yes MT 
UK 2 Yes ST, LP INC No Yes INF 
UK Yes AC AC, MO No Yes MT/INF 
US 1 No MO MO No No MT 
US 2 Yes ST, LP AC Yes Yes INT 
US Yes ST, LP MO Yes Yes MT/INT 
Note: AC is Accommodationist, ST is Structuralist, LP is Liquidity Preference, MO is Monetarist 
view and INC indicates the results are inconclusive. No* indicates that the results were not robust to 
the inclusion of deposits. MT is Monetary targeting, INF is Inflation targeting and INT is Interest rate 
targeting. 
 
The findings show that money supply is endogenous in most countries except 
for the two periods coinciding with monetary targeting control regimes in UK 1 and 
US 1. The samples were split because of the change in monetary regimes – for 
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example, monetary policy was monetary aggregates targeting for UK 1, while under 
UK 2 monetary policy was inflation targeting. UK 1, US 1 and Canada 1 had 
monetary targeting. The results for UK 1 and US 1 support Hypothesis 1.1 where 
money is found to be exogenous, while the evidence on the other countries supportes 
Hypothesis 1.2. The results for UK 1 and US 1 were consistent with the monetary 
policy in place, that is, targeting monetary aggregates; however, Canada 1 was found 
to be endogenous. This is similar to Italy, where targeting monetary aggregates was 
the monetary policy before the advent of the euro. For the countries where money 
was found to be endogenous, there was mixed evidence as to which of the three 
views (accommodationist, structuralist or liquidity preference) was supported.  
 
Very important results followed. Mainly the structuralist view was supported 
for Canada 1 and 2, France, Germany, Japan, UK 2, US and US 2, as there was 
bidirectional causality between bank loans and monetary base and/or bank loans and 
money multiplier and/or money supply and income. The liquidity preference view 
was supported for these countries (except Canada 2 and Germany, which supported 
the accommodationist view) as there was bidirectional causality between bank loans 
and money supply. Canada and UK were found to support the accommodationist 
view, with Italy supporting both the monetarist and accommodationist views; while 
UK 1 and US 1 supported the monetarist view. 
 
The results also indicate that there is a difference between long-run and short-
run causality. Where there is support for structuralist or liquidity preference in the 
long run, Japan, Canada 1, and US 2 show support for the accommodationist view in 
the short run, while France and Germany appear to conduct monetary policy in 
accordance with the monetarist view in the short run. Most of the short-run results 
indicate support for either the monetarist view or the accommodationist view, with 
the exception of bank loans and money multiplier in France, where there is 
bidirectional causality evidencing support for the structuralist view. These results 
suggest that even though money is endogenous in the long run in some of these 
countries, the central banks still intervene in the short run.  
 
An interesting pattern that has emerged is that the countries with inflation 
targeting as their monetary policy, Canada 2 and UK 2, had an inconclusive result in 
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the short run. The countries with monetary aggregate targeting as their monetary 
policy (Canada 1, Italy, UK 1 and US 1) had results consistent with a monetarist 
view in the short run, while those with a mixed monetary policy regime over the 
years – for example, France, Germany and Japan – also had mixed endogenous 
(mostly accomodationist) views supported by the results in the short run. In the long 
run, countries with a pure monetary targeting regime, that is, UK 1, Italy and US 1, 
still had the monetarist view. Canada 1 was the exception to this pattern. With the 
mixed monetary policy regimes, the money endogeneity views were more evident. 
 
Because post-Keynesians assert that bank loans cause deposit and in turn 
these cause money supply, a trivariate VAR causality test proposed by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) was used to determine whether causality was still valid between 
loans and money supply even with the presence of demand deposits. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of deposits for all samples except Canada 2 and Italy, while 
deposits were found to be important in US and US 2. One interesting fact is that the 
only country that had deposits found to be important also had interest rate targeting 
as its monetary policy. This supports Hypothesis 6, suggesting that the results are 
robust with the inclusion of deposits. 
 
After all the tests for money endogeneity were performed, it was of interest to 
test whether there was a relationship between money supply and bank stock returns, 
which is the second important issue in this thesis. Econometric tests involving 
VECM and Granger causality tests, similar to those used in examining the nature of 
money supply, were performed between bank stock returns and money supply. The 
results indicate that, with the exception of US 1, there was a relationship between 
money supply and bank stock returns. This finding supports Hypothesis 7 in that 
money supply causes bank stock returns or/and bank stock returns cause money 
supply. These results were retested for robustness and the results are the same. 
 
A simultaneous equation model was developed in Chapter 4 for the purposes 
of testing further the relationship between bank stock returns and money supply. This 
model was tested using the panel data Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
methodology proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Before the panel data GMM 
was estimated, a number of econometric tests were conducted to test whether the 
  149 
characteristics of the variables entering the tests were satisfactory and also whether 
the predetermined variables should be omitted from the equations. As the data were 
panel data, which included a time-series component, panel unit root tests based on 
Fisher (1932) tests were used to examine whether the series were stationary. The 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher chi-square test and Choi Z-statistics were adopted for 
this purpose. All the variables besides the interest rate variables, domestic-to-foreign 
interest rate (RbRf) and net interest margin (RlRd) were found to be integrated of 
order one (I(1)). 
 
 Since the variables were found to be I(1), panel cointegration tests could be 
performed on the equations. Based on the Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration 
test, the equations were found to be cointegrated. We then tested for long-run and 
short-run causality using vector error-correction models and found that money 
supply causes bank stock returns in the long run. This finding corroborates related 
findings on money endogeneity – although, as the results were found in the long run, 
this result could be driven by some other relationship. There is bidirectional causality 
between bank loans and money supply even with the presence of exogenous 
(predetermined) variables. 
 
 The results of the panel data GMM test show that there is a positive 
relationship between money supply growth and growth in bank stock returns and a 
negative relationship from growth in bank stock returns to money supply growth. It 
was also found that there is a bidirectional positive relationship between bank loan 
growth and money supply growth, which supports earlier results in Section 5.2.3. 
This is consonant with the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money. As there is 
a simultaneous relationship (or effect) found between bank stock returns and money 
supply, and money supply and bank loans, this finding supports Hypothesis 8.  
 
Overall, this thesis has presented evidence on the relationship between money 
supply and bank stock returns by using aggregate and panel data40 respectively, and 
                                                 
40
 Aggregate data includes data that involves the banking industry in each country, whereas panel data 
includes combined time series data from 1973 to 2007 and stacked cross-section data from the seven 
countries. 
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while taking the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money into account in the 
model. This was the main aim of the thesis as set out in Chapter 1.  
 
6.2 Limitations of the thesis 
The thesis has some limitations. First, the data used are sourced from 
DataStream. Even though the macroeconomic variables were checked with the IMF 
IFS database, there may be some inconsistencies, especially for the bank price index 
taken from DataStream. Ince and Porter (2006) found inconsistencies between the 
DataStream data and that of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). They 
found issues of coverage, classification and data integrity for the DataStream data; 
for example, they noted several issues with calculating total returns using the return 
variables provided by DataStream in that there could be survivorship bias and 
coverage issues. However, as no bank price index for the seven countries is available 
elsewhere, this study had to rely upon the DataStream database. 
 
Second, bivariate causality tests have been used in most cases. Besides the 
omitted variable bias, channels of causality may be hidden when only two variables 
are used. However, the causality between bank loans and money supply was tested 
using the trivariate test. Other tests, such as the unit root and cointegration tests, were 
also conducted prior to the causality tests. These two tests are known to have low 
power and size properties in small samples (Cheung and Lai, 1993). This limitation 
is more applicable in the case of France, where there are only 46 observations. 
Therefore, care must be taken when interpreting the results for France. 
 
The GMM panel data model may contain variables that are omitted. This is 
the third limitation of this study. Omitted variables may be a source of threat to 
statistical validity. However, the predetermined variables have been used in previous 
studies, for example, Foster (1992), and are derived from monetary economic theory.  
 
Finally, the thesis concentrates on the banking sector, as the post-Keynesian 
theory of endogenous money is focused on the idea that money supply is created by 
the operations of the commercial banks and the public. One limitation that is 
immediately recognisable is that the findings of this thesis may not be generalised to 
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other industries in the economy. However, even though the thesis concentrates on the 
banking sector of the G-7 countries, there is scope to generalise the findings to 
banking sectors in other countries with a well-developed financial system. 
 
6.3 Implications and future research directions 
6.3.1 Implications 
The findings of this study provide several important implications. Firstly, our 
findings in general support Howells and Hussein’s (1998) results – namely, that the 
money supply in our tests of G-7 countries is endogenous, as theorised by the PK 
economists. This is because we found bank loans to cause money supply, and found 
that bidirectional causality exists between bank loans and money supply. Contrary 
results, where money is exogenous, were found only in respect of two sub-sample 
tests in the UK and the US during which monetary aggregates were used as targets 
for the conduct of monetary policy. This implies that current monetary policy 
adopted by the G-7 countries allows for the creation of money supply, even though it 
is not directly controlled by the central banks. 
 
Second, for the countries where money was found to be endogenous, mainly 
the structuralist and liquidity preference views were supported. This implies that 
monetary policy is not only important in determining the nature of money supply, but 
also that it may be seen as an informative tool in assessing the financial system. With 
the findings supporting the structuralist view, an inference may be made that banks 
are involved in liability management to meet credit demands, as suggested by 
Rochon (1999) amongst others. 
  
Third, as indicated by the robust results of the trivariate VAR tests, bank 
deposits are found to be a significant variable in all samples except those of Canada 
(1991:1 to 2007:1) and Italy. Deposits were found to be important in the US. An 
interesting fact is that interest rate targeting is the main monetary policy regime in 
the US, and this is different from the other G-7 countries. This suggests that demand 
deposits are an important factor in the US compared to the other countries.  
 
Fourth, our findings using the GMM panel data estimation method show that 
there is a positive relationship from money supply growth to growth in bank stock 
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returns. However, the relationship from growth in bank stock returns to money 
supply growth is negative. This may be explained by central bank interest-rate 
changes aimed at negating inflation, leading to a rise in interest rates and 
subsequently to reduced money supply. It was also found, in this context, that there is 
a bidirectional positive relationship between bank loan growth and money supply 
growth, which supports the PK theory of endogenous money. Thus, the results 
suggest that bank credit creation is the source of the effect of money supply on bank 
stock returns. 
 
Finally, an important implication of the overall findings of this thesis points 
towards the key functioning of a banking system. Banks are not only transmitters of 
monetary policy but are also important in the development of the growth of money 
through loan creation to the money supply and bank stock price formation.  
 
6.3.2 Future research directions 
This thesis concentrated on three European countries (France, Germany and 
Italy) as part of the G-7 countries. However, due to the change to the euro system in 
these three countries, the data for these countries end in 1998. A natural extension to 
this thesis would be to investigate the nature of money supply in these three countries 
before and after the advent of the euro. This would show whether there were changes 
in money supply following monetary integration in 1998. 
 
This thesis only tested endogenous money on the basis of vector error-
correction models and Granger causality tests. Foster (1992) and Holtemöller (2003) 
have developed a model of broad money supply based on the UK and German 
systems respectively. Another avenue of research would be to test the nature of 
money supply (exogenous or endogenous) by applying one of these two models to 
different countries. 
 
As the thesis focuses on the G-7 countries, one avenue of research is to utilise 
the methodology of this thesis, especially the GMM panel data, to study developing 
nations or even emerging economies. 
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Appendix A5.1: VECM Test Results  
 
Panel A: Cointegrating equations 
 DV INDV Beta t-stat Intercept Trend t-stat 
Canada BL MB 12.066 [ 3.357]*** -33.139 -0.153 [-3.695]*** 
 MS Y -2.177 [-18.59]*** 16.24   
Canada 1 BL MB -1.393 [-6.115]*** -1.419 -0.006 [-2.042]** 
 BL MS -0.834 [-6.659]*** 4.975 -0.008 [-2.704]*** 
 MS Y -11.595 [-4.626]*** 139.433 0.071 [ 3.562]*** 
Canada 2 BL MB -2.282 [-2.757]*** 0.142   
 BL MS 3.45 [ 2.655]*** -47.422   
 MS Y 2.114 [ 4.468]*** -39.315 -0.03 [-7.698]*** 
France BL MB 1.688 [ 5.236]*** -26.291 -0.002 [-0.675] 
 BL MM -0.851 [-10.86]*** -11.952   
 BL MS -2.125 [-9.544]*** 5.393   
 MS Y -1.35 [-6.887]*** 12.239   
Germany BL MB 2.322 [ 4.136]*** -15.561 -0.048 [-6.405]*** 
 BL MM -1.592 [-7.654]*** 6.733 -0.011 [-11.63]*** 
 BL MS -4.71 [-5.578]*** 50.961 0.062 [ 4.235]*** 
Italy BL MB -0.587 [-9.406]*** -3.259 -0.013 [-10.17]*** 
 BL MM 1.285 [ 5.038]*** -15.404 -0.028 [-14.64]*** 
 BL MS -1.114 [-44.30]*** 7.438 -0.001 [-0.992] 
 MS Y -8.985 [-2.756]*** -11.882 0.061 [ 2.812]*** 
Japan BL MB 2.234 [ 5.571]*** -14.633   
 BL MM -1.195 [-2.135]** 0.059 -0.018 [-1.897]* 
 BL MS -1.408 [-12.31]*** 10.491 0.013 [ 6.834]*** 
 MS Y 12.321 [ 1.869]* -20.846 0.002 [ 0.048] 
 UK BL MM -1.773 [-3.643]*** 9.696   
 BL MS -8.954 [-4.029]*** -8.842   
 MS Y -2.27 [-2.356]** 15.706   
UK 2 BL MB -0.511 [-6.912]*** -3.657 -0.016 [-20.73]*** 
 BL MM 0.679 [ 5.296]*** -11.169 -0.027 [-23.19]*** 
 BL MS -1.046 [-23.45]*** 7.34   
 MS Y -2.353 [-9.234]*** 19.444   
US BL MM -0.763 [-8.788]*** -5.251 -0.019 [-57.66]*** 
 BL MS -0.997 [-18.16]*** -0.188 -0.003 [-3.978]*** 
US 1 BL MS -3.358 [-4.582]*** 15.506 0.051 [ 3.081]*** 
US 2 BL MM 28.319 [ 3.157]*** -86.664   
 BL MS -1.183 [-66.02]*** 1.179   
 MS Y -1.835 [-16.55]*** 20.63   
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively; DV and INDV are dependent and independent variables respectively. Canada 1 = 
(1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:4), UK 2 = (1993:1 - 2006:2), 
US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank loans, MB is monetary base, 
MM is money multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income. 
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Panel B: VECM (Short-run and long-run causality) 
    LR SRC 
 
SR 
 
DV INDV ECT t-stat Conclusion DV INDV 
2χ  test Conclusion 
Lag
Canada         
BL MB -0.003 [-0.448]     0.07   1 
MB BL -0.012 [-4.198]*** BL⇒MB   1.416   1 
MS Y -0.027 [-4.473]*** MS ⇔ Y   0.569   2 
Y MS -0.009 [-2.254]**    1.614   2 
Canada 1         
BL MB -0.15 [-4.214]*** MB ⇔ BL   1.276   1 
MB BL -0.136 [-4.783]***    1.667   1 
BL MS -0.191 [-3.268]*** BL ⇔  MS   0.842   1 
MS BL -0.134 [-4.783]***    2.13   1 
MS Y -0.033 [-4.038]*** MS ⇔ Y   0.881   2 
Y MS 0.013 [ 1.977]**  0.54 0.235 4.815* MS ⇒Y 2 
Canada 2         
BL MB -0.029 [-3.146]*** MB ⇔ BL   0.203   1 
MB BL -0.015 [-3.326]***    0.859   1 
BL MS 0.003 [ 1.010]     0.259   1 
MS BL -0.003 [- 8.50]*** BL⇒MS   0.207   1 
MS Y 0.079 [ 2.636]*** MS ⇔ Y   2.638   2 
Y MS -0.056 [-4.044]***  0.16 0.492 8.308** MS⇒Y 2 
France         
BL MB 0.081 [ 2.846]*** BL ⇔ MB -0.101  10.999** MB⇒BL 3 
MB BL -0.446 [-3.021]***  0.468 1.369 5.167   3 
BL MM -0.069 [ -3.16]*** BL ⇔ MM  0.1 13.796*** BL ⇔ MM 3 
MM BL -0.318 [-2.441]**  0.505 -1.77 6.704*  3 
BL MS -0.11 [ -5.45]*** BL ⇔  MS  0.337 6.733*** MS⇒BL 1 
MS BL -0.068 [-3.255]***  0.376  0.04   1 
MS Y -0.087 [-3.356]*** MS ⇔ Y 0.324  0.053   1 
Y MS -0.035 [-3.315]***  0.35  0.003   1 
Germany         
BL MB 0.029 [ 2.576]*** MB ⇔ BL   1.309   1 
MB BL -0.202 [-3.146]***  -0.226 0.771 6.283** BL⇒MB 1 
BL MM -0.147 [-2.951]*** BL ⇔ MM 0.104  4.441** MM⇒BL 1 
MM BL -0.422 [-3.809]***  -0.191  0.137   1 
BL MS -0.016 [-1.499]     0.474   2 
MS BL -0.25 [-4.142]*** BL⇒MS 1.221  43.256*** BL⇒MS 2 
Ital
         
BL MB -0.262 [-4.600]*** MB ⇒BL 0.782 -0.822 14.552** MB⇒BL 5 
MB BL -0.062 [-0.556]    0.68 7.392   5 
BL MM -0.113 [-4.398]*** MM⇒BL 0.411 0.666 17.452*** MM ⇒BL 5 
MM BL -0.067 [-0.857]   0.341  8.662   5 
BL MS -0.051 [-0.190]     5.442   5 
MS BL -0.774 [-2.612]*** BL⇒MS 0.646 -0.879 7.115   5 
MS Y -0.025 [-3.561]*** Y ⇔ MS -0.475 -0.764 7.081   5 
Y MS -0.006 [-2.330]**  -0.366 -0.089 8.605   5 
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Panel B: VECM (Short-run and long-run causality) continued 
    LR SRC 
 
SR 
 
DV INDV ECT t-stat Conclusion DV INDV 
2χ  test Conclusion Lags 
Japan          
BL MB -0.006 [-7.641]*** BL ⇔ MB   0.252   1 
MB BL -0.003 [-1.743]*    0.835   1 
BL MM -0.012 [-7.567]*** MM⇒BL   0.277   1 
MM BL -0.001 [-0.163]     0.981   1 
BL MS -0.066 [-5.447]*** BL ⇔  MS -0.145  1.097   2 
MS BL -0.014 [-3.293]***  0.018 0.605 10.163*** BL⇒MS 2 
MS Y -0.001 [-5.118]*** Y⇒MS 0.48 0.123 5.555* MS ⇔ Y 2 
Y MS 0.002 [ 0.404]   0.196  7.946**  2 
UK          
BL MM -0.017 [-5.818]*** BL ⇔ MM   0.23   1 
MM BL -0.008 [-2.779]***    0.198   1 
BL MS -0.002 [-0.684]    0.961 5.843** MS⇒BL 2 
MS BL -0.004 [-6.607]*** BL ⇒  MS   0.095   2 
MS Y -0.005 [-4.130]*** MS ⇔ Y   0.642   2 
Y MS -0.002 [-1.955]*    1.133   2 
UK 2          
BL MB -0.215 [-3.652]*** BL ⇔ MB   1.137   1 
MB BL -0.358 [-2.467]**    0.358   1 
BL MM -0.138 [-3.692]*** BL ⇔ MM   1.241   1 
MM BL -0.306 [-2.452]**    0.118   1 
BL MS -0.095 [-4.619]*** MS ⇔ BL  0.253 2.408   1 
MS BL -0.095 [-3.967]***    0.346   1 
MS Y -0.024 [-4.587]*** Y ⇔ MS   0.041   1 
Y MS -0.065 [-3.333]***  0.347  1.643   1 
US          
BL MM -0.069 [-3.747]*** BL ⇔ MM   1.835   5 
MM BL 0.121 [ 2.145]**    8.375   5 
BL MS -0.071 [-2.336]** BL ⇔  MS 0.17  9.901* MS⇒BL 5 
MS BL 0.086 [ 3.147]***    2.011   5 
US 1            
BL MS -0.099 [-5.017]*** MS⇒BL -0.262 -0.415 0.765   1 
MS BL -0.07 [-1.131]   0.338  1.689   1 
US 2          
BL MM -0.001 [-6.921]*** BL ⇔ MM   1.176   1 
MM BL 0.001 [ 2.431]**   0.538 4.647** BL⇒MM 1 
BL MS -0.17 [-5.825]*** BL ⇔  MS   0.14   1 
MS BL -0.123 [-6.919]***  0.252  2.532   1 
MS Y -0.033 [-4.824]*** Y⇒MS 0.27 -0.379 8.208** Y⇒MS 2 
Y MS -0.005 [-0.951]   -0.307  1.09   2 
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels respectively, DV and INDV are dependent and independent variables respectively, ECT 
denotes error-correction term; SRC is short-run coefficient; only significant lags are summed under 
SRC. LR = long run and SR = short run, ⇒  indicates unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates 
bidirectional. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:4), 
UK 2= (1993:1 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). BL denotes bank loans, 
MB is monetary base, MM is money multiplier, MS is money supply and Y is income. 
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Panel C: Granger Causality results 
DV INDV F test Probability Lags Granger DV INDV F test Probability Lags Granger 
UK      Germany      
BL MB 1.824 (0.177) 1   MS Y 2.809 (0.246) 2   
MB BL 6.777 (0.009) 1 BL⇒MB Y MS 72.172 (0) 2 MS ⇒ Y 
UK 1      US      
BL MB 0.088 (0.766) 1   BL MB 8.869 (0.114) 5   
MB BL 0.132 (0.717) 1   MB BL 4.753 (0.447) 5   
BL MM 0.498 (0.481) 1   MS Y 7.418 (0.025) 2 Y⇒MS 
MM BL 0.027 (0.87) 1   Y MS 1.651 (0.438) 2   
BL MS 2.72 (0.099) 1 MS ⇒ BL       
MS BL 0.18 (0.672) 1         
MS Y 1.051 (0.305) 1         
Y MS 0.273 (0.602) 1         
Canada      US 1       
BL MM 7.092 (0.008) 1 MM⇒ BL BL MB 0.643 (0.423) 1   
MM BL 0.442 (0.506) 1   MB BL 0.009 (0.923) 1   
BL MS 1.343 (0.511) 2   BL MM 0.191 (0.662) 1   
MS BL 6.7 (0.035) 2 BL ⇒MS MM BL 0.049 (0.825) 1   
     MS Y 1.34 (0.247) 1  
     
Y MS 1.518 (0.218) 1 
 
Canada 1     US 2        
BL MM 0.007 (0.935) 1   BL MB 0.952 (0.329) 1   
MM BL 8.391 (0.004) 1 BL ⇒MM MB BL 2.31 (0.129) 1  
Canada 2           
BL MM 0.155 (0.694) 1         
MM BL 0.411 (0.521) 1        
Note: DV and INDV are dependent and independent variable respectively. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:4), UK2= 
(1993:1 - 2006:2), US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). ⇒  indicates unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates bidirectional. BL denotes bank  loans, MB is  
monetary base, MM is  money multiplier, MS is  money supply and Y is income. 
  157 
Appendix A5.2: Trivariate VAR 
 
DV INDV MWald Causality MWald Causality MWald Causality 
  Canada  Canada 1 Canada 2 
BL DEP 5.68 DEP⇒BL 2.26 
 
0.31  
  (0.059)  (0.689)  (0.579)  
BL MS 6.76 MS⇒BL 14.87 MS⇒BL 3.42 MS⇒BL 
  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.064)  
BL DEP & MS 12.55 DEP&MS⇒BL 17.81 DEP&MS⇒BL 6.06 DEP&MS⇒BL 
  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.048)  
DEP BL 4.57  2.64  0.04  
  (0.102)  (0.619)  (0.84)  
DEP MS 2.39  25.4 MS⇒DEP 1.23  
  (0.303)  (0)  (0.268)  
DEP BL & MS 8.67 BL&MS⇒DEP 28.98 BL&MS⇒DEP 4.9 BL&MS⇒DEP 
  (0.07)  (0)  (0.086)  
MS BL 11.99 BL⇒MS 4.03  1.13  
  (0.003)  (0.403)  (0.287)  
MS DEP 13.74 DEP⇒MS 3.48  1.44  
  (0.001)  (0.482)  (0.23)  
MS BL & DEP 15.16 BL&DEP⇒MS 17.23 BL&DEP⇒MS 1.77  
  (0.004)  (0.028)  (0.412) 
 
  France  Germany    
BL DEP 5.98 DEP⇒BL 1.62   
 
  (0.05)  (0.655)   
 
BL MS 2.15  1.65   
 
  (0.342)  (0.648)   
 
BL DEP & MS 13.4 DEP&MS⇒BL 7.23   
 
  (0.01)  (0.3)   
 
DEP BL 6.88 BL⇒DEP 0.9   
 
  (0.032)  (0.826)   
 
DEP MS 4.55  6.44 MS⇒DEP 
  
  (0.103)  (0.092)   
 
DEP BL & MS 7.56  10.16   
 
  (0.109)  (0.118)   
 
MS BL 5.98 BL⇒MS 12.85 BL⇒MS  
 
  (0.05)  (0.005)   
 
MS DEP 3.31  49.48 DEP⇒MS 
  
  (0.191)  (0)   
 
MS BL & DEP 7.67  101.3 BL&DEP⇒MS 
  
  (0.105)  (0)   
 
  Italy  Japan    
BL DEP 9.74 
 
24.08 DEP⇒BL  
  
  (0.136) 
 
(0)   
 
BL MS 4.14 
 
14.17 MS⇒BL  
  
  (0.658) 
 
(0.003)   
 
BL DEP & MS 14.34 
 
35.07 DEP&MS⇒BL  
 
  (0.279) 
 
(0)   
 
DEP BL 8.84 
 
7.81 BL⇒DEP  
  
  (0.183) 
 
(0.05)   
 
DEP MS 7.86 
 
5.18   
  
  (0.248) 
 
(0.159)   
 
DEP BL & MS 13.42 
 
11.26 BL&MS⇒DEP  
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  (0.339) 
 
(0.081)   
 
MS BL 4.56  9.9 BL⇒MS  
  
  (0.601)  (0.02)   
 
MS DEP 15.88 DEP⇒MS 1.75  
  
  (0.014)  (0.625)   
 
MS BL & DEP 24.32 BL&DEP⇒MS 12.54 BL&DEP⇒MS 
 
  (0.018) 
 
(0.051)   
 
  UK  UK 1  UK 2  
BL DEP 0.53  0.6  1.44  
  (0.769)  (0.742)  (0.487)  
BL MS 11.95 MS⇒BL 5.26 MS⇒BL 2.29  
  (0.003)  (0.072)  (0.318)  
BL DEP & MS 15.34 DEP&MS⇒BL 10.08 DEP&MS⇒BL 3.15  
  (0.004)  (0.039)  (0.534)  
DEP BL 0.69  0.2  5.96 BL⇒DEP 
  (0.708)  (0.907)  (0.051)  
DEP MS 9.88 MS⇒DEP 4.19  5.97 MS⇒DEP 
  (0.007)  (0.123)  (0.051)  
DEP BL & MS 10.13 BL&MS⇒DEP 5.74  11.36 BL&MS⇒DEP 
  (0.038)  (0.22)  (0.023)  
MS BL 5.06 BL⇒MS 9.98 BL⇒MS 5.71 BL⇒MS 
  (0.08)  (0.007)  (0.058)  
MS DEP 5.15 DEP⇒MS 10.01 DEP⇒MS 3.51  
  (0.076)  (0.007)  (0.173)  
MS BL & DEP 6.44  11.11 BL&DEP⇒MS 11.61 BL&DEP⇒MS 
  (0.169)  (0.025)  (0.021)  
  US  US 1  US 2  
BL DEP 4.7 DEP⇒BL 2.16  3.23  
  (0.095)  (0.34)  (0.199)  
BL MS 0.21  13.22 MS⇒BL 7.85 MS⇒BL 
  (0.899)  (0.001)  (0.02)  
BL DEP & MS 8.13 DEP&MS⇒BL 15.34 DEP&MS⇒BL 9.2 DEP&MS⇒BL 
  (0.087)  (0.004)  (0.056)  
DEP BL 18.51 BL⇒DEP 0.17  13.39 BL⇒DEP 
  (0)  (0.92)  (0.001)  
DEP MS 12.13 MS⇒DEP 1.38  6.64 MS⇒DEP 
  (0.002)  (0.502)  (0.036)  
DEP BL & MS 24.79 BL&MS⇒DEP 1.4  26.62 BL&MS⇒DEP 
  (0)  (0.844)  (0)  
MS BL 8.59 BL⇒MS 0.02  27.53 BL⇒MS 
  (0.014)  (0.991)  (0)  
MS DEP 6.29 DEP⇒MS 0.54  4.76 DEP⇒MS 
  (0.043)  (0.763)  (0.093)  
MS BL & DEP 26.07 BL&DEP⇒MS 0.57  32.86 BL&DEP⇒MS 
  (0)  (0.966) 
 
(0)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are probability. DV and INDV are dependent and independent variables 
respectively. Number of lag lengths (k) and order of integration (d) is 1 and 1 respectively in all cases 
except Canada 1, Japan and Germany where k=2 and d=1 and Italy where k=5 and d=1. Canada 1 = 
(1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 1992:4), UK 2= (1993:1 - 2006:2), 
US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4), US. ⇒  indicates unidirectional causality. BL denotes bank loans, DEP is 
deposits and MS is money supply. 
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Appendix A5.3: Money Supply and Bank Stock Returns 
 
Panel A: Cointegrating equations 
Country Beta t-stat Trend t-stat Intercept 
Canada -1.803 [-9.196]***   17.708 
Canada 1 -0.324 [-1.095] -0.014 [-2.129]** -0.616 
Canada 2 -3.823 [-11.58]***   42.876 
France -4.944 [-4.873]***   28 
Germany -1.136 [-1.674]*   12.188 
Italy -0.71 [-3.862]***   2.585 
Japan -5.492 [-5.241]*** 0.031 [ 1.833]* 62.579 
UK 1.06 [ 1.410]   -30.196 
UK 1 1.111 [ 1.567] -0.066 [-2.646]*** -16.882 
UK 2 -2.192 [-5.448]***   19.897 
US -2.105 [-15.50]***   11.508 
US 2 -1.795 
[-5.2 
12]***   7.992 
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10  
percent levels respectively. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = 
(1975:3 - 1992:4), UK 2= (1993:1 - 2006:2), US2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). 
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Panel B: VECM (Short-run and long-run causality) 
    LR SRC   SR 
DV INDV ECT t-stat Conclusion DV  INDV 
2χ test Conclusion 
Canada         
RET MS -0.05 [-1.943]* MS ⇔ RET -0.173 -0.591 17.656*** MS⇒RET 
MS RET 0.008 [ 2.888]***    2.829   
Canada 1        
RET MS -0.485 [-4.435]*** MS⇒RET   2.297   
MS RET 0.014 [ 0.949]     0.034   
Canada 2        
RET MS -0.022 [-1.262]     0.12   
MS RET -0.012 [-8.365]*** RET⇒MS   0.469   
France         
RET MS -0.029 [-0.717]     0.383   
MS RET 0.012 [ 4.260]*** RET⇒MS   2.251   
Germany        
RET MS -0.009 [-6.173]*** MS ⇔ RET   1.951   
MS RET -0.015 [-1.643]*    0   
Italy         
RET MS -0.156 [-1.640]* MS ⇔ RET  -0.611 13.491** MS⇒RET 
MS RET 0.037 [ 3.057]***    3.847   
Japan         
RET MS -0.036 [-1.642]* MS ⇔ RET   0.249   
MS RET -0.002 [-1.762]*    3.752   
UK         
RET MS -0.006 [-1.951]* MS ⇔ RET   4.582   
MS RET -0.001 [-4.755]***    0.507   
UK 1         
RET MS -0.497 [-5.007]*** MS⇒RET   0.152   
MS RET 0.021 [ 1.616]    2.535 6.85*** RET⇒MS 
UK 2         
RET MS -0.062 [-2.510]** MS ⇔ RET   1.761   
MS RET -0.01 [-5.296]***    2.585   
US         
RET MS -0.052 [-1.642]* MS ⇔ RET   2.344   
MS RET 0.007 [ 3.150]***    0.881   
US 2         
RET MS -0.011 [-0.351]     2.272   
MS RET 0.007 [ 3.670]*** RET⇒MS   0.464   
Note: Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10  
percent levels respectively, DV and INDV are dependent and independent variables respectively, ECT 
denotes error-correction term; SRC is short-run coefficient; only significant lags are summed under 
SRC. LR = long run and SR = short run, ⇒  indicates unidirectional causality and ⇔  indicates 
bidirectional causality. Canada 1 = (1976:3 - 1990:4), Canada 2 = (1991:1 - 2007:1), UK 1 = (1975:3 - 
1992:4), UK 2= (1993:1 - 2006:2), US 2 = (1987:1 - 2007:1). MS is money supply and RET is bank 
returns. 
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Panel C: Granger causality 
Country DV INDV F-test Probability 
US 1 RET MS 1.573 (0.21) 
  MS RET 0.92 (0.338) 
Note: DV and INDV are dependent and independent variables respectively. US 1 = (1975:3 - 1986:4). 
MS is money supply and RET is bank returns. 
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Appendix B1: DataStream Data Sources 
 
 
 
 
Variable Name Code Source 
Canada 
DEP 
CN BANKING INSTS.: DEMAND DEPS, 
OTHER RESD. SECTS. IN CNTY. CURN CNQ24...A IFS (IMF) 
BL CN DOMESTIC CREDIT CURN CNQ32...A IFS (IMF) 
MS CN MONEY SUPPLY M3 CURA CNM3....B CANSIM - Statistics Canada 
INF CN CPI NADJ CNQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb CN TREASURY BILL RATE CNQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P CANADA-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSCN DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl CN LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) CNQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd CN DEPOSIT RATE CNQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y CN GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA CNOCFGDPD OECD MEIs 
France 
DEP DEMAND DEPOSITS 13224...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
BL DOMESTIC CREDIT 13232...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
MS 
FR MONEY SUPPLY - M3 (DEF. 1991) 
CURA FROMA013B OECD MEIs 
INF FR CPI NADJ FRQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb FR TREASURY BILL RATE FRQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P FRANCE-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSFR DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl FR LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) FRQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd FR DEPOSIT RATE FRQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y FR GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA FROCFGDPD... OECD MEIs 
Germany 
DEP DEMAND DEPOSITS OF OTH RESID 13424...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
BL DOMESTIC CREDIT 13432...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
MS 
BD MONEY SUPPLY - M3 
(CONTINUOUS SERIES) CURA BDM3C...B Deutsche Bundesbank 
INF BD CPI NADJ BDQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb BD TREASURY BILL RATE BDQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P GERMANY-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSBD DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl BD LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) BDQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd BD DEPOSIT RATE BDQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y BD GDP (REAL)(EO76)(DISC.) CONA BDO9FGDPD OECD MEIs 
Italy 
DEP DEMAND DEPOSITS 13624...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
BL DOMESTIC CREDIT 13632...ZF... IFS (IMF) 
MS M2(NATIONAL DEFINITION) 13659MB.ZF... IFS (IMF) 
INF IT CPI NADJ ITQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb IT TREASURY BILL RATE ITQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P ITALY-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSIT DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl IT LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) ITQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd IT DEPOSIT RATE ITQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y IT GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA ITOCFGDPD OECD MEIs 
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Variable Name Code Source 
Japan 
DEP 
JP BANKING INSTS.: DEMAND DEPS, 
OTHER RESD. SECTS. IN CNTY. CURN JPQ24...A IFS (IMF) 
BL JP DOMESTIC CREDIT CURN JPQ32...A IFS (IMF) 
MS 
JP MONEY SUPPLY: M3 PLUS CD (EP) 
CURN JPM3CDF.A Bank of Japan 
INF JP CPI NADJ JPQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb 
JP NIKKEI BOND INDEX YIELD - 
SHORT-TERM (EP) NADJ JPNKBNDSF 
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 
INC, JAPAN  
P JAPAN-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSJP DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl JP LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) JPQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd JP DEPOSIT RATE JPQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y JP GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA JPOCFGDPD OECD MEIs 
United Kingdom 
DEP 
UK DEMAND, TIME, SAVINGS & 
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS 
CURN UKQ25L..A IFS (IMF) 
BL UK DOMESTIC CREDIT CURN UKQ32...A IFS (IMF) 
MS 
UK MONEY SUPPLY M4 (END 
QUARTER LEVEL) CURA UKM4Q...B Bank of England 
INF UK CPI NADJ UKQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb UK TREASURY BILL RATE UKQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P UK-DS Banks - PRICE INDEX BANKSUK DataStream 
Rf US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl UK LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) UKQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd UK DEPOSIT RATE UKQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y UK GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA UKOCFGDPD OECD MEIs 
United States 
DEP 
US BANKING INSTS.: DEMAND DEPS, 
OTHER RESD. SECTS. IN CNTY. CURN USQ24...A IFS (IMF) 
BL US DOMESTIC CREDIT CURN USQ32...A IFS (IMF) 
MS US MONEY M2 CURA USQ59MBCB IFS (IMF) 
INF US CPI NADJ USQ64...F IFS (IMF) 
Rb US TREASURY BILL RATE USQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
P NASDAQ BANKS - PRICE INDEX NASBANK NASDAQ Stock Market 
Rf UK TREASURY BILL RATE UKQ60C.. IFS (IMF) 
Rl US LENDING RATE (PRIME RATE) USQ60P.. IFS (IMF) 
Rd U.S DEPOSIT RATE USQ60L.. IFS (IMF) 
Y US GDP (REAL) (AR) CONA USOCFGDPD OECD MEIs 
Note: IFS (IMF) is International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund), OECD EO is 
OECD Economic Outlook, and OECD MEI is OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
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